

A Threat to the Peace

*North Viet-Nam's Effort
To Conquer South Viet-Nam*

In Two Parts

PART I

PART II—A separate publication—
consists of the appendices
referred to in Part I

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
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“The determined and ruthless campaign of propaganda, infiltration, and subversion by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam and subjugate its peoples is a threat to the peace. The independence and territorial integrity of that free country is of major and serious concern not only to the people of Viet-Nam and their immediate neighbors but also to all other free nations.”

**Secretary of State Dean Rusk
at his news conference on
November 17, 1961**



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Introduction

On September 25, 1961, in an address to the United Nations, President Kennedy warned that body and the people of the world of the dangers of "the smoldering coals of war in south-east Asia." Nowhere do those coals glare more ominously than in South Viet-Nam. While attention is diverted elsewhere—to Berlin, to negotiations over Laos, to turmoil in the Congo, to the United Nations itself, as well as to dozens of other problems—the Communist program to seize South Viet-Nam moves ahead relentlessly.

It is a program that relies on every available technique for spreading disorder and confusion in a peaceful society. Today it may call for the murder of a village chief known to be unfriendly to the Communists; tomorrow it may produce an attack in battalion strength against an outpost of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam. No tactic, whether of brutal terror, armed action, or persuasion, is ignored. If mining a road will stop all transport, who cares that a school bus may be the first vehicle to pass? If halting rice shipments means that many people go hungry, perhaps they will blame it on the Government. If people object to paying taxes to both the Communists and to the Government in Saigon, they are urged to refuse the latter.

The basic pattern of Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist) activity is not new, of course. It operated, with minor variations, in China, and Mao Tse-tung's theories on the conduct of guerrilla warfare are known to every Viet Cong agent and cadre. Most of the same methods were used in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Cuba, and in Laos. If there is anything peculiar to the Viet-Nam situation, it is that the country is divided and one-half provides a safe sanctuary from which subversion in the other half is directed and supported with both personnel and materiel.

What follows is a study of Viet Cong activities in South Viet-Nam and of the elaborate organization in the North that supports those activities. The Communists have made the

most elaborate efforts to conceal their role and to prevent any discoveries that would point an accusing finger at them for causing what is happening. But their efforts have not been totally successful.

In such a large-scale operation there are always some failures. There are defections. There are human frailties and some misjudgment. In major military operations prisoners are taken and documents are seized. All these and more have occurred in Viet-Nam. Over the years the authorities in Saigon have accumulated a mass of material exposing the activities of the Viet Cong.

This report is based on an extensive study of much of that material. It relies on documentary and physical evidence and on the confessions of many captured Viet Cong personnel. Officials of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam gave unselfishly of their time and their expert advice in connection with this investigation. Countless individuals and agencies responsible for gathering and interpreting this kind of evidence contributed to the research that went into this report. Without their cooperation and help, it obviously would not have been possible.

The specific cases cited herein have been presented, as they occurred, to the International Control Commission in Saigon by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Most recently, that Government made an elaborate presentation to the I.C.C. on October 24, 1961, of the data available at that time of Communist-directed subversion in South Viet-Nam. The presentation was accompanied by a request that the I.C.C. investigate. The Government in Saigon generously made available this same information for the compilation of this report.

What emerges from this study is a detailed, but by no means exhaustive, picture of Viet Cong operations and of the program of the Communist government in Hanoi to win power over all Viet-Nam. The Government of the United States believes that picture should be presented to the world.

There can be no doubt that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is fighting for its life. Those who would help the people of South Viet-Nam to remain outside the Communist orbit must have a thorough appreciation of the nature of that fight and of the way it is being conducted by the authorities in Hanoi and their disciplined followers in the South.

PART I

I. *The Background*

Even as they were negotiating the Geneva Accords that ended the Indochina war in 1954, the Communists were making plans to take over all of Viet-Nam. Trained and well-disciplined party members were picked to remain in the South to promote Hanoi's cause. Arms and ammunition were cached in hundreds of carefully selected spots throughout South Viet-Nam. During the months after the Geneva Agreement went into effect, most of the military units loyal to Ho Chi Minh were transferred to North Viet-Nam; but some of the best-trained guerilla units moved to remote and inaccessible regions in the South, particularly to mountainous areas along the Cambodian and Lao borders and to jungle regions in the southern delta. Individual agents and many members of Communist cells were told to stay in place, to lead normal lives, and to wait until they received orders to carry out party assignments.

It was the Communists' calculation that nationwide elections scheduled in the Accords for 1956 would turn all of Viet-Nam over to them. With total control over the more populous North in their hands, the Communists assumed they would be able to promote enough support in the South for their cause to win in any balloting. The primary focus of the Communists' activity during the post-Geneva period was on political action—promoting discontent with the Government in Saigon and seeking to win supporters for Hanoi.

The authorities in South Viet-Nam refused to fall into this well-laid trap. They were convinced that under the circumstances there could be no such thing as a completely free and democratic expression of opinion in the North. There was no satisfactory provision for effective general and impartial supervision of the proposed balloting. There was no assurance that the people would have a chance to hear any free discussion of the issues at stake. Moreover, the Government in the South

had never signed the Geneva Accords and was not bound by their provisions.

It refused to take part in a procedure that threatened its country with absorption into the Communist bloc. The refusal came as a sharp disappointment to Hanoi, whose political program for 2 years had been aimed at precisely that goal. The failure of 1956 was a severe blow to the morale of the Viet Cong organization in the South. Defections were numerous. Some broke away because of disillusion with the Hanoi regime, others because they realized there was hope for a non-Communist orientation for their country, still others because they opposed a new resort to force after the long years of fighting.

The period 1956-58 was one of rebuilding and reorganization for the Viet Cong. Defectors were replaced with new party officials trained in the North. Military units were given stronger support in both manpower and equipment. Recruitment was pushed. More and more, the Viet Cong units turned to the use of force and of terror. One purpose clearly was to win prestige and to give strong backing to their requests for support and aid from the people, the kind of support that political and propaganda appeals had failed to elicit. Another purpose was to embarrass the Government in Saigon and to raise doubts about its ability to rule effectively and to maintain internal order.

After 1958 the use of terror by the Viet Cong increased sharply. The control organizations in the North expanded and their techniques were refined. Political cadres and military replacements were sent South in increasing numbers. Infiltration systems—by sea and by land—were expanded. Local recruitment, through both terror and propaganda, became a priority assignment for all units. Communications between North and South were modernized. The effort to win adherents or at least collaborators inside the South Vietnamese Government and armed forces assumed massive proportions. Some specialists believe that, given the size of the country and the resources available, the effort by the Hanoi government to penetrate, subvert, and conquer South Viet-Nam is one of the most extensive of its kind in history.

II. *The Setting (South Viet-Nam)*

When the Republic of Viet-Nam was born in 1955, its economy was a shambles. Years of foreign occupation, wartime bombing, bitter fighting with the French, and internal battles with dissident elements had left confusion in their wake. Roads had been neglected and many bridges destroyed. Thousands of farmers had killed off their livestock and abandoned their paddy fields to seek the comparative security of urban areas.

Canals and irrigation systems were damaged and neglected. Disruption of the transport system had reduced sharply the flow of goods from suppliers to markets. The modest industrial plant was in disrepair. The departure of the French entailed a loss in managerial and technical skills. To complicate further an already serious internal situation, more than 900,000 North Vietnamese decided to move to the South immediately after settlement of the Indochina war in order to escape from Communist rule.

With this as a backdrop, there were few observers, not excluding the Vietnamese themselves, who thought the new Republic could survive. The problems seemed too immense, the available resources too meager. In most foreign ministries, and in Saigon itself, the estimates of the longevity of South Viet-Nam's independence ranged from 6 months to a year.

These calculations reckoned without the skill, the intelligence, and the pride of the Vietnamese. Their ingenuity and their determination to remain their own masters were somehow ignored by the pessimistic observers. The people and the new Government responded to the challenge far more energetically and effectively than even optimists dared predict.

Extensive aid from friendly powers, particularly the United States, was an important element in South Viet-Nam's surprising recovery from chaos. The fact remains, however, that all the assistance in the world could not have proved decisive had it not gone to a people who were exceedingly able and fiercely determined to survive in freedom.

The years 1956 to 1960 produced something close to an economic miracle in South Viet-Nam. Food production rose an

average of 7 percent a year and prewar levels were achieved and passed. While per capita food production in the North was 10 percent lower in 1960 than it had been in 1956, it was 20 percent higher in the South. The output of textiles in the South jumped in only 1 year from 68 million meters (in 1958) to 83 million meters. Sugar production in the same 1-year span increased more than 100 percent, from 25,000 metric tons to 58,000 metric tons.

Despite the vastly larger industrial plant inherited by the North when Viet-Nam was partitioned, gross national product is considerably larger in the South. In 1960 it was estimated at \$110 per person in the South and \$70 in the North. Foreigners who have visited both North and South testify to the higher living standards and the much greater availability of consumer goods in the latter.

The record of South Viet-Nam in these recent years is written in services and in improved welfare as well as in colder economic indices. A massive resettlement program effectively integrated the 900,000 refugees from the North into the economic and social fabric of the South. An agrarian reform program was designed to give 300,000 tenant farmers a chance to buy the land they work for a modest price. Under the Government's agricultural credit program aimed at freeing the farmers from the hands of usurers, loans to peasant families increased fivefold between 1957 and 1959.

Thousands of new schoolrooms were built and the elementary school population in South Viet-Nam increased from 400,000 in 1956 to 1,500,000 in 1960. A rural health program installed simple dispensaries in half of South Viet-Nam's 6,000 villages and hamlets. An elaborate malaria eradication program was launched to rid Viet-Nam of its most important infectious disease. Doctors and nurses went into training in South Viet-Nam and abroad to serve their people's health needs.

This is a part, a very small part, of the setting against which the Viet Cong launched their campaign of armed action, subversion, and terror against South Viet-Nam. It is a record of progress over a few brief years equalled by few young countries. It is a background against which to measure claims that what is happening in South Viet-Nam today is a purely internal rebel-

lion born of frustration and dissatisfaction and odious comparison with "progress" in the North.

The people in South Viet-Nam know better; so do the Viet Cong. The economic and social advances scored by the South Vietnamese up to last year made it clear that Hanoi's program for peaceful takeover had little or no chance of success. If they were to win, the Communists had to resort to force. It is significant that most of the indicators of progress—hospitals and aid stations, malaria eradication teams, schools, the transport system—became favorite targets for Viet Cong attack. It was a campaign clearly designed to harass and embarrass a Government, not to serve the needs and desires of a people.

Under peaceful conditions the indicators had been unmistakable. South Viet-Nam was outstripping the North in the same fashion that West Germany had exceeded the achievements of the "socialist" east. The leaders in Hanoi apparently could not accept that prospect. They decided on a course of violence, the pace of which is accelerating steadily.

III. *The Pattern of Viet Cong Activity in the South*

A. THE MILITARY PATTERN

The pattern varies from village to village, from district to district, depending on the extent of Viet Cong control. But the variations are minor. In general, the organizational framework of the Viet Cong military units is quite standardized throughout South Viet-Nam.

There are three kinds of Viet Cong soldier. One is based on the village. He receives no pay. Generally he works at his job—usually as a farmer or fisherman or laborer—during the day. At night or in emergencies he is available for assignment by his superiors. The Viet Cong like to have at least 5 and preferably 10 guerrillas of this type in each village. In villages largely controlled by the Viet Cong, a full squad (10 to 16

men) is usual. A village squad is likely to have a few land mines at its disposal and two or three rifles or submachineguns. Knives, machetes, spears, or other weapons are more common than modern firearms.

Halftime, irregular forces are organized by the Viet Cong at the district level. There are generally several companies of 50 or more men in each district. These troops receive half pay and so must work at least part time to eke out a living. They are both better equipped and better trained than the village guards.

It would be a mistake to assume that the Vietnamese villagers are searching out Viet Cong agents in order to enlist as local guards or irregular soldiers. Undoubtedly there are some volunteers. But the record shows that many young Vietnamese are dragooned into service with the VC. Some are kidnapped; others are threatened; still others join to prevent their families from being harmed.

Last summer, an American radio correspondent (CBS) interviewed a young Vietnamese who had been captured in an action against the Viet Cong in Kien Phong Province. The "volunteer," Pham Van Dau, was only 17 years old. The reporter asked him why he had joined the Communists. He replied: "Because they took my father away for 10 days and tried to force him to join their organization. But my father refused. Then they took me and forced me to cooperate. They threatened to kill my father if I refused. That is why I joined them."

Similar statements have been made by hundreds of young men who either deserted the VC ranks or surrendered to the Republic of Viet-Nam forces.

The hard core of the Viet Cong (VC) military organization is the full-time regular unit usually based on a province or region. These are well-trained and highly disciplined guerrilla fighters. Soldiering is their job and they do it effectively. They follow a rigid training schedule that is roughly two-thirds military and one-third political in content. This compares with the 50-50 proportion for district units and the 70 percent political and 30 percent military content of the village guerrilla's training.

Some of the regular VC forces have been introduced from the North in units. Moreover, the leaders of regular VC units are almost exclusively men trained in North Viet-Nam although many are natives of the South.

Money to pay the regular VC units comes from a variety of sources. "Taxes" are extorted from the local population. Landowners and plantation operators often must pay a tribute to the VC as the price for not having their lands devastated. Similarly, transportation companies have been forced to pay the VC or face the threat of having their buses or boats sabotaged. Officials and wealthy people have been kidnapped for ransom by the VC. The VC have often stopped buses, taken the money and valuables of all on board, given them a lecture on the "glories of communism," and turned them loose.

For the most part the VC have concentrated their attention on individuals and isolated or poorly defended outposts. They have killed hundreds of village chiefs and other local officials. In the past year, however, and particularly in the last few months, the VC have moved into larger unit operations. Several attacks have been carried out in battalion strength or more against fairly large units of the South Vietnamese Army.

Among the favored targets of the VC have been police stations, self-defense corps units, civil guard outposts, and small units of the South Viet-Nam Army. By hitting such targets suddenly and in superior force, the VC are able to assure themselves a supply of arms and ammunition. This reduces their dependence on the long supply line from the North. The weapons of the VC are largely French- or U.S.-made, or handmade on primitive forges in the jungles.

The Communists have avoided any large-scale introduction of Soviet-bloc arms into South Viet-Nam, for this would be too clear evidence of their direct involvement. However, as the armed forces of the so-called Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam have been reequipped with new weapons from the Sino-Soviet bloc, their old weapons have helped supply the Viet Cong in the South.

The size of the Viet Cong regular units has grown steadily in recent years. Once estimated at approximately 3,000 men, the strength of the full-time Viet Cong elite fighting force is

now believed to be at least 8,000 or 9,000 organized in some 30 battalions. An additional 8,000 or more troops operate under the leadership of regular Viet Cong officers at the provincial or district level. These figures do not include many thousands of village guards, political cadres, special agents, bearers, and the like. The pace of infiltration of officers and men has jumped markedly since Pathet Lao victories in Laos have assured a relatively safe corridor through that country into western South Viet-Nam.

There are good reasons to think that Laos now provides not only a route into South Viet-Nam but also a safe haven from which Viet Cong units operate. Laos-based units of the Viet Cong are believed to have played an important role in large-scale attacks by the VC in the highlands north of Kontum and near Ban Me Thuot this summer and fall and perhaps in assaults in the northern Provinces of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai.

In addition to providing a channel for troops and agents, the infiltration routes from North Viet-Nam into the South are used to transfer supplies and equipment. Much of the food needed by the VC is acquired locally through "taxation" or outright seizure. Armed attacks provide many of the weapons and much of the ammunition. But shipments from the North supplement these sources. There is also regular traffic across the mountain trails and by seagoing junks which supplies the VC with material for clothing and uniforms, medical supplies, communications equipment, tools, generators, and all the many things required by a fighting force in the field.

B. THE POLITICAL PATTERN

The content and methods of Viet Cong political activity leave no doubt as to its Communist orientation. In a transparent effort to give their movement a cloak of respectability and of popular support, the so-called "Front for Liberation of the South" was formed late last year. Within the front are separate "liberation" organizations—for youth, for the peas-

ants, for workers, for intellectuals, for women, indeed for every significant segment of society in South Viet-Nam.

However, seized documents, propaganda pamphlets, and indoctrination leaflets picked up throughout South Viet-Nam make clear that the Lao Dong (Workers) Party, that is, the Communist Party, is the vanguard of the "liberation" movement. As those familiar with the Communist movement know, this means that the "liberation" movement is directed by the Communist Party. The Lao Dong Party of the South is part of and controlled by Ho Chi Minh's Lao Dong Party in the North.

The Viet Cong organization in the South follows the familiar Communist pattern. The basic unit is the cell of a few persons in a village or neighborhood. Village units are subordinate to the district headquarters and these in turn are controlled by the provincial party headquarters. Above the latter are the regional or zonal headquarters which take their directions from Hanoi.

The pattern of political indoctrination is what one would expect—concentration on studies of "socialism," meaning communism; praise for and identification with the program and progress of the Ho regime in the North; promises of support for the "liberation" movement by the "socialist camp"; criticism of the "imperialists," "warmongers," and "colonialists" and their "puppets."

Through their propaganda the Viet Cong seek to appeal to every group in the South with promises of special attention—"autonomy" for minority tribal groups, land and freedom from usury for the peasants, education for the youth, "freedom" for the intellectuals, and so forth.

In addition to the party organization itself, close ties are maintained with the military units through a system of political officers assigned to all units down to the platoon. Party members often serve as part-time guerrillas. They provide additional eyes and ears for the military units, supplying reports on GVN military establishments and troop movements. They may be assigned to collect money or to gather food for the Viet Cong.

C. THE USE OF TERROR

While professing sympathy for the needs and hopes of the people, the Viet Cong has resorted to the most brutal forms of force and coercion in carrying out its program. It has sought by every available means to frustrate the efforts of the authorities in South Viet-Nam to provide the people with social services. It has made no secret of its determination to destroy if possible the legally elected Government in South Viet-Nam and to place that country and its people under the control of Hanoi. It promises improvements but does what it can to prevent those very improvements if they are carried out by the non-Communist authorities.

Assassination, often after the most brutal torture, is a favored Viet Cong tactic. Government officials, schoolteachers, even wives and children have been the victims. Literally hundreds of village chiefs have been murdered in order to assert Viet Cong power and to instill fear in the populace. The list of atrocities is long. A catalog of these activities has been assembled in annual installments by the Saigon authorities.¹ They make gruesome reading, even for a generation that is jaded with accounts of man's inhumanity.

A particularly brutal example was reported from Vinh Binh Province the first week in November. The chief of the Cau Ke district, Le Van Nghia, was killed when his car hit a Viet Cong mine. Killed with the district chief were his wife and two other persons. The official's two children, aged one and three, miraculously survived the blast, but they were killed on the spot by the Viet Cong who had prepared the ambush.

Kidnapping is another criminal technique commonly used by the Viet Cong. Often the victims are never heard from again. Sometimes they are returned after sufficient ransom has been paid. At times this method is used to get recruits when efforts at persuasion fail.

Recently, in a gesture of utter contempt for the International Control Commission (I.C.C.) which is charged with overseeing enforcement of the Geneva Accords in Viet-Nam, the Viet Cong

¹ See "Violations of the Geneva Agreements by the Viet-Minh Communists," published by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and dated July 1959, July 1960, and May 1961.

kidnapped Col. Hoang Thuy Nam, chief of the South Viet-Nam liaison mission with the I.C.C. He was seized by a group of armed men at his farm less than 10 miles from Saigon. Appeals for his release went unheeded. The I.C.C. refused to raise its voice in protest. Ten days later his body was found floating in the Saigon River. It bore the marks of awful torture inflicted before his death. It was a ghastly crime that shocked Viet-Nam and civilized people everywhere.

Any official, worker, or establishment that represents a service to the people by the Government in Saigon is fair game for the Viet Cong. Schools have been among their favorite targets. Through harassment, the murder of teachers, and sabotage of buildings the Viet Cong succeeded in closing more than 200 primary schools in South Viet-Nam in 1960, interrupting the education of more than 25,000 students. The number is reported to have risen to almost 400 in recent months.

Hospitals and medical clinics have often been attacked as part of the anti-Government campaign and also because such attacks provide the Viet Cong with needed medical supplies. The Communists have encouraged people in rural areas to oppose the work of the Government's antimalaria teams, and some of the workers have been killed. Village and town offices, police stations, and agricultural research stations are high on the list of preferred targets for the Viet Cong.

In short, anything that spells order or security for the people of the South is anathema to the Viet Cong (VC) unless it be VC "order" or VC "security," anything that represents service or public welfare becomes a target, and a man who serves his Government and his people is likely to have his name inscribed on the Viet Cong's "wanted" list.

In 1960 the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam claimed that about 1,400 local Government officials and civilians were assassinated by the Viet Cong. Approximately 700 persons were kidnapped during the year. In the first 6 months of 1961 more than 500 murders of officials and civilians were reported and about 1,000 persons were kidnapped. The number of acts of terrorism carried out by the Viet Cong in recent months exceeds last year's levels according to authorities in Saigon.

IV. *Direction of the Viet Cong by North Viet-Nam*

The Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam have made no secret of their full support for the subversive movement in the South. The Third Lao Dong Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960 set forth two tasks for its members: "to carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam" and "to liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country."

The party congress agreed that strengthening communism in the North would "benefit the revolutionary movement for the liberation of the South." The party faithful were told that "in the South we must endeavor to rally all national and democratic forces, expand and consolidate the national unity bloc, isolate the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, and speed up the struggle to strengthen peace and reunify our fatherland."

The congress resolutions dealing with developments in the South were proprietary in tone. The effort to destroy the legal Government was described as follows: "The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary power of the masses."

The Lao Dong Party did not advise or recommend but rather told its followers, North and South, what they *must* do. "We must pay special attention to . . ."; "We must unceasingly expose . . ."; "We must strive . . ."—that is the language of the party's resolutions regarding action in the South.

At the September meeting the Communist leaders in the North called for formation of "a broad national united front directed against the U.S.-Dien clique." Three months later Hanoi announced creation of the "Front for Liberation of the

South." This is the organization that Communist propaganda now credits with guiding the forces of subversion in the South; it is pictured as an organization established and run by the people in the South themselves. At the Lao Dong Party Congress last year the tone was different. Then, even before the front existed, the Communist leaders were issuing orders for the group that was being organized behind the scenes in Hanoi. "This front must rally . . ."; "The aims of its struggle are . . ."; "The front must carry out . . ."—this is the way Hanoi and the Communist Party addressed the so-called "liberation front" even before its founding.

Clearly the Liberation Front is Hanoi's creation; it is neither independent nor southern, and it hardly seeks what most men would consider liberation. The only accurate word in the title of the organization is "front." That it is!

When directly charged with responsibility for guiding and supporting the armed rebellion in the South, the Communist leaders in Hanoi call the allegations slanderous, unfounded, and provocative. At other times they are more frank in discussing their attitude toward the struggle in the South.

In his address to the Lao Dong Congress, party and government leader Ho Chi Minh spoke of the necessity "to step up the socialist revolution in the North and, at the same time, to step up the national democratic people's revolution in the South."

The year before, writing for *Red Flag*, the Communist Party newspaper of Belgium, Ho had said much the same thing:

"We are building socialism in Viet-Nam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution."

In the same vein, the commander in chief of the North Vietnamese armed forces, Vo Nguyen Giap, spoke at the Lao Dong Congress of the need to "step up the national democratic people's revolution in the South." Earlier last year, writing for the Communist Party journal *Hoc Tap* in Hanoi, General Giap described the North as "the revolutionary base for the whole country."

Le Duan, a member of the Politburo and First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party, was even more explicit when he talked

at the Party Congress in Hanoi about the struggle in the South and the party's role.

After noting the difficulties involved in overthrowing the existing order in South Viet-Nam, Le Duan said :

"Hence the southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal—and based on the building, consolidation and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the South—especially the workers, peasants, and the intellectuals—and must uphold the revolutionary fighting spirit of all strata of patriotic compatriots."

Later in the same speech, he said :

"In order to assure the complete victory of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam, the South Viet-Nam people, under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Party and the working class, should endeavor to build a worker-peasant-army coalition bloc, and set up a broad national united front against the U.S.-Dien clique on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance."

Another high official of the Hanoi regime, Truong Chinh, writing in the party organ *Hoc Tap* in April this year, said that the party congress had called for "stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam." He wrote that the responsibilities of the "socialist revolution" in the North and of the "democratic revolution" in the South were "closely related and interdependent." He, too, referred to North Viet-Nam as "the revolutionary base common to the entire country." He expressed confidence in the success of the struggle to remove the legal Government in South Viet-Nam because: "socialist North Viet-Nam is being rapidly consolidated and strengthened, is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as a strong base for the struggle for national reunification."

He outlined the steps by which the Communists expect to achieve control over all Viet-Nam as follows: The "Liberation

Front" would succeed in destroying the present Government in the South; a "National Democratic Coalition Government" would be established; this government would agree with the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi regarding national reunification "under one form or another." It takes little imagination to understand the form that is intended.

"Thus," wrote Truong Chinh, "though South Viet-Nam will be liberated by non-peaceful means, the Party policy of achieving peaceful national reunification is still correct."

(Excerpts from resolutions of the Lao Dong Party's Third Congress and from speeches and articles by Ho Chi Minh and others cited above are included in Part II, appendix A.)

The official government radio in Hanoi is used both overtly and covertly to support the Viet Cong effort in South Viet-Nam. It disseminates a heavy schedule of propaganda, of course, praising the regime in the North, hailing the real and imagined successes of other Communist states, and attacking the Government in the South and all who are friendly to that Government. Recorded messages from individuals directed to loved ones and family members in the South are broadcast regularly. Their clear purpose is to influence morale adversely and weaken the will to resist. Captured agents have testified that the broadcasts are used sometimes to send instructions in veiled code to Viet Cong representatives in the South.

The clandestine radio of the "liberation" movement is but a pale imitation of Radio Hanoi. Most of its air time is devoted to rebroadcasts of programs transmitted first from the capital of North Viet-Nam. However, the Liberation Front radio occasionally originates broadcasts that are of interest in pointing up the front's activities and its relation to the North.

Viet Cong propaganda leaflets usually carry the hammer-and-sickle symbol of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party. Liberation Front pamphlets refer frequently to the leading role of the Communist Party. (The matter of Viet Cong and Liberation Front propaganda is dealt with in detail in section VI-F (see page 43).

V. The Viet Cong Organization in North and South Viet-Nam

The Viet Cong operation in South Viet-Nam has the backing of an elaborate organizational structure in North Viet-Nam. The Ho Chi Minh regime has shown that it is ready to allocate every resource that can be spared—whether it be personnel, funds, or equipment—to the cause of overthrowing the legitimate Government in South Viet-Nam.

A. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Political guidance of the Viet Cong (VC) and, through VC cadres, of the “liberation” movement in the South is supplied by the Lao Dong Party, i.e. the Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh. Party agents are responsible for indoctrination, recruitment, political training, propaganda, anti-Government demonstrations, and other activities of a political nature. The considerable intelligence-gathering facilities of the party are also at the disposal of the VC movement.

Overall direction of the Viet Cong movement is the responsibility of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party. Within the Central Committee’s organization a special “Committee for Supervision of the South” has been established. Three leading members of this special group based in Hanoi are: Le Duc Tho, member of the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party; Pham Hung, a Vice Premier of the North Viet-Nam government and also a Politburo member; and Brig. Gen. Nguyen Van Vinh, alternate member of the Lao Dong Party’s Central Committee and chairman of the Board for National Reunification.

For administrative purposes the Viet Cong divide South Viet-Nam into two major zones: the Interzone of South-Central Viet-Nam (sometimes called Interzone 5) and the Nambo region. The former includes the highlands and coastal regions of Central Viet-Nam south of the 17th parallel; the Nambo

region is made up of the southern and southwestern provinces including the Mekong delta area.

Each of the two major zones has its own VC executive committee which operates under the Committee for Supervision of the South in Hanoi. Each zonal committee is directed by a secretary general and a deputy and has 10 or more members, each with specific responsibilities. Under the zone committees are a number of specialized agencies responsible for such things as liaison, propaganda and training, personnel, subversive activities, military bases, espionage, military affairs, and the like.

Each of the two major zones is divided by the Viet Cong into four interprovincial administrative regions. These regions include from three to nine provinces. Each interprovince has its own executive committee and an administrative organization patterned on that of the zone. Beneath the interprovince the Viet Cong structure is based on the administrative organization of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Party units are maintained at the province, district, village, and hamlet level. The elaborateness of the party unit and the extent to which it operates openly or underground is determined in part by the extent of Viet Cong control over the area concerned.

B. MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Military affairs of the Viet Cong are the responsibility of the Armed Forces high command in North Viet-Nam under close supervision from the party. These responsibilities include selection of key targets, operational plans, assignments of regular units, training programs, military communications, tactical intelligence, supplies, and the like.

The subordination of the Viet Cong military effort to the political leadership of Communist cadres is clear. General Vinh is the junior member of the Committee for Supervision of the South in Hanoi. Brig. Gen. Nguyen Don, in charge of military affairs in the South-Central Interzone, is responsible to Tran Luong, a member of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee and secretary general of the interzone executive

group. The same is true in Nambo, where military affairs chief Nguyen Huu Xuyen is the subordinate of political boss Muoi Cuc.

C. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

A key element in the Viet Cong effort is an elaborate organization in Hanoi called the Central Research Agency (C.R.A.) (Cuc Nghien-Cuu Trung-Uong). Though it handles Hanoi's intelligence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus of its operation is on South Viet-Nam. The Research Agency is able to draw on the intelligence capabilities of both the Lao Dong Party and the Armed Forces for information, personnel, and facilities.

The C.R.A. reportedly operates under the close personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh himself. Some of the top officials in the Hanoi government reportedly sit on its directing committee, including Premier Pham Van Dong, Deputy Premier Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap.

Considerable information on the organization of the C.R.A. has become available from captured Viet Cong agents and from the work of intelligence agents of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Much of this information cannot be made public for security reasons. But it is possible to describe the C.R.A. organization and its operations in broad outline.

The headquarters of the C.R.A. in Hanoi is divided into six main sections, not including a special code unit. The six sections are responsible for administration, cadres, communications, espionage, research, and training. Each section has units to handle the specialized activities of its particular area of responsibility. The research section, for example, has subsections that handle political, economic, and military affairs respectively.

Also operating under the direct supervision of C.R.A. headquarters are a number of special centers for overseas operations. One such center is responsible for maintaining intelligence

channels to overseas areas. It operates through special units at Haiphong and at Hongay which have contact with Hong Kong, Paris, and other overseas points.

A second special center is based in Vinh and is responsible for VC intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. A third center handles activities along the "demarcation line," the border with South Viet-Nam. The unit is based in Vinh-Linh in southeast North Viet-Nam. This center is responsible for sending agents and supplies to the South by sea, across the demilitarized zone, and along the mountain trails through Laos. The C.R.A. maintains intelligence bases in Laos and other neighboring countries.

Inside South Viet-Nam the Viet Cong are known to have a large intelligence network. Some of its units are responsible for receiving and sending on agents arriving from the North. They feed and give instructions to groups infiltrating into South Viet-Nam. They take delivery of equipment and supplies received from the North and relay them to Viet Cong units in the South.

Some C.R.A. units specialize in infiltration by sea routes. Others are responsible for controlling overland routes across the demilitarized zone and through Laos.

Many Viet Cong agents have been captured in the City of Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by the C.R.A. to penetrate all Republic of Viet-Nam Government agencies, foreign embassies, and other specialized organizations.

Party and military intelligence units and agents work closely with the C.R.A. Often the functions are combined when, for example, a high ranking military officer with long party experience controls a region. He may, in such a case, represent the party, the C.R.A., and the military high command in Hanoi.

This is believed to be the case in at least three important instances. General Hoang Dao, a well-known officer in the North Viet-Nam Army, is believed to be in command of Viet Cong operations along the Viet-Nam-Cambodian border. Colonel Le Cau is both the intelligence chief and the senior commander in the western highlands region. Another colonel,

Van Trong, directs military and intelligence operations in the northern sector just below the demilitarized zone.

Each of the main centers operating directly under C.R.A. headquarters has its own sections and units designed to carry out its main functions. The center at Vinh Linh, responsible for the main infiltration effort of the Viet Cong, has separate sections for radio communications, coding, documentation and training, and liaison. It also has specialized units for infiltration through the mountains, infiltration by sea, and "illegal action" in the mountain area.

The C.R.A. maintains a large and expanding radio communications network. Agents also are used to carry messages, usually in secret writing or memorized.

Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelligence operation in support of the Viet Cong is one of the most extensive of its kind in the world.

(Charts of the VC organizational structure are included in appendix B.)

VI. *Evidence of External Guidance and Support of the Viet Cong*

A. BACKGROUND

The authorities in North Viet-Nam—the central government, the army, the Central Research Agency, the Lao Dong Party—have gone to elaborate lengths to conceal their direct participation in the program to conquer and absorb South Viet-Nam. In part, these efforts are designed to help preserve the fiction that the armed uprising in the South is an internal matter. In part, too, the effort appears a concession to that amorphous factor called “world public opinion.” In addition, the Communist leaders in Hanoi probably would like to be able to adopt a posture of outrage, should the methods being practiced by them in the South ever be turned against them in the North.

To help conceal the identity of its agents going into the South, a special section of the Central Research Agency in Hanoi is kept busy producing false identification papers, forged boat registration certificates, draft cards, and other documents. Military personnel are supposed to turn in all identification papers before they move across the South Viet-Nam border. Weapons of Soviet-bloc origin are generally shunned and Viet Cong troops entering the South usually are supplied with French weapons dating from the Indochina war or U.S. equipment captured in Laos or in attacks on military units in South Viet-Nam.

However, no effort at concealment carried out on such a huge scale can ever be completely successful. Viet Cong (VC) agents have been captured or have defected. VC officers and soldiers have surrendered or been taken prisoner. South Vietnamese agents have uncovered much valuable information on the Viet Cong operation. Other sources have provided additional details.

Data from these varied sources provide a fairly detailed picture of what the Viet Cong is doing and of how it is directed and supported by the regime in Hanoi.

Over the years, the Government of South Viet-Nam has tried to bring details of this picture of subversion and covert aggression to the attention of the world. Primarily, it has done so by presenting evidence, as it was acquired, to the International Control Commission. Almost 200 letters detailing more than 1,200 incidents—everything from acts of sabotage or cases of assassination to large-scale military actions by the Viet Cong—are in the International Control Commission (I.C.C.) files. Thus far that body has not investigated any cases of subversion, just as it has not uttered a word of protest over the kidnapping and murder of Colonel Nam.

The reasons for this inaction are obvious. The Polish member of the I.C.C. will not favor any investigation that might embarrass the Viet Cong. The Indian chairman of the Commission has taken the view that any actions by the group should be supported by both the Polish and the Canadian members. This approach has prevented the I.C.C. from enforcing effective control over any violation of the Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam, whether it be subversion in the South or the illegal introduction of Soviet-bloc military goods into the North.

For the past 3 years the Government in Saigon has published annual reports on Viet Cong actions and atrocities in order to focus attention on the deepening tragedy of a people who want to be left alone but who have become the target of Hanoi's plan for conquest. These accounts of accumulating horrors in the Viet-Nam countryside do not make pleasant reading. But they throw some much-needed light on the "convert or destroy" methods of the Viet Cong.

B. INFILTRATION OF AGENTS

One of the ways in which the Viet Cong and the authorities in Hanoi violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Viet-Nam is the introduction of espionage agents into the South. An earlier section noted the existence of a special unit of the Viet Cong intelligence organization that has the

specific task of training and dispatching its agents to work in South Viet-Nam. Sometimes these agents travel by fishing junks operated by the Special 603d Maritime Unit in Dong Hoi or by other infiltration groups. Others travel south along one of the many secret infiltration trails through the demilitarized zone, or through Laos. They may stay in the South for only a day or two—long enough to deliver and/or pick up messages—or they may go on extended assignments.

1. The An Don Case

ON THE EVENING OF JUNE 5, 1961, a patrol craft of the Tourane Naval District cruised along the shore of An Don, a waterfront area in Tourane on the northeast coast of South Viet-Nam. Its mission: to check on any suspicious persons or vessels. As the patrol approached a junk, one of the inspectors saw a familiar face. The inspector knew the young man's mother and knew that he had been missing for some time. Under questioning, the young man, Truong Van Hao, confessed. He and his four companions were taken into custody.

It was an important arrest. Interrogation of the prisoners disclosed the following.

Nguyen Chuc, alias Nguyen Thi, 34, was the leader of the group. A lieutenant in the North Vietnamese Army, he had fought with the Viet Cong against the French. After Geneva, in 1955, he went north though his native village and his family were in the South. Between June 1959 and June 1961 he had made 17 trips to South Viet-Nam on espionage missions. He was a member of the Viet Cong maritime liaison group in Dong Hoi, a port on the east coast just north of the 17th parallel. His assignments included transporting agents from North to South and South to North and carrying messages and secret material from and to espionage units in the South.

Chuc and the others all carried false identification papers, including draft cards, fisherman's licenses, and election cards. The registration papers for their boat also were forgeries as were the logbooks. Found aboard the Viet Cong junk were a miniature camera of German manufacture; a Japanese-made transistor radio; 8,260 piasters (about \$112) in South Viet-

namese money; 20 sheets of blank paper presumed to carry invisible writing; a book on taxation policy and economic development in Viet-Nam published by the Government in Saigon but not available to the public at the time of seizure; a copy of the latest Cong Dan yearbook (1960-61) published in Saigon which contained the names, addresses, and other data on all leading South Vietnamese officials.

Arrested with Chuc was Huynh Tinh, alias Le Nghe, 38, a warrant officer in the North Viet-Nam armed forces. A native of Quang Nam province in the South, he had gone North in 1955 with his Viet Cong unit, the 17th Battalion of the 93d Regiment. His experience with fishing boats as a youth led to his transfer in June 1960 to the maritime liaison unit.

Nguyen Dong, 58, was the third member of the group. A maker of fish nets and a fisherman from his youth, he had gone North in 1957. He said he had believed the Viet Cong propaganda that said that "life in the North was very happy" and "earning a living was easy." He said he participated in only five trips to the South.

Lam Dua, alias Le Lam, 32, and Truong Van Hao, 29, were the other crew members. The former came from Quang Nam province and the latter from Tourane. Both entered the Viet Cong movement through Communist youth group activities.

(Pictures and interrogation records of the five men are included in appendix C.)

The An Don case is but one of many instances of infiltration of agents and couriers from North Viet-Nam into the South. On June 15 the South Vietnamese intercepted seven junks coming from the North with 36 persons aboard. The latter carried forged papers. On June 17 six boats with 29 persons aboard were picked up by a patrol unit off Thuan An.

2. The Do Dinh Hai Case

Do DINH HAI, 41, is a native of North Viet-Nam. An aircraft mechanic, he served with the French Air Force. During the last year of World War II and later he worked for the Viet Minh. In 1951 he went to work for a French airline and

3 years later he was recruited by the Viet Cong. When the French airline moved its operations from Hanoi to Saigon in February 1955, Hai moved to the South.

He reported on all air force activities, first of the French and later of the South Viet-Nam Air Force and its American advisers. Also, he helped service the I.C.C. courier planes which traveled between Saigon and Hanoi. Hai said the planes were used by the Viet Cong (VC) as a carrier for messages and it was his task to remove them from their hiding place on the plane and deliver them to a Viet Cong agent once a week.

In April 1958 Hai's espionage ring learned it had been exposed. He was told to drive his superior, a man he knew as Hong, to the central highlands. Hai identified Hong as Le Cau, the North Vietnamese colonel who now directs VC espionage and military operations in the highlands. From the area between Kontum and Pleiku, Le Cau, Hai, and several others made the long trek over mountain trails to the North. Two months later they arrived in the Vinh Linh special zone just north of the 17th parallel. They went immediately to Hanoi.

In August, Hai was ordered South again. He traveled by junk from Dong Hoi to Tourane, took a bus to Na Trang, and from there went by train to Saigon. He was arrested on August 28, 1958, by South Vietnamese security officers. Though still under surveillance, he works now as a mechanic in Saigon and has relative freedom. His story is available to any authorized official.

There are hundreds of such cases. Many have been brought to the attention of the I.C.C. and the Commission has declined to investigate.

C. INFILTRATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

If the traffic in espionage agents into the South has been a serious problem, the infiltration across South Viet-Nam's borders by VC military forces, officers and men, sometimes in organized units, has assumed ominous proportions. Sometimes they travel by junk from the North. More often they have

moved into South Viet-Nam along secret trails that cross the western portion of the demilitarized zone, a mountainous region of heavy forests. Now, with much of Laos in Communist hands, infiltration trails through that country have been used increasingly by the Viet Cong.

1. The Calu Case

ON MARCH 29, 1961, a unit of the Vietnamese Army located and destroyed a Viet Cong base at Calu, near Thuong Trung in the northern Province of Quang Tri. The Calu post was a way station on an infiltration route from the North. It was a place where entering Viet Cong personnel could stop for food and rest before moving farther south. Calu was Station No. 8 on the trail. Station No. 2 was on the North-South border at Bo Ho Su; presumably Station No. 1 was the jumpoff point just north of the border. Another identified post on the trail was No. 25 at Ba Ngai in southern Quang Tri.

Thirteen Viet Cong personnel were killed in the fight at Calu. A number of documents, maps, and some medical supplies were captured as well as rice and other food stocks. Most of the documents were Communist indoctrination and study pamphlets of a kind that can be found at any VC position. But several captured documents were of particular significance.

One notebook found at Calu contained a careful daily record of rice and other foods received and consumed at the post. A second notebook contained a daily record of meals served with full notations of the number of Viet Cong who passed through the post on their way into South Viet-Nam. Analysis of the records shows that 1,840 Viet Cong entered the South along the Calu trail during the period from October 1960 to March 1961.

(Photocopies of sample pages from the two Calu notebooks plus a brief analysis are in appendix D.)

2. The Tra Bong Case

IN OCTOBER 1960 a company of Viet Cong troops attacked the district town of Tra Bong in Quang Ngai Province. In the savage fighting that developed, 34 Viet Cong were killed. The attackers succeeded in carrying off the bodies of two of their men, one of them believed to be that of Nguyen Cong Phuong,

an official of the VC Interzone Committee for northern South Viet-Nam.

Apparently document control for this group of VC had been lax. Though they had no identification papers, seven of the dead had carried in their pockets pictures of themselves in the uniform of the Army of North Viet-Nam. Obviously they were regular soldiers in the North and had been assigned to fight for the Communist cause in the South.

(Pictures of the VC in North Viet-Nam Army uniforms are in appendix E.)

3. The Dakrotah Case

A VIET CONG FORCE of about 1,000 men launched a series of attacks in late October 1960 against military outposts of the South Viet-Nam Army in northern Kontum Province near the Laos border. One VC unit, Company 3 of Battalion 20, concentrated on the outpost at Dak Dru. The unit was made up largely of highland tribesmen who had been trained in the North, but most of the officers were Vietnamese. After several waves of attacks against the outpost failed, the VC unit pulled back and withdrew across the Lao border.

Captured in the action near the village of Dakrotah while on reconnaissance were four VC soldiers, all members of highland tribes. One of them, Y Lon, told interrogators that he and other members of his group went North with their Viet Cong military unit (120th Regiment) in 1954. He said that about 6,000 or 7,000 tribesmen from the highlands of South Viet-Nam had been regrouped with him.

In June 1959, Y Lon and 29 other Viet Cong soldiers crossed into South Viet-Nam. They were used not only in military actions but also were assigned to spread Communist propaganda among the hill tribes in the South.

(Pictures of the Viet Cong soldiers captured at Dakrotah together with excerpts from Y Lon's interrogation record will be found in appendix F.)

4. The Le Hoa Case

LE HOA IS A VIET CONG CORPORAL. He was born in 1931 in the village of Duc Lan in Quang Ngai Province. During the

Indochina war he was a member of the village defense corps. He later was recruited by the Viet Cong as a member of the district guard in Mo Duc. When the war ended, he went to North Viet-Nam with his unit. In June 1956 the Mo Duc unit was disbanded and Le Hoa was assigned to the 803d Regiment of the North Viet-Nam Army.

In June 1961, Le Hoa and eight members of his company were ordered to report to regimental headquarters. There they were told they had been picked for special training and would join the "liberation" forces in the South. After 1 month of training, the group boarded trucks at their training camp located at Vinh and began their journey to South Viet-Nam.

By truck and on foot they moved southward until they reached the Ben Hai River which divides North and South Viet-Nam. They crossed the river on July 22 according to Corporal Hoa's account. He reported passing through Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Ngai Provinces.

The corporal told his interrogators that he decided on October 8 to desert the Viet Cong. He was captured on October 12 by two members of the self-defense corps in Binh Dinh Province.

South Viet-Nam authorities are skeptical of parts of Le Hoa's story. They believe he gave false details of the route his unit took into the South in order to protect his comrades who might follow. They doubt, too, that he decided to defect. Rather they think he became separated from his unit during an action, wandered aimlessly through the jungle for days, and then, weak from exhaustion and lack of food, lost any desire to resist capture. But that he was a Viet Cong soldier and that he came from North Viet-Nam as he claimed, there can be no doubt.

(Excerpts from Le Hoa's interrogation are in appendix G.)

5. The Diary of Nguyen Dinh Kieu

IN AN ACTION NEAR DAKAKOI ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1961, armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam killed a number of Viet Cong. Among the dead was VC Captain Nguyen Dinh Kieu. A diary was found in his pocket. The first entry was dated May 30, 1961; the final one, September 15.

The first section of Captain Kieu's diary contains organizational charts and other data on the VC company he commanded. The second section (37 pages) contains the captain's notes on his journey from North Viet-Nam to the South, on travel conditions, troop morale, political indoctrination, and other subjects.

The Kieu diary contains four separate organizational charts of the company, apparently reflecting periodic revisions caused by losses through combat, illness, and defections, and by the addition of new men. There are individual notations on the men in the company listing their ages, dates of entry into the army, party membership, and other details. The total strength of Kieu's unit ranged from 56 to 69 men, though at one point in his diary he noted that he had only 37 "effectives."

Captain Kieu and his Viet Cong company began their journey to the South on June 15, 1961. At midnight on that date they crossed the Ngan San River at Huong Khe in North Viet-Nam. They rested for 2 days at Thanh Lang. The entry for June 21 makes it clear that Kieu and his group were in Laos by that date.

"We rest at Thapachon, Kham Muon (the Laotian province of Khammouane)," he wrote. "It has taken us 2½ days to arrive here by foot. This friendly country is really beautiful and rich. Why are its people poor?"

By June 29, Captain Kieu and his men had reached the major Pathet Lao and Viet Cong base at Tchepone, where Soviet planes have been flying in supplies from Hanoi for several months. The company rested there for several days. On July 18 they crossed the border into South Viet-Nam.

"From this day on, I am in the Fatherland again," wrote Captain Kieu.

During the next 2 months Captain Kieu and his company operated in the Provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Kontum. They took part in the fighting around Konbrai early in September. A few days later Kieu noted the receipt of new weapons for his company—15 submachineguns, 4 machineguns, 6 automatic rifles. On September 15, the date of the final entry, the company was preparing defensive positions and planning propaganda activities among the people north of Konbrai. Eleven days later Captain Kieu was killed in action.

(Photocopies of sample pages from the Kieu diary and excerpts from the document are in appendix H.)

D. INTRODUCTION OF SUPPLIES FROM THE NORTH

Through its clandestine channels into the South, the Viet Cong (VC) have sent not only espionage agents and military personnel but large quantities of military equipment and other supplies. As we have seen, the Viet Cong have been able to fill much of their logistical support requirement within their assigned regions—through military action, collection of “taxes,” ransom collections, outright robbery, rice seizures, and other illegal means. But the demand, particularly in view of heightened activity and the sharp increase in size of the Viet Cong establishment, has outpaced the local sources of supply.

Most of the things required by a military force in a combat zone have been sent at various times from the North to the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam. These include everything from TNT to tobacco. And since the VC operation is not only a military venture but one with a high political content, weapons for waging the propaganda war as well have been sent to the South. Among the latter are party pamphlets and newspapers, books, paper supplies, printing presses, and the like.

Some examples demonstrating the flow of supplies to the Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam follow.

1. The Calu Case (#2)

IN THE ATTACK ON THE CALU STATION of the secret trail network (described on page 28), Vietnamese Government forces also captured the notebook of a Viet Cong official, probably the commander of the Calu post. The document discusses many details related to infiltration activities. Included are records of weapons sent in over the secret trail for distribution to VC units in Quang Tri Province, in VC Zone 5, and in other areas.

The notations are in a simple code which Vietnamese intelligence analysts had little trouble interpreting because they had seen it before. The notebook listed the following war materiel as entering for distribution to Zone 5:

115 light machineguns and 75,054 rounds of ammunition
78 submachineguns and 26,758 rounds of ammunition
2,342 rifles and 488,388 rounds of ammunition

421 grenades
138 packages and 11 cases of explosives
287 cases of mines
382 cases of bombs
148 boxes of gunpowder

The following were sent in for use in Quang Tri:

40 light machineguns
80 submachineguns
12 pistols
308 rifles and 73,204 rounds of ammunition
24 grenade launchers
115 grenades

Supplies listed in the notebook for distribution to other areas:

35 light machineguns and 3,664 rounds of ammunition
243 submachineguns and 88,314 rounds of ammunition
702 rifles and 209,274 rounds of ammunition
502 kilograms of explosives
201 cases of mines
75 cases of bombs
9 boxes of gunpowder

South Vietnamese authorities estimate this quantity of military hardware could supply at least 30 regular companies of infantry. They are convinced that some of this equipment was used by the Viet Cong in their attack on Vietnamese Army outposts near Dakrotah in late 1960 and against Government units in the Kontum region early in September this year.

There is a small but interesting sidelight to the Calu officer's notebook. On one of the back pages there is an entry in the Russian language. It is the name and address in Moscow of a Vietnamese, presumably a friend of the notebook's owner.

(Photocopies of several pages from the VC officer's notebook are in appendix I.)

2. The Ly Son Case

ON JANUARY 31, 1960, a large junk with six men aboard landed at the island of Ly Son off the coast of Quang Ngai Province in South Viet-Nam. When questioned by the local

authorities, the men said they had come from the North to seek freedom in South Viet-Nam. The local security officials were inclined to believe the claims of the six, but there were enough discrepancies in their tales to create some doubts. The six men were transferred to provincial control and finally, in April, to Saigon.

That same month a high-ranking agent of the Viet Cong was captured in Long Khanh Province. His confession disclosed the real nature of the voyage of the six men who had come South in January. Confronted with this information, each of the six admitted that he had engaged in a special mission for the regime in the North. The six separate accounts of their journey tallied so closely with each other, even in small details, as to remove doubts about the real purpose of their trip to the South.

All six of the captured men were veterans of the Viet Cong movement; all had fought against the French and then had gone North after the Geneva agreements ended the Indochina war. Each was a member of the Lao Dong, or Communist, Party. And all six had been assigned the previous year to duty with the special maritime liaison group (Doan 603) which was responsible for using the sealanes to maintain contact with the Viet Cong in the South.

Nguyen Bat, alias Duong, a first lieutenant in the Viet Cong armed forces, was the leader of the six-man group. More than that, he was the commander of the sea transport company of the 603d Battalion, one of the two main elements in the liaison unit.

In October 1959 the 603d acquired two junks of about 5 tons each built in the North to resemble South Vietnamese junks as closely as possible. For the next 2 months Bat and his companions sailed their junk to become familiar with its handling, studied navigation and compass reading, and otherwise prepared for their mission. In December they received their orders: Deliver supplies to a Viet Cong liaison group located in Quang Nam Province. They were given forged identification papers, told how to act if captured, and given secret signals by which they could identify the correct landing site and the group that was to receive their cargo.

Bat listed the cargo his group took to the South as follows: 12 bolts of nylon cloth, 5 packages of white paper (large sheets), 3 bolts of black cloth, 20 cases of medicine, 2 tin boxes of rice seeds, 2 rolls of electric wire, a case of light bulbs, a case of batteries, 1 electric motor, a mimeograph machine, 1 case of printer's ink, 15 packages of documents, and 4 bundles of warm clothing (overcoats, sweaters, et cetera). He estimated the weight of the cargo at 2 tons.

Each member of the crew received clothing, a supply of food, some tobacco, and 1,000 piasters (about \$13.60) in South Vietnamese currency. The group was supplied with weapons in case they encountered any small boats that might cause trouble or expose them. The weapons included 6 submachineguns and 24 clips of ammunition, 18 grenades, and 6 knives.

Early on the morning of December 9, 1959, Bat and his crew went aboard to make their journey to the South. The others were Tran Muc, 34, deputy boat commander; Nguyen Nua, 38, who was the navigator or guide; Nguyen Xanh, 42; Nguyen Nu, 31; and Huynh Lac, 31—all crewmen. Bad weather forced them back to their base on the Gianh River. They tried again on December 14 with the same result.

On December 29 they set off for the third time and again the weather turned against them. Wind ripped the mainsail and they had to put into Ron. After a dispute with the local police because of their forged papers, they were finally permitted to return to their unit for repairs to the boat, and, apparently, a dressing-down from their superiors for their three failures.

On January 27 they sailed down the Gianh River and out to sea for the final time. They ran into several bad storms and had to take down the sails and drift. The weather eased during the night, but they ran into another and more severe storm the next morning. The rudder was broken and they spent hours trying to repair it. The patched rudder lasted only half an hour in the sea and then it broke again. They drifted southward all the next day.

On January 30 they tried once more to repair the damaged rudder but with little success. In the early morning hours of January 31 they saw a light. At first they thought it was a

patrol boat. Then they decided it must be Ly Son Island off the Quang Ngai coast.

What to do? They knew that, if they were caught with all their supplies, their mission would be exposed and they would spend years in prison. If they continued to drift out to sea, they would all probably die, for their water supply was almost exhausted. They decided to follow their orders: If in danger of immediate exposure, throw your cargo overboard and claim to be defectors from the North!

Over went the weapons and the cases of medicine. Some of the supplies floated and had to be retrieved and weighted down before they would sink. It was not easy to throw all that money into the sea. They tried at first to find a safe hiding place for it. They decided, however, that if it were found it would give them away, so it followed the weapons and the cargo to the bottom.

They drifted in to Ly Son and were picked up immediately by the local police. To save themselves, they claimed to be fleeing from the oppression of the Viet Cong. In fact, only the accident of bad weather prevented them from carrying out an important mission for the Viet Cong.

(Pictures of the six VC captured at Ly Son and excerpts from their detailed confessions are contained in appendix J.)

3. Northern Maps of the South

ONE ITEM PRODUCED IN HANOI that is virtually standard equipment for Viet Cong fighting units in the South is a map. For the most part, these North Vietnamese maps of the South are a 1956 issue based on information collected up to 1954. They are on a 1/100,000 scale. Some of the symbols and even some of the place names are different from those used on South Vietnamese maps.

Maps printed in the North have been picked up in many military actions in the South. A map of Quang Nam, for example, was found after the battle of Phuoc Son in September 1960. A map of Quang Tri was found at the secret trail post of Calu mentioned earlier. These maps are carried into South

Viet-Nam by Viet Cong cadres infiltrating from the North or are sent in along with other equipment by supply missions such as that described in the Ly Son case above.

4. Medical Equipment From North Viet-Nam and the Communist Bloc

In THE LY SON CASE, see page 33, captured Viet Cong agents described the medical supplies they brought from the North as being of Western origin. But the requirements of a military force as large as that of the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam cannot always be met with Western supplies, because of both cost and limited sources. Attacks on clinics, hospitals, and pharmacies help the Viet Cong meet their own demands, but not entirely.

As a result the VC organization in the North has found it necessary occasionally to send to its units in the South medical supplies that originate in Hanoi or the Communist bloc. This has been true particularly of the more unusual kinds of medical equipment and supplies.

In attacks on Viet Cong units and camp sites, the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam has occasionally discovered medical supplies produced in the Sino-Soviet bloc which could only have been brought in from outside South Viet-Nam. Fighting in northern South Viet-Nam in August this year produced such supplies. In a series of clashes about 25 miles west of the provincial town of Darlac, a special Vietnamese combat team caught a Viet Cong medical unit by surprise and captured much of its equipment.

Included were stocks of medicines from Hungary, Bulgaria, and Communist China. There were rubber gloves, syringes, and a stethoscope from China and a large collection of medical instruments from a variety of countries. Three large medical charts were marked "Printed in Peking."

An attack by Government of Viet-Nam forces on a Viet Cong base near Ban Me Thuot early in October (see the Mai Xuan Phong case on page 41) resulted in the capture of medical supplies from North Viet-Nam. Included were vials of novocain,

atropine, and other drugs produced by the Xi Nghiep Duoc Pham (state-owned factory for pharmaceutical products) in North Viet-Nam.

No one seriously contends that the Viet Cong are getting all their supplies, equipment, food, and weapons from outside South Viet-Nam. We know, in fact, that they are able to get much of what they need from the areas in which their military units operate. Most of the methods used to get their supplies involve force, fear, or fabrication, but they are nonetheless effective.

However, we also know that the large and growing forces of the Viet Cong are not able to meet all their needs in this manner. There is too much evidence—in the testimony of their own personnel and in the nature of captured supplies—that demonstrates their reliance on supply lines from the North.

This flow of supplies from the North into South Viet-Nam—like the infiltration of agents and the introduction of military personnel—is a clear violation of the Geneva Accords, of course. Still, it goes on, day in and day out, and the pace is increasing as the size of the Viet Cong establishment grows.

(Pictures of Soviet-bloc medical supplies captured in South Viet-Nam are in appendix K.)

E. LAOS AS A BASE AND A ROUTE FOR THE VIET CONG

It takes a rather special lens to be able to look at heightened Communist, that is, Pathet Lao, control over southeastern Laos and at sharply increased Communist, that is, Viet Cong, activity just across the border in South Viet-Nam, and to see nothing more than “coincidence.” It is a lens that permits its wearer to fail to see what he chooses not to see.

In fact, of course, the two developments are intimately linked. The Viet Cong long have used infiltration routes through Laos and along the Viet-Nam-Laos border to send personnel from North Viet-Nam into the South. Now, with their friends of the Pathet Lao in control of an increasing number of villages and roads in eastern Laos, the Viet Cong

are able to move units of considerable size across the border without fear of exposure or opposition.

1. North Vietnamese Forces in Laos

THE GOVERNMENT IN HANOI has angrily denied charges that some of its military units were engaged in the fighting in Laos. It has claimed these were provocative allegations without foundation in fact. Intelligence reports and the testimony of prisoners captured in Laos tell a different story.

Since last December, North Viet-Nam has been the base from which the extensive Soviet airlift of supplies to the Pathet Lao has operated. North Vietnamese technicians have been instructing the Pathet Lao in guerrilla warfare and in the use of artillery. But beyond this, troops of the regular Army of North Viet-Nam have been stationed in Laos for training purposes and to conduct combat missions.

Nguyen Van Nham, a lieutenant in the North Vietnamese Army was captured during the battle of Van Mieng in Laos. He identified himself as an officer of the 335th Division of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Vi Van Sang, who handled an 81 mm. mortar, was captured in the battle of Pha Tang. He said he belonged to the 925th Battalion of the North Viet-Nam Army. Ne Tong, a private, second class, was picked up in the fighting at Nong Het. He told interrogators he was a soldier of the 120th Regiment of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam Army.

(Photographs and statements of these three North Vietnamese soldiers captured in Laos are attached in appendix L.)

Do Luc, whose case is reported on page 40, wrote in his diary of fighting in Laos with his unit before he was assigned to join the Viet Cong military effort in South Viet-Nam.

These pieces of evidence merely reinforce reports gathered from many sources that there were, indeed, North Vietnamese soldiers in Laos. The principal units involved were the 335th Division; its component regiments—the 83d, 280th, and 673d; the 120th Independent Regiment; and the 359th Frontier Guard Regiment.

2. The Movement of North Vietnamese Troops From Laos Into South Viet-Nam

THE PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE UNITS IN LAOS is disturbing to the Government of South Viet-Nam on two counts. *First*, it means that much of northeastern and southeastern Laos is under control of the Communists. *Second*, and even more upsetting, is the knowledge that regular units of the North Viet-Nam Army are in a position to move readily into South Viet-Nam to fight with the Viet Cong whenever the high command in Hanoi decides they are needed.

The fact is that for some time, particularly since the cease-fire went into effect in Laos in May, Viet Cong fighters have moved with increasing frequency into South Viet-Nam through the Lao corridor.

In a fight with the Viet Cong in the central highlands, near the village of Daktrum on September 3, 1961, South Vietnamese forces killed a VC soldier. In his pocket was found a small, homemade diary. In it he had jotted down remembrances, personal experiences, notes to his wife or sweetheart, and comments on things as varied as the weather and the Communist Party.

The diary is headed "Do Luc," presumably the VC soldier's name or alias. It bears the notation H-602, presumably a personal or unit code designation.

Some of the notations are significant. Do Luc recalled his days fighting with the Viet Cong against the French and his decision in April 1955 to leave his family and friends behind and move to the North. In December 1960 he was ordered to go with his unit to Laos to help "destroy the reactionary gang of Phoumi-Boun Oum (General Phoumi Nosavan and Prime Minister Boun Oum)."

When the fighting slowed in Laos, he was sent to South Viet-Nam to join the Viet Cong effort. He noted crossing the Laos-Viet-Nam border on May 4, 1961, and in June he wrote of his feelings at being back once again in Quang Nam Province, VC Interzone 5, which he had left 6 years before.

(Reproduction of several pages of the Do Luc diary, together with the translation of key passages, is in appendix M.)

Do Luc was but one of many Viet Cong soldiers who moved into South Viet-Nam through Laos. Some of the forces that carried out the attack in the Dakrotah area (see page 29) were believed to have entered Viet-Nam through Laos and after the action to have withdrawn across the Laos-Viet-Nam border.

On September 18, 1961, in Saigon national police arrested a man named Vo Van Tan, alias Vo Hoa Mi, during a routine check of identification documents. A member of the Viet Cong, Tan had moved to the North at the end of the Indochina war. In April of this year, he said, he was assigned to a special 250-man battalion, Independent Battalion No. 2, to fight in South Viet-Nam. After 6 weeks of training designed to familiarize them with U.S. weapons and guerrilla tactics, Tan and his unit left Hoa Binh Province in North Viet-Nam on June 20. They marched south along the Laos-Viet-Nam border and through the Lao Province of Khammouane.

They entered South Viet-Nam across the border of Quang Nam Province. Then they moved south through the Provinces of Kontum and Darlac to the area west of Ban Me Thuot.

Tan told his interrogators that he decided to defect after his battalion suffered heavy losses in a fight on August 26. He stole 95,000 piasters (about \$1,292) from the battalion finance section and made his way to Saigon. He was arrested during a document check at the An Dong bus station.

(A picture of Vo Van Tan and a summary of his confession are in appendix N.)

On October 3, 1961, near the town of Ban Me Thuot, an Army unit of the Republic of Viet-Nam attacked a Viet Cong camp. In their haste the VC left behind some medical supplies and documents. Among the latter was a small notebook kept by a man named Mai Xuan Phong, a medical corpsman or doctor of the Viet Cong.

The notebook bore the seal "Tong Cong Ty Bach Hoa" (literally, General Company for a Hundred Things), a state-owned enterprise in North Viet-Nam. In the back pages were entered the words of a popular Vietnamese song. In the front Mai Xuan Phong had recorded at irregular intervals his activities between April and September.

He noted, for example, his departure on a "new mission" on April 20, 1961. Two days later he recorded his departure from North Viet-Nam into Laos. He passed through and rested at Muong Phine, southwest of Tchepone. On June 1 he was at the border of Laos and South Viet-Nam and wrote that he had then been away from his native South for 6 years.

On June 10, Mai Xuan Phong arrived at the border of Kontum Province. One month later he wrote that his group had entered Cambodia. By August 7, Phong was in Darlac in the southwest highlands of Viet-Nam, and 2 days later he was assigned to a small armed unit of two squads composed of highland tribesmen with two Vietnamese cadres.

In September, Phong joined a new Viet Cong unit. He reported that it carried out a large-scale attack on the land development center of Quang Nhieu, near Ban Me Thuot, on September 21. He wrote that many documents and military supplies were seized in the attack and that his group had gathered together 400 local citizens to propagandize and win support for the policy of the Front for Liberation of the South.

(Copies of pages from the Mai Xuan Phong diary and a translation of the document are in appendix O.)

The increased use of the Lao corridor by the Viet Cong is responsible for much of the heightened pace of VC activity in the central highlands region and in the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam. As noted earlier, there have been at least five major attacks by VC forces of from 500 to 1,000 men in those areas in recent months. South Vietnamese patrols operating along the Viet-Nam-Laos border have had several engagements with VC units moving toward the highlands from Laos.

It should be noted, too, that Soviet transport planes flying from North Viet-Nam have been airlifting supplies into Tchepone, only 20 miles from the Viet-Nam border in east-central Laos, since spring. Military equipment has been landed at the Tchepone airport and has been dropped by parachute as well. The Tchepone region is believed to be a major base of operations for the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao. The airport there was improved in mid-September and the frequency of flights by Soviet transports has increased since then.

F. THE GOAL OF THE "LIBERATION" MOVEMENT: COMMUNIST CONTROL OVER ALL VIET-NAM

We saw in an earlier section (see IV above) that the Communist leaders in North Viet-Nam have made a poorly kept secret of their support for and control over the so-called "liberation" movement in the South. In recent years thousands of documents—propaganda pamphlets, party directives, study papers, action plans, and the like—reflecting this control have been picked up by the authorities in the South. These documents demonstrate a number of important facets of the Viet Cong movement and its "cover" organization, the Liberation Front. They expose both the short-run tactics of the movement as well as its long-range goals. The central objective is clear and unmistakable: to overthrow the legal Government in South Viet-Nam and to absorb that country and its people into the Communist orbit.

A look at a sampling of Viet Cong documentary material is instructive for anyone who would understand what their methods and goals are.

1. Communist Party Cadres in the South

ON MAY 18, 1961, the Liberation Front radio broadcast acknowledged the leadership of the Lao Dong Party, that is, of the Communist Party. After discussing the decisions of the Lao Dong Party Congress of October 1960, the "Voice" of the Liberation Front said:

"In general, the above-mentioned decision of the Third Congress of the Lao Dong Party concerning the revolution to be carried out in South Viet-Nam has been correctly executed by the delegate of the party for South Viet-Nam and the different echelons of the party"

The same broadcast added:

"In order to meet the exigencies of the revolution and to meet the new situation which the revolution faces, all of us—cadres and members of the front as well as those who love their fatherland and the revolution in South Viet-Nam—must

strictly execute the basic and immediate mission determined by the party. . . .”

The fact that Lao Dong (Communist) Party agents are at work in the Viet Cong program of conquest in South Viet-Nam is well known. Many of them have been arrested and have confessed regarding their activities. Clear documentary evidence of one such case was uncovered by a Republic of Viet-Nam military unit late in October.

In an attack on a Viet Cong base north of Saigon on October 26, Vietnamese troops overran a small medical unit and seized quantities of documents. Among them were the medical and party records of a man named Huynh Van Cuong. He was a party activist, aged 36, with the rank of captain.

The medical record sheet shows clearly the direct involvement of the regime in Hanoi with the Viet Cong. It is headed “DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM,” with the subheading “Independence-Liberty-Happiness.” The report sheet was from “The Military Medical Office, Medical Section 108.” The record showed that Captain Cuong was suffering from a lung ailment.

Party documents attached to the medical record were equally informative. One was a certificate of introduction from his parent party body, Chapter 11, E 400 of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam. It noted Cuong’s membership in good standing (his dues were paid through March 1961!) and asked that he be permitted to carry out special party activities in his new area of assignment. It was addressed to the party’s Organizing Committee, F 351.

A second document was a certificate of announcement, signifying receipt of the introduction certificate. This, too, was addressed to F 351 to be completed by the party officials of that body. Apparently Cuong was too ill to submit the latter form to the proper authorities, for it was not receipted by the Viet Cong officials in his new post.

(Photocopies of Huynh Van Cuong’s medical and party records are in appendix P, item 1.)

2. Party Leadership of Front Organizations

AS NOTED EARLIER, the Liberation Front is composed of separate “liberation” groups for various categories of citizens—

for peasants, youth, women, workers, and so forth. Behind the scenes, control over these groups is held by the Lao Dong Party.

A document, titled "A Draft Program of Action and Rules of Procedure for the Association of Peasants for Liberation" was picked up by South Vietnamese security agents in Dinh Tuong Province. It illustrates the point:

(On p. 2)—"The Association of Peasants for Liberation, together with all the other classes and revolutionary forces belonging to the Popular Front for Liberation of South Viet-Nam, will contribute to strengthening the links of solidarity among the working classes under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam. . . ."

The security service captured a "Research Document on the Organization of Peasants Association" in Bien Hoa Province on February 8, 1961. It says, in part:

(On p. 4)—"Our final victory will depend on our policy in rural areas. The Front's policy should be in deep harmony with the laboring class and should be placed under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam. . . ."

(On p. 6)—"Under what leadership should the Peasants Association be placed?

"The Peasants Association accepts the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam because: imperialism and feudalism, concretely represented by the U.S.-Dien clique, are the peasants' enemies and have always exploited and oppressed the peasants; on the other hand, the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam has always led the fight against imperialists and feudalists, and for the liberation of the people. . . ."

Similarly, the military units of the "liberation" movement accept the leadership of the Communist Party. A letter from the commanding officer of Company 265 of the Viet Cong, addressed to officers and men of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam stationed in Truc Giang in Kien Hoa Province, in April 1960 said:

"The policy of the revolution and the responsibility of the entire population in the fight against colonialism and feudalism, under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam,

is to annihilate imperialism and feudalism, to give land to the tillers, and to lay the foundation for the building of socialism and communism. . . .”

(Copies of the above documents are in appendix P, item 2.)

3. Calls for More Aggressive Action

SECURITY AGENTS IN BIEN HOA PROVINCE found a VC directive dated January 23, 1961, with the title “Instructions on the Creation of People’s Self-Defense Units.” It was signed “Thin, for 12,” with “12” apparently a headquarters unit designation. It said:

(On p. 1)—“Our present and future responsibility is to create armed self-defense units. The creation of armed self-defense units is based on the following four points:

“1) take the offensive in order to eliminate the enemy and protect the movement.

“2) our activity among the people is [through] the Front; propagandize in order to rally the people; organize basic revolutionary cells in order to build political forces among the people.

“3) try to achieve self-sufficiency.

“4) create a reserve force. . . .”

Police in Saigon picked up in early 1961 a Viet Cong pamphlet titled “Instructions Regarding Activities in Cities.” It said:

(On p. 1)—“The responsibility and main goals that our Party has in view are to develop activities in the countryside, to increase activity in the cities, to reoccupy our former resistance bases, to extend our security zones, to limit the field of action and control of the enemy.”

(Copies of the above documents are attached in appendix P, item 3.)

4. The Policy of Forcible Seizure of Power

AT THE END OF 1960 a GVN unit attacked and seized a Viet Cong district headquarters in Dinh Tuong Province. One of the casualties was a VC district commissioner named Nguyen Van Van. He had in his possession a notebook in which he had

recorded the outline of a VC training course. Among other things, he noted the following:

"Our purposes: To incite the people to rise against the U.S.-Diem clique in order to achieve the objective of the revolutionary liberation of the South. The enemy is now implementing a dreadful policy to oppress the people (for example, decree no. 10/59, agrovilles, etc.). The people should stand up and fight against them, using all means, legal and illegal, political and military. . . .

"Whether we should resort to the use of arms or not depends on the actual situation at the moment. This should not occur too early or too late, and it is only up to the Central Committee to determine when the time is appropriate and reach a decision.

"The revolution in the South at the present time has two possibilities:

"—general uprising to seize power.

"—a long-term armed struggle.

"But our final objective is a general uprising to seize power."

(Excerpts from the VC commissioner's notebook are in appendix P, item 4.)

5. Party Policy Toward the Front

In an attack on a forest hideout of a Viet Cong district chief at Thai Hoa (Phuoc Thanh Province), Government security forces captured instructions to party members "Concerning the Organization of Committees in the Popular Front." It was dated March 28, 1961, and was addressed to the VC in the Thu-Bien (Thu Dau Mot and Bien Hoa) area.

The document urged party members to begin immediately to organize Liberation Front committees in villages and towns. It noted that there should be at least two party members working openly on these committees but that the number should be governed by the extent of Viet Cong control over the village. The document also said: "To secure a broad base of representation within the Front, the number of Party members on committees of the Popular Front should not exceed two-fifths of the total membership."

(A copy of the Thu-Bien "Instructions" is included in appendix P, item 5.)

6. Deceptive Appeal for Broad Support of the "Liberation" Movement Is a Temporary Policy of the Communist Party

Republic of Viet-Nam armed forces, while carrying out an operation in Tay Ninh Province on February 15, 1961, captured a copy of instructions from the Viet Cong Regional Committee of the South. It was addressed to interprovincial committees.

In these instructions the regional leadership emphasized that the policy of appealing for support from all strata and groups for the "liberation" movement was a temporary tactic. It noted that many people in these groups—intellectuals, young people, bourgeois elements, wealthy peasants, et cetera—were unreliable.

The document states:

"In the present situation of South Viet-Nam, the Central Committee of the Party supports integration of these elements into the Front, not because the Party is betraying the policy of class struggle and of the revolution, not because the Party is going to entrust these classes with heavy responsibilities in the revolutionary liberation of South Viet-Nam, but only to utilize their abilities and their prestige in order to push forward the revolution and to give more prestige to the People's Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam.

"This line of conduct is only a temporary policy of the Party. When the revolution is crowned with success, this policy will be revised. Then the Party will act overtly to lead the revolution in South Viet-Nam."

(A photocopy of the original document and excerpt are included in appendix P, item 6.)

7. Policy of Violence by the Viet Cong

IN AN ATTACK ON A VIET CONG ESTABLISHMENT in Long An Province on August 15, 1961, a Republic of Viet-Nam Army unit seized a document containing instructions to the VC provincial committee from the Inter-Province Committee of the Central Region.

The document analyzed certain shortcomings in VC activities and urged that they be corrected. It also issued specific instructions as follows:

1. Special caution should be used in handling members of the civil guard who defected to the Viet Cong. "They might be spies." Such persons should be subjected to thorough investigation for a period of 3 months.

"After this period," the instructions added, "if the case remains suspicious, immediately liquidate the suspect to avoid further trouble for the revolution."

2. "Step up extermination activities against traitors. All those refusing to have rice collected, to pay taxes or make money contributions to the Front can be considered as reactionaries and punished like other traitors."

3. "Step up activities [aimed at] encircling and paralyzing strategic roads, means of communication used for transporting rice, pigs, and charcoal, such as canals and most particularly inter-provincial road no. 4. These activities are aimed at ruining the economy of the enemy, of raising the cost of living in the city of Saigon."

The document noted that the VC in Long An and Dinh Tuong had sunk during the month of June five boats carrying charcoal and eight carrying rice and confiscated three truck-loads of pigs. These actions were cited as "deserving our praise."

(A photocopy of the captured document is in appendix P, item 7.)

VII. *The Present Danger*

The Communist program to take over South Viet-Nam has moved into a new and more dangerous phase. Political and propaganda activity has been stepped up. More important, the Viet Cong have advanced from relatively small actions and hit-and-run tactics, common to the early phase of a guerrilla-type operation, to the employment of larger units and more sophisticated strategy.

At first concerned only with gathering enough rice and other food supplies to meet their own needs, the Viet Cong this year sought through a variety of techniques to choke off the flow of food to Saigon and thereby to deal the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam a mortal economic blow. They were aided by nature in the form of floods, the most serious in decades, in the southern delta.

In the military field a series of carefully planned and well-executed moves by the RVN military forces in the delta region caused heavy casualties among the Viet Cong and set back their timetable. But they retaliated with a number of major attacks in the North and in the central highlands. For the first time, Viet Cong units of 500 to 1,000 or more troops were thrown into action at a number of points—at Dakha, north of Kontum; near Ban Me Thuot; at Phuoc Vinh; and in the northern Provinces of Quang Nam and Quang Tri.

Control over the Lao corridor by friendly Pathet Lao troops has permitted the Viet Cong to move with impunity along the infiltration trails in that area into South Viet-Nam. A Soviet airlift has provided large stocks of military supplies to Tchepone, only 20 miles from the South Viet-Nam border.

Junk traffic from North Viet-Nam to the South increased during the summer. In June, for example, South Vietnamese patrols seized 21 boats from the North with 100 Viet Cong aboard. Given the Government's shortage of adequate equipment and trained personnel to counter this kind of activity, it must be assumed that many more Viet Cong junks were able to complete their missions.

That the Viet Cong have stepped up their efforts to win control in the South is evident. However, this development did not come as a surprise to officials in the RVN Government. The acceleration had been accurately forecast in a number of documents captured from the Viet Cong earlier in the year. One of the most detailed and specific of these documents was seized on May 12 at Hat Dich in Phuoc Tuy Province.

The document bears the title "Military Plan of the Provincial Party Committee at Baria." (Baria is the former name of Phuoc Tuy.) It described in minute detail plans for building up the Viet Cong guerrilla force in the region. It set as the

party's goal recruitment of at least 36,000 "volunteers" for guerilla action in Baria, to be divided into four battalions, three independent companies, and two platoons, with a reserve force of six companies and two platoons. Some of the recruits would be used for espionage, communications, liaison, and sabotage.

The Baria military plan gives a good indication of Viet Cong ambitions and methods of organization.

(A copy of the military plan is in appendix Q.)

VIII. *Conclusions*

It is impossible to look at South Viet-Nam today without recognizing the clear and present danger of Communist conquest. The people of South Viet-Nam and their friends in other countries must look soberly at this problem and at the likely consequences should the Viet Cong succeed.

A. THE MEANING OF A VIET CONG VICTORY

For the people of South Viet-Nam the meaning of a Communist victory is obvious. They would join their compatriots in the North within the Communist orbit. They would take their place alongside the North Koreans, the Tibetans, the Hungarians, the East Germans, and others in the conformity of an "order" ruled by Moscow and Peiping.

Those who had opposed the Viet Cong would swiftly be eliminated. "Land for the tillers" would become "land for the state." Promises of "autonomy" for minority peoples would be forgotten except by the disillusioned highland tribes themselves. Absolute political control would rest with the Communist Party. In short, the pattern of Communist domination and dictatorship would be imposed over the entire country, and 14 million able and energetic people would find themselves in the "socialist camp."

For Viet-Nam's neighbors the consequences of a Communist victory in all Viet-Nam would be far-reaching. It would

doubtless seal the fate of Laos, where the Communists already control about half the country. Cambodia's precarious neutrality would be subjected to heavy and steadily increasing pressure. Thailand, too, would have to expect to see the tactics used in Laos and in Viet-Nam directed against her.

The present balance of forces between independent and Communist states in Asia would be tipped perilously if Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos fell under Communist domination. What then would be the prospects for Thailand and Burma, for Pakistan and India, for Malaya and Indonesia?

If the Viet Cong effort proves successful in Viet-Nam, other states with Communist neighbors are likely to be exposed to similar covert and overt methods of aggression. It is not logical to expect that the Communists will abandon techniques that prove successful. Conversely, failure in Viet-Nam might prove an important deterrent to repetition elsewhere.

B. THE NEED FOR ACTION

The responsibility for meeting and overcoming the Viet Cong threat falls primarily on the people of South Viet-Nam and on their Government. Their stake is by far the largest of all those involved. It is their country, their lives, their future that are most directly in danger.

The Republic of Viet-Nam must cope with aggression that almost daily increases in intensity and scope. As units of larger size have moved in from the North, the nature of the war in South Viet-Nam has changed from one of an almost entirely guerrilla character toward one with the proportions of conventional warfare. The size of engagements fought recently testifies to the accelerated pace of Viet Cong infiltration.

To overcome this steadily growing threat will require courage, intelligence, energy, and imagination. But these are all qualities that the people of South Viet-Nam have in abundance. The Government of the Republic has recognized the necessity to step up its effort to meet the increasing threat from subversion and covert aggression.

North Viet-Nam, in guiding and supporting the Viet Cong effort, has had the full backing of Moscow, Peiping, and the

rest of the Communist world. It is too much to expect that the people of South Viet-Nam would be able to oppose this massive threat without outside support. The United States and other friendly countries have already contributed much to the cause of strengthening South Viet-Nam's military and economic programs. In the face of heightened efforts by the Viet Cong, more assistance may be needed. The problem here is to work out cooperatively the kind of assistance program that is likely to prove most effective in meeting the present danger.

The world community itself bears some responsibility toward the people of South Viet-Nam. It is not enough for other non-Communist states to point to their own serious problems and to shrug their shoulders and ask: "What can *we* do?" We can all do much. First, we can try to understand the situation that prevails in South Viet-Nam, the real and not the imagined situation. We can look hard at the facts and come to realize that what is happening in the villages and in the highlands of South Viet-Nam does not reflect the will or the desires of that country's people.

One need not accept the word of others. Any friendly government can send in its own observers to see for themselves. It can consult closely with those on or near the scene who know most about what has been happening in Viet-Nam. Free men could, if they would, force a halt to such things as infiltration through Laos and the use of neighboring territories as "safe" bases for Viet Cong operations.

Viet-Nam is not an isolated problem. The tactics used there have been used before. They will be used again, particularly if they prove successful. A government or a people who now think that "Viet-Nam is so far away from us" may well discover that they are the South Vietnamese of tomorrow. Then they may wish they had done more now. But then it will be late, very late, perhaps too late!

MAR - 1 1962

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A Threat to the Peace

North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam

PART II—The Appendices

A Threat to the Peace

North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam

In Two Parts

PART II—The Appendices

PART I—A separate publication—
is the report which refers
to these appendices

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7308

Far Eastern Series 110

Released December 1961

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BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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R. Turner 13 Nov. '80

APPENDIX A

Direction of the Viet Cong by North Viet-Nam

(See Part I, section IV, pp. 14-18)

The Government and the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam provide support and encouragement to the illegal movement to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Communist Party, called the Lao Dong (Workers) Party in North Viet-Nam, provides the ideological orientation of the so-called "liberation movement" in South Viet-Nam.

The following excerpts from Lao Dong Party declarations and from the articles and speeches of party and government officials in Hanoi demonstrate clearly the leading role played by North Viet-Nam in the Viet Cong campaign in the South:

1. From the resolution of the 3d National Congress of the Lao Dong (Workers) Party of Viet-Nam adopted at Hanoi on September 10, 1960:

"1. The Third National Congress of the Party unanimously finds that over the past nine years and more, from the Second Congress to the third, under the leadership of the party, the Vietnamese revolution has won big victories. . . .

"The people's democratic power, more and more consolidated, is a strong instrument for fulfilling the tasks of proletarian dictatorship and speeding up socialist transformation and socialist construction in the North; at the same time, it is a firm base for our whole people in their struggle for the strengthening of peace and the achievement of national reunification. Under the leadership of the party, the People's Army has vigorously developed its revolutionary character, scored new achievements in study and in work, and made steady progress in turning itself into a regular and modern army.

"The national united front has been consolidated, the worker-peasant alliance strengthened. The Viet-Nam fatherland front and the political parties and mass organizations, members of the front, have made active contributions to the cause of socialist revolution in the North and the struggle for national reunification.

"In the South, our compatriots' struggle against the American imperialists and their agents, the Ngo Dinh Diem clique, though facing many difficulties, is being firmly maintained and further expanded day by day. Our people throughout the country have united closely in their struggle and enjoy worldwide sympathy and support. The American imperialists and their henchmen are more and more isolated. . . .

"Since the reestablishment of peace and the complete liberation of the North, the Vietnamese revolution has shifted over to a new stage. Under the leadership of the party, the North is advancing by firm steps toward socialism; it has strengthened its forces in all fields and become the bulwark of the nationwide revolution. Meanwhile, the U.S. imperialists and the Ngo Dinh Diem clique have set up a despotic and warlike administration in the South and turned it into a colony of a new type and a military base of the American imperialists. They are hampering and sabotaging the cause of national reunification of our people.

"In the present stage, the Vietnamese revolution has two strategic tasks: first, to carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam; second, to liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country. These two strategic tasks are closely related to each other and spur each other forward.

"To take the North toward socialism is a necessary and unavoidable task following the completion of the national people's democratic revolution. To take the North toward socialism and make it more and more powerful in every field will benefit the revolutionary movement for the liberation of the South, the development of the revolution throughout the country, and the preservation and consolidation of peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world. Therefore, to carry out the socialist revolution in the North, in the South we

must endeavor to rally all national and democratic forces, expand and consolidate the national unity bloc, isolate the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, and speed up the struggle to strengthen peace and reunify our fatherland. That is why the guiding principle of the socialist revolution in the North is: To build the North and take the South into due consideration.

"In the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country and the achievement of national reunification, our compatriots in the South have the task of directly overthrowing the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their agents. The revolutionary struggle of our compatriots in the South also aims at frustrating the attempt of the U.S.-Diem clique to rekindle war, and making an active contribution to the defense of peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world. That is why the struggle of our southern compatriots against the U.S.-Diem clique for the liberation of the South has a decisive and direct effect on the liberation of the South, the achievement of national reunification, and the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country.

"The two revolutionary tasks of the North and the South belong to two different strategies, each task being aimed at satisfying the definite requirement of each zone under the specific conditions of our divided country. But these two tasks have one common aim—to achieve peaceful national reunification and resolve one common contradiction of our whole country—the contradiction between our people and the imperialists and their henchmen.

"The common task of the Vietnamese revolution at present is: to strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace, to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam; and to contribute practically to reinforcing the socialist camp and to maintaining peace in Southeast Asia and in the world. . . .

"The immediate task of the revolution in the South is to achieve the unity of the whole people, to fight resolutely against the aggressive and war-mongering U.S. imperialists, to overthrow the

dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem ruling clique, lackeys of the democratic coalition government in South Viet-Nam, to win national independence and establish democratic freedoms, to improve the people's livelihood, to safeguard peace, to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy, and to make an active contribution to the defense of peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

"The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary power of the masses. During this process we must pay special attention to the work of organizing and educating the people, first and foremost the workers, peasants and intellectuals, promoting to the highest degree the revolutionary fighting spirit of the various strata of our patriotic countrymen. We must unceasingly expose the criminal schemes and acts of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, doing our utmost to divide and isolate them.

"To insure the complete success of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam our people there must strive to establish a united bloc of workers, peasants, and soldiers and to bring into being a broad national united front directed against the U.S.-Diem clique and based on the worker-peasant alliance. This front must rally all the patriotic classes and sections of the people, the majority and minority nationalities, all patriotic parties and religious groupings, together with all individuals inclined to oppose the U.S.-Diem clique. The aims of its struggle are peace, national independence, democratic freedoms, improvement of the people's living conditions, and peaceful national reunification.

"The front must carry out its work in a very flexible manner in order to rally all forces that can be rallied, win over all forces that can be won over, neutralize all forces that should be neutralized, and draw the broad masses into the general struggle against the U.S.-Diem clique for the liberation of the South and the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

"The revolutionary movement in the South plays a very important role in relation to the reunification of the country. Simultaneously with the effort to build the North and advance toward socialism our people must strive to maintain and

develop the revolutionary forces in the South and create favorable conditions for peaceful national reunification. . . ."

2. From the speech of Ho Chi Minh at the opening session of the Lao Dong Party's 3d Congress in Hanoi, September 5, 1960:

"In the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and private capitalist industry and commerce, we have won a victory of a decisive character. We have recorded many achievements on the agricultural and industrial production fronts, and in cultural and educational work, and have made improvements in the people's living standards. The North is becoming more and more consolidated and transformed into a firm base for the struggle for national reunification. The big victories won over the past 9 years have testified to the correctness of our party's line and the firmness of our party's leadership. They are victories of Marxism-Leninism in a country which has suffered imperialist oppression and exploitation. Our party is worthy of the confidence of our people from north to south.

"Our party can be proud to be the heir to our people's glorious traditions, and the guide of our people on the road to a bright future. . . .

"The victories of the Vietnamese revolution are due also to the wholehearted assistance of the fraternal socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and China. We avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our warm feelings of gratitude toward the fraternal socialist countries headed by the great Soviet Union. We are also sincerely grateful to other fraternal parties, first of all, to the French Communist Party, for their active support to our people's just struggle. We sincerely thank all colonial peoples and peace-loving people throughout the world, who have always given us their sympathy and support.

"The history of the 30-year-long struggle of our party has taught us this: the best guarantee of victory for the revolution is to steep ourselves in Marxism-Leninism; to remain loyal to the interests of the working class and the people; to preserve solidarity and unity of mind within the party and between all Communist parties and all countries of the big socialist family. . . .

"A prosperous and strong North is the firm base of the struggle for national reunification. This congress will shed new light on our people's

revolutionary path to peaceful national reunification. Our nation is one, our country is one. Our people will undoubtedly overcome all difficulties, 'achieve national reunification and bring the North and the South together again.'

"Dear comrades, the Vietnamese revolution is a part of the world forces of peace, democracy, and socialism. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is a member of the big socialist family headed by the great Soviet Union. It is our duty to defend the advance post of socialism in Southeast Asia, to endeavor to contribute to the strengthening of the forces of the socialist camp, and to safeguard peace in Southeast Asia and the world. . . ."

3. From an article by Ho Chi Minh in the Belgian Communist publication *Red Flag*, July 10, 1959:

"We are building socialism in Viet-Nam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution."

4. From the speech of Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap to the Lao Dong Party's 3d Congress in Hanoi, September 12, 1960:

"The August general uprisings [against the French] are a model of successful uprisings in a colonial and semifeudal country and a model of a clever association between political and armed struggles and between the political forces of the masses and the revolutionary armed forces.

"The success of the August general uprisings proves that under the present world situation, the liberation struggle by the people of a colonial country—under fixed historic conditions—can be brought to a successful conclusion through the channel of uprisings. This is an experience having a creative character which has been daily proved by the rich realities of the people's liberation movements over the past few years. . . .

"These successes and experiences give us this lesson: to be successful, the armed struggle and the building of armed forces must be guided by correct political lines and the armed struggle must serve the objectives of the political struggle. Indeed, during the whole process of its leadership over the armed struggle, our party kept a firm hold on the national democratic revolutionary line and cor-

rectly associated the anti-imperialist responsibility with the antifeudal responsibility, thus achieving brilliant successes. At the same time, we have fully understood that 'to build and consolidate our armed forces is one of the important conditions enabling our revolution to defeat any aggressive enemy, protect, and develop its achievements,' as stated in the political report.

"Under the lively conditions of our people's liberation struggle, our party has set forth a correct policy concerning the revolutionary armed struggle and on the building of the revolutionary armed forces: it is the policy of people's war and people's army. The major significance of this policy lies in the fact that our party has cleverly and creatively applied the general principles of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete realities of the revolutionary struggle in a former colonial and semifeudal country like ours. This is the cause of all successes achieved by our party. . . .

"After thoroughly surveying the international and domestic situation, the political report of the party Central Committee sets forth the revolutionary task to be carried out by our people in the present phase as follows: 'to strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace; to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy, to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam, and to contribute practically to reinforcing the socialist camp and to maintaining peace in south-east Asia and in the world. . . .'"

5. From an article by Vo Nguyen Giap in the Lao Dong Party journal *Hoc Tap*, January 1960 issue:

"The North has become a large rear echelon of our army. . . . The North is the revolutionary base for the whole country."

6. From the political report of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party delivered at the Party's 3d Congress in Hanoi by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Committee, on September 5, 1960:

"At present our party is facing momentous tasks: to promote socialist construction in the

North and to consolidate the North into an ever more solid base for the struggle for national reunification; to strive to complete the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country, to liberate the South from the atrocious rule of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, prosperous, and strong Viet-Nam. To guarantee the full execution of these tasks, we must make our party even stronger and must strengthen the leadership of the party. The present national congress of the party will define for the whole party and the whole people the line for carrying out the socialist revolution in the North, for the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country, for the struggle to achieve national reunification; at the same time it will decide upon the basic orientation for the building of the party and for the strengthening of party leadership to meet the new requirements of the revolution.

"The Second National Congress of our party was the congress of resistance for national salvation. The present national congress is the congress of construction of socialism in the North and of struggle for the achievement of national reunification. It will open up the road to new victories for the people throughout our country. . . .

"The socialist revolution is carried out in the North while in the South we have to make every effort to achieve a broad national unity embracing all national and democratic forces, all forces opposed to the U.S. imperialists and Ngo Dinh Diem. In building and consolidating the North, we must on the one hand keep firmly to the line of socialist construction and, on the other, pay the greatest attention to the situation in the South, help create further conditions for the rallying of all patriotic forces opposed to the U.S.-Diem regime in the South into a broad national united front with the worker-peasant alliance as its basis, and insure the victory of the revolutionary struggle in the South. Our guiding principle in carrying out the socialist revolution in the North is: consolidate the North, and in so doing, take the South into due consideration. . . .

"The North is the common revolutionary base of the whole country. Its constant strengthening not only heightens the confidence and stimulates the revolutionary enthusiasm of our patriotic

countrymen in the South but also helps the balance of forces between revolution and counter-revolution on a national scale to tip over to the side of revolution, creating favorable conditions for the powerful development and final victory of the revolution in the South. Besides, since the North is the common revolutionary base of the whole country, the socialist revolution in the North aims not only at building a new life for the northern people but also at laying the foundations of a new life full of freedom and happiness for our entire nation and at preparing effectively the future development of the revolution throughout the country. . . .

" . . . the southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal—and based on the building, consolidation and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the South—especially the workers, peasants, and the intellectuals—and must uphold the revolutionary fighting spirit of all strata of patriotic compatriots. We must ceaselessly unmask the perfidious and cruel schemes of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys with a view to isolating them further, and winning over the forces that can be won over. On the basis of developing the great revolutionary force of the masses and uniting closely with the peace-loving peoples of the world, we must struggle tenaciously for the implementation of the Geneva agreements.

"In order to assure the complete victory of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam, the South Viet-Nam people, under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Party and the working class, should endeavor to build a worker-peasant-army coalition bloc, and set up a broad national united front against the U.S.-Diem clique on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance. This front must be able to unite all patriotic classes and strata, the delta and minority peoples, all patriotic parties and religions, and all those who have anti-U.S.-Diem tendencies. The aims of the struggle of the national united front against the U.S.-Diem clique in South Viet-Nam are peace, national independence, democratic freedoms, improvement of the people's livelihood, and peaceful reunification of the fatherland. The activities of the front

must be extremely varied in order to unite all forces that can be united and win over all the forces that can be won over, neutralize the forces that must be neutralized, and draw the masses of the people into the common struggle against the U.S.-Diem clique.

"The revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam has a very important position in the cause of national reunification. Parallel with the building and consolidation of North Viet-Nam, bringing it to socialism, our people should endeavor to maintain and develop the revolutionary forces in South Viet-Nam, thus creating favorable conditions for the peaceful reunification of the country. . . ."

7. From an article by Truong Chinh, a member of the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party, in the journal *Hoc Tap* for April 1961:

"Thus the resolutions of the Third National Party Congress have clearly set forth two strategic responsibilities of the Vietnamese revolution:

"1. 'To carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam';

"2. 'To liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country.'

"These two strategic responsibilities aim at satisfying the objective and concrete requirements of each zone while our country is temporarily partitioned. But they also aim at solving a problem: to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam. Thus the Third National Party Congress set forth the general responsibilities of the present Vietnamese revolution:

"'To strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace; to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam; and to contribute practically to reinforcing the socialist camp and to maintaining peace in southeast Asia and in the world. . . .'

"Inside the country, the responsibilities of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam and those of the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam are also closely related and interdependent. Indeed, the success of the socialist revolution and construction in North Viet-Nam will not only consolidate North Viet-Nam and bring a peaceful, free, and happy life to the northern people, but it will also strongly encourage southern compatriots to struggle against the U.S.-Diemists, to liberate South Viet-Nam, and to achieve national reunification. On the other hand, each success of the National People's Democratic Revolution in South Viet-Nam has two effects: (1) to struggle against the U.S.-Diemists, restore to the southern people the right to earn their daily living, advance toward liberating South Viet-Nam from the imperialist and feudal yoke, and create favorable conditions for peacefully reunifying the country; and (2) to help protect revolutionary bases common to the entire country and to encourage the northern compatriots to do their best to build socialism.

"It is precisely because of this interdependence between the revolutionary responsibilities in the two zones that the congress has set forth this slogan for North Viet-Nam: 'Build North Viet-Nam and pay attention to the South.' One of the important points in the present propaganda, mobilization, and ideological education work in North Viet-Nam is to turn the hatred for the U.S.-Diemists into practical actions in order to step up the patriotic emulation movement and the building of socialism in North Viet-Nam.

"The Political report of the Central Committee to the congress said:

"The responsibilities of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam are obviously the most decisive responsibilities in the development of the entire revolution in our country and in the national reunification work of our people."

"Why? First of all, because North Viet-Nam is the revolutionary base common to the entire country, and the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam not only seeks to build a peaceful, free, and happy life for the northern people but also lays the foundation for the building of a peaceful, free, and happy life for all the people throughout the country; and prepares practically for the future development of the entire country.

"After determining the role and responsibilities of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam, the congress set forth the role and responsibilities of the National People's Democratic Revolution in South Viet-Nam, which are: to overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in order to liberate South Viet-Nam and fulfill the responsibilities of the National People's Democratic Revolution throughout the country. . . .

"From a passive state, our people in South Viet-Nam are advancing to take the initiative. They have exhaustively exploited the difficulties encountered by the Ngo Dinh Diem authorities, especially since the November 1960 coup d'etat. Forms of struggle are multiplying daily; political struggles are being closely associated with military struggles. . . .

"The deadly enemies of our people do not resign themselves to dying. As long as they live, they will resort to all plots and measures to oppress and terrorize the revolutionary forces in South Viet-Nam, hoping to destroy them and provoke North Viet-Nam. Their plots will be thwarted and they will be destroyed only by the vigorous struggle of our people in South Viet-Nam as well as in North Viet-Nam, and by the positive support of the peace- and justice-loving people the world over. We are very enthusiastic over the development of the revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam. However, we must understand that the struggle against the U.S.-Diemists to liberate South Viet-Nam is still arduous and complicated.

"However, we are firmly convinced that the revolution in South Viet-Nam and the struggle to achieve peaceful national reunification will surely succeed because they are evolving under these favorable conditions: socialist North Viet-Nam is being rapidly consolidated and strengthened, is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as a strong basis for the struggle for national reunification; the peaceful and socialist forces the world over are stronger than the warlike imperialist forces; and the colonial system of imperialism is disintegrating rapidly and is advancing toward destruction

"Unable to endure the oppressive, exploiting, and murderous policies of the enemy, southern compatriots have to rise and group themselves under the fighting banner of the Liberation Front to destroy the U.S.-Diemist regime and set up a National Democratic Coalition Government. Once established, this government will agree with

the DRV Government about achieving peaceful national reunification under one form or another, including the holding of free elections throughout the country. Thus, though South Viet-Nam will be liberated by nonpeaceful means, the Party policy of achieving peaceful national reunification is still correct. It is precisely because of the revolutionary struggle of southern compatriots to overthrow the U.S.-Dienists and to liberate Viet-Nam that there are favorable conditions to carry out the policy of achieving peaceful national reunification.

"The development of the revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam is fully consistent with the following view of the Moscow Declaration of November 1960:


" 'The presence of the world socialist system and the weakening of imperialist position have opened for all the oppressed new possibilities to recover independence. The recovery of independence by colonial people through peaceful or nonpeaceful means depends on the concrete conditions of each country.' . . . "

APPENDIX B

The Viet Cong Organization in North and South Viet-Nam


(See Part I, section V, pp. 18-22)

1. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE VIET CONG:




APPENDIX B (Cont.)

2. TYPICAL INTER-PROVINCE ORGANIZATION OF THE VIET CONG




APPENDIX B (Cont.)

3. ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL RESEARCH AGENCY OF THE VIET CONG




APPENDIX B (Cont.)

4. ORGANIZATION OF A TYPICAL
VC INTELLIGENCE CENTER



APPENDIX B (Cont.)

5. SPECIAL TARGETS FOR PENETRATION BY VIET CONG INTELLIGENCE AGENTS



The An Don Case


(See Part I, section VI, B, 1, pp. 25-26)



Map showing the route from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam taken by the Viet Cong agents in the An Don Case.



Viet Cong agents captured at An Don on June 5, 1961. (Left to right: Lam Dua, Nguyen Chuc, Huynh Tinh, Nguyen Dong, and Truong Van Hao.)



The junk that Nguyen Chuc and his comrades used to carry agents and messages between the Viet Cong base at Dong Hoi and landing sites in South Viet-Nam.

B LỜI KHAI CUNG ĐÓ KHỎI
của



Tên NGUYỄN CHỨC bị danh NGHIỆP hay tên giả là
NGUYỄN THI Trung-Úy quân đội V.C., bị bắt
tại An Đôn (BT.040.790) ngày 5/6/1961
lúc 18 giờ 30

I)- TRÌNH LỊCH:

Họ và tên : NGUYỄN CHỨC tên giả NGUYỄN THI.
Bí danh : NGHIỆP.
Sinh năm : 1927 (34 tuổi).
Sinh quán : Thôn 1 xã Duy Nghĩa, huyện Duy Xuyên,
tỉnh Quảng Nam.
Tên cha : NGUYỄN VŨNG.
Tên mẹ : VŨ THỊ LÊNG.
Chức vụ : Trung-Úy, trong quân đội V.C.
Quốc tịch : Việt-Nam.
Tình trạng gia đình : Có vợ, 2 con
Lý do bị bắt : Thành phần tập kết và được V.C. bổ trí
vào Namhạt động.
Ngày bị bắt : 5/6/1961 lúc 18 giờ 30.

II)- CỦA TRÌNH HOẠT ĐỘNG :

a)- Trước ngày định chiến :

Năm 1945 - 1947 : tham gia đội Dân quân tự vệ xã
Duy Nghĩa, huyện Duy Xuyên, Quảng
NAM

..../....2

Preliminary Statement
of

NGUYEN CHUC, alias Nghiep or Nguyen Thi, a lieutenant in the Viet Cong Army, who was arrested at An Don at 1830 hours on June 5, 1961

I. Personal History

Name	: Nguyen Chuc alias Nguyen Thi
Secret name	: Nghiep
Year of birth	: 1927 (34 years old)
Place of birth	: Hamlet 1, Duy Nghia township, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province
Father's name	: Nguyen Tung
Mother's name	: Vo Thi Lang
Occupation	: Lieutenant in the Viet Cong Army
Nationality	: Viet-Nam
Family status	: Married, 2 children
Reason for arrest	: A regrouped person who was assigned to carry out activities in the South by the Viet Cong
Date of arrest	: June 5, 1961, at 1830 hours

II. Chronology of activities

A. *Before the ceasefire (1954)*

1945-47 : Was in the self-defense militia of Duy Nghia township, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province

Excerpts from remainder of Nguyen Chuc's confession

- 1947-49 : In charge of a transportation office in the South
- 1949-53 : In charge of transportation work in the Nam Dong area
- 1953-55 : At home ill

B. *After the ceasefire*

Regrouped to the North in January 1955. Taken to Thanh Hoa Province. Inducted into the 2d Battalion stationed at Thieu Hoa. Battalion was part of the 55th Regiment. Assumed duties of commander of Third Platoon of the 1st Company commanded by Nguyen Khuong.

From December 1955 to 1958, studied at the construction branch at Gia Lam and after graduating was assigned to work on camp construction.

In 1959 was assigned by the North Vietnamese High Command to carry documents into South Viet-Nam and was given training to prepare for the assignment.

III. His Story of Crossing the (17th) Parallel

I worked for the first time in South Viet-Nam in June 1959, and from then until May 1961 made 17 trips to the South.

There were five of us who worked in South Viet-Nam:

1. Nguyen Chuc alias Nguyen Thi (the subject)
2. Huynh Tinh alias Le Nghe
3. Truong Van Hao alias Ding Dai
4. Nguyen Dong alias Nguyen Tham
5. Lam Dua alias Le Lam

Traveled by boat No. T 02. The boat was built mainly by Nguyen Dong. . . .

The false inspection cards we brought in in order to carry out activities in the South were distributed at Dong Hoi by [men named] Nguyen Vinh and Binh.

The trip by boat from Dong Hoi to Tourane took only 3 days.

On our trips across the parallel to work in South Viet-Nam, we usually docked at [one of] three places:

1. Lang Co
2. Trem (Tourane)
3. An Don (the An Chanh section of Tourane)

Whenever the boat docked at a port, I [Chuc] went ashore alone to establish contact, usually for half an hour. The other four men waited in the boat. . . . On each trip across the parallel into South Viet-Nam I brought documents in from the North and received documents from the South to take out.

The documents brought from North to South Viet-Nam were usually rolled up in an aluminum tube about 10 centimeters long and 2 centimeters in diameter.

IV. Contacts on Shore

(Chuc listed the names and addresses at which he made contacts in South Viet-Nam with Viet Cong agents from June 1959 to June 1961. He also admitted transporting at least two Viet Cong agents between North and South Viet-Nam.)

BẢN KHAI CUNG SỞ KHỐI của

Tên HUYNH TÍNH (tên gia là HUYNH TÍNH)
cán bộ V.C vượt tuyến vào Nam hoạt-dộng và bị
bắt ngày 5/6/61 tại BÀ RĂNG.



I.- PHẦN LÝ LỊCH :

<u>Họ và tên</u>	: HUYNH TÍNH bí danh LÊ NGHE
<u>Ngày sinh</u>	: 38 tuổi
<u>Nơi sinh</u>	: Duy Nghĩa, Duy Xuyên, Quảng Nam
<u>Con ông</u>	: HUYNH LÂM (c)
<u>Và bà</u>	: PHẠM THỊ LÂM
<u>Vợ</u>	: NGUYỄN THỊ NHÌ, 34 tuổi, ở làng
<u>Con trai</u>	: HUYNH THU, 5 tuổi, ở làng
<u>Học lực</u>	: biết đọc biết viết
<u>Xu hướng chính trị</u>	: Gia nhập Mặt Trận Liên Việt 1952 ở Duy Nghĩa do tên HÌNH cán bộ xa (tập kết) giới thiệu.
<u>Tôn giáo</u>	: Phật giáo
<u>Tiền án chính trị</u>	: Không
<u>Ba :</u>	: HUYNH THỊ TÍNH 37 tuổi, buôn bán, vợ lẽ tên (Trần) Tư, huyện Thăng- Bình - Quảng-Nam. - HUYNH THỊ BÌNH, 36 tuổi, buôn bán, vợ tên NGUYỄN SĨ ở Duy-Xuyên. - HUYNH THỊ KỶ, 32 tuổi, cô chồng đi lính cho chính phủ VNCH ở bản HỘ-AM - HUYNH THỊ LIÊU, 30 tuổi, làm ruộng, chồng tên là TRẦN ĐỒ, thanh-niên Cộng-hòa xa Duy-Nghĩa. - HUYNH SỰ, 20 tuổi, nghe nói cả lính cho chính phủ VNCH.

....//....



P) AN KHAI CUNG
của

tên NGUYỄN-DÔNG, can hoạt-động cho V.C tại ĐÀ-NẴNG, bị bắt ngày 5/6/1961 trên ghe đậu tại bến AN-DŨN (ĐÀ-NẴNG).

I.- PHÂN LÝ-LỊCH :

Họ tên : NGUYỄN-DÔNG (tên thật kiểm-tra giả)
ĐANG-DÔNG (-nt-)
NGUYỄN-THẨM (tên thật)

Ngày và nơi sinh : Năm 1903 tại Làng HÒA-THÀNH-HẠ, Quận TAM-KỲ, Tỉnh QUẢNG-NAM.

Nghề-nghiep : Làm chài lưới (đi biển).

Địa-chỉ hiện tại : Cho một cái lều ở bờ sông gần lò rèn và nhà Thờ Thiên-Chúa-giáo ở Thị-xã ĐÔNG-HỚI (QUẢNG-BÌNH).

Cha - Mẹ : NGUYỄN-ĐẮ (chết) và TRẦN-THỊ-LOÀNG (c).

Vợ con : HUỖNH-THỊ-PHÒNG, 57 tuổi, làm nghề đi biển, hiện ở Làng HÒA-THÀNH-HẠ, Quận TAM-KỲ, Tỉnh QUẢNG-NAM. Hai con là : NGUYỄN-THỊ-CHÂU 24 tuổi, làm nữ cứu-thương cho bộ-đội V.C từ năm 1952 hiện nay không rõ ở đâu. NGUYỄN-BA 19 tuổi làm lưới ở VƯỜI-MÈ tại Làng HÒA-THÀNH-HẠ (QUẢNG-NAM).

Anh em ruột : Không có ai.

Cha Mẹ vợ : HUỖNH-TỐT (chết) và Bà LÊ-THỊ ... (chết)

Anh em vợ : Không có ai.

Tôn giáo : Đạo Phật.

Trình-độ học lực : Biết chữ Quốc-ngữ nhưng không thông thạo

Xu-hướng chính-trị : Không theo Đảng phái nào nhưng nghe lời tuyên-truyền của V.C nên theo V.C vượt-tuyên ra Miền BẮC VIỆT-TUYÊN 17.

Tiền - án : Không.

... / ...



I AN KHAI CUNG SƠ KHỞI
CỦA TÊN LAM ĐUA, TÊN GIẢ LÊ LAM (trong kiểm-tra)
bị bắt tại AN ĐỒN (BT.040.790 - NAI MIEM -
QUẢNG NAM) ngày 5/6/61 lúc 18 G 30.

I.- PHÂN LÝ LỊCH

Tên, họ : LAM ĐUA bí danh không có

tên giả trong thẻ kiểm-tra: LÊ LAM.

Đảng-viên Cộng-sản: 10 tuổi đảng, vào đảng CS năm 1952 do
sự giới-thiệu của :

- tên LÊ VĂN ĐOM, Ủy-viên Thường vụ Khu ĐÔNG -
HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.

- tên TRƯƠNG UYÊN, Phường-trưởng ở Khu ĐÔNG -
HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.

Sinh năm: 1929 (32 tuổi) tại Khu ĐÔNG, HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.

Tên cha : LAM ĐƯỢC (chết năm 1953)

Nghề-nghiệp người cha: làm cá tại CỬA ĐỘI - HỘI AN (Q. NAM)

Tên mẹ : PHẠM THỊ ĐUA (sống)

Tuổi : 50

Nghề-nghiệp người mẹ: Đi mò tôm, cua, ở Khu ĐÔNG - HỘI AN -
QUẢNG NAM.

Địa-chỉ cha, mẹ: Làng NHẬT Khu ĐÔNG - HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.

Nghề-nghiệp đương-sự: Đánh cá tại CỬA ĐÔNG HỘI - HỘI-viên
"Ngư-Trưởng NHẬT LÊ".

Học lực : Lớp Tư (biết đọc, biết viết)

Giai cấp: Bần-nông (tuy nhiên gia đình được VC cấp 3 sào 3
ruộng ở làng NHẬT, Khu ĐÔNG, HỘI AN năm 1947.

Tôn-giáo : thờ tổ-tiên.

Tình trạng gia-đình: Có vợ, 1 con (1 chết)

Tên vợ : PHẠM THỊ NUÔI, 32 tuổi (năm 1929)

Nghề-nghiệp người vợ: Đi mò cua, ốc, tôm (tuy nhiên nhà có
1 sào 5 ruộng do VC cấp vào năm 1952).

Tên người con thứ 1: không có (vì vừa lọt lòngra đã chết)-

...../...

7 ÁNH KHAI CUNG SƠ - LƯỢC

của

tên TRƯƠNG VAN HẢO tức NGUYỄN ĐÀI dùng ghe vượt tuyến vào Miền Nam hoạt-dộng cho V.C, bị bắt giữ tại Bến An-Đôn (Nai-Hiên) hồi 18 giờ ngày 5-6-1961.

-o-o-o-



I.- PHÂN LÝ LỊCH.

Họ tên : TRƯƠNG VAN HẢO (tên thật)
- NGUYỄN ĐÀI (tên thẻ kiểm tra giả)
- ĐẶNG ĐÀI (tên thẻ kiểm tra giả)

Ngày sinh và nơi sinh : Năm 1932 tại làng Hà-Khê, quận Châu-Thành Đà-Nẵng.

Nghề nghiệp : Đánh cá

Địa chỉ hiện tại : Ở rạp sông Nhật-Lệ, thị xã Quảng-Bình (Bắc vĩ-tuyến 17).

Cha mẹ : TRƯƠNG VAN ĐU (chết) và LÊ THỊ TÍN, 70 tuổi, buôn bán ở làng Hà-Khê (Đà-Nẵng).

Vợ con vợ lớn : NGUYỄN THỊ DUNG 27 tuổi, buôn bán, hồi năm 1955 y vẫn ở với mẹ chồng tại làng Hà-Khê (Đà-Nẵng) có một con nuôi, lúc tôi ra đi còn nhỏ không rõ đặt tên là gì và THỊ DUNG có lẽ đã đi lấy chồng khác rồi.


Vợ nhỏ : TRƯƠNG THỊ KINH 25 tuổi, làm cá, ở thôn Đông-Thành, thuộc khu phố Thành-Mỹ thị xã Quảng-Bình (Bắc vĩ tuyến 17) đã có hai con nhưng đã chết rồi, hiện nay đang có thai được 6 tháng.

Anh em ruột : Có người anh tên là TRƯƠNG VAN THÂM, 44 tuổi, làm cá, ở làng Hà-Khê (Đà-Nẵng).

... / ...

The Calu Case

(See Part I, section VI, C, 1, p. 28)



Map showing infiltration route from the North, including the Calu way station.

A black and white photograph of a male athlete in mid-throw of a javelin. The athlete is wearing a dark singlet with the number '1028' on the front and dark shorts. He is holding a javelin with both hands, extending his right arm forward. The background is a light, textured surface. Overlaid on the right side of the image is a large, dark rectangular label with the text '100 PAGES' in a bold, sans-serif font. The label has a decorative border and a small '100' in the top left corner. The overall image has a vintage, slightly grainy quality.

GAO ĐN THÁNG 11

Chúc Phạm Anhàng 11!

[illegible]

The two mealbooks, pages of which are reproduced in this appendix, were captured during a raid by Republic of Viet-Nam armed forces on a Viet Cong infiltration station at Calu in Quang Tri Province on March 29, 1961. Calu was station No. 8 along a secret trail that had at least 25 such way stations where Viet Cong infiltrators from North Viet-Nam were fed and rested as they moved into the South.

Notebook No. 1 is a monthly record (October 1960-March 1961) of food items received and consumed at the Calu station. Separate entries were made for rice and for other foods (meat, vegetables, et cetera). The date of each transaction is recorded together with the quantity of rice or other food, the price paid, the person from whom received, and other data.

Notebook No. 2 is a record of food served at the Calu station by individuals or units. The front part of the notebook lists men by name, apparently the members of a Viet Cong unit based at or near Calu. The size of the unit varied from 28 to 35 over the 6-month period.

The back pages of notebook No. 2 provide a record of "guests" served at the Calu station from October to March, sometimes with the number of men involved, sometimes with merely the name of the leader and the notation that a group accompanied him.

With the average daily per capita consumption of rice known, as well as the amount of rice delivered to each passing group, it is possible to estimate with fair accuracy the number of Viet Cong who moved through the Calu station during the October-to-March period. On this basis it is believed that approximately 1,840 VC personnel moved south along the Calu trail during those 6 months.

APPENDIX E

The Tra Bong Case

(See Part I, section VI, C, 2, pp. 28-29)

A number of Viet Cong soldiers were killed in a fight with forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam at Tra Bong, Quang Ngai Province, in October 1960. Some of them (see below) had pictures of themselves wearing the uniform of the North Viet-Nam Army.



APPENDIX F

The Dakrotah Case

(See Part I, section VI, C, 3, p. 29)



Route of Y Lon and fellow Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam to Dakrotah, where he was captured on October 23, 1960.



Picture of Y Lon (left) and three other highland tribesmen who were members of a Viet Cong unit and were captured at Dakrotah on October 23, 1960.

BẢN KHAI CUNG

Của tên Y LON, đội-viên thuộc Trung-đội 3
Đại-đội 3 /Tiểu-đoàn 20 V.C. bị Tiểu-đoàn
2/41 bắt ngày 23/10/60 tại DakRotah (YB-965796)

- 8 -

I.- PHÂN CÁN CƯỚC VÀ LÝ LỊCH :



- Tên : Y LON
- Tuổi : 20 (không nhớ năm sinh. Chỉ nhớ 14 tuổi
thi tập kết).
- Quê quán : Toumorong (QUẢNG NGÃI)
- Trình-độ văn-hóa : lớp 5 V.C. (tương đương đệ lục của ta).
- Cha mẹ : Chết từ hồi còn nhỏ
- Thân quyến : Không còn ai
- Gia cảnh : 1 vợ, không con
- Tên vợ : MƠI
- Tuổi : 18
- Quê quán : Dak Dru Dok
- Cha mẹ vợ : O. A-XUNG và bà Y-DAM (không biết tuổi)
- Nghề-nghiệp : Làm rẫy ở Dak-Dru
- Thân-nhân vợ : không có

II.- LỜI KHAI TRONG ĐÊM THẨM VẤN ĐẦU TIÊN TẠI SAIGON (25/10).

Tôi thuộc Tiểu-đội 2, Trung-đội 3, Đại-đội 3, Tiểu-đoàn 20 V.C., Quân số 111 người. Tôi bị bắt khi có nhiệm-vụ đi dò đường từ Dak-Dru xuống Dak Rotah cho đơn-vị tôi tiếp viện cho 1 đơn-vị khác ở Dak-Rotah.

Năm 1954, tôi 14 tuổi, làm bồi cho 1 tên Đại-úy Pháp. Sở dĩ tôi biết Đại-úy BELLO vì tôi có theo người Cô đem gà và gạo cho Đại-úy này luôn, lúc y ở tại DakTo. Tên này qua LÀO, tôi ở lại bị V.C. dọ chết đói nên theo V.C. tập kết.

STATEMENT

of

Y LON, member of the 3d Platoon, 3d Company, 20th VC Battalion, who was captured by Battalion 2/41 on October 23, 1960, at Dakrotah

I. Identification and personal history

Name	: Y Lon
Age	: About 20 (does not remember year of birth but was about 14 when regrouped to North in 1954)
Native village	: Toumorong (Quang Ngai)
Parents	: Died when he was young
Relatives	: None
Family status	: Wife, no children
Wife's name	: Moi
Wife's age	: 18
Native village	: Dak Dru Dok
Wife's parents	: A Xung and Y Dam (ages unknown)
Occupation	: Farmers at Dak Dru
Wife's relatives	: None

II. Chronology of activities

Served with the French Army at Toumorong. In 1954 . . . went to Binh Dinh on the train and arrived at Qui Nhon. After resting for 4 days and 4 nights at Qui Nhon I was regrouped to the North on a Polish ship. On the ship there were about 6,000 or 7,000 mountain tribesmen who were attached to the 120th Regiment. The regiment was commanded by Y Bloc, a Hre tribesman, and at the present time is stationed at Nghe An. At present it is called Su-doan 120 and is still commanded by Y Bloc. The ship docked at Sam Son and, after a stopover of 5 days there, went to Ha Long. I went to Gia Lam for cultural study at the "nationalities" school.

On May 1, 1959, the Viet Cong began to train me to educate my compatriots and on May 29 I left Gia Lam and went by car to Vinh Linh. . . . I arrived at Vinh Linh on June 1, 1959. After 2 days of rest at Vinh Linh, my group (which included 30 men) went out during the day on foot in order to cross the Ben Hai River. . . .

Immediately after we crossed the parallel, our group arrived at a contact point where there were four or five men who . . . showed us the way. After that, I do not know what places we passed through nor do I remember the date because we moved through the jungle. When we were near the Quang Nam border I remember that we stood on a mountain peak and looked at the ocean. I remember that we crossed Route 9 but I am not sure at what spot.

After leaving Quang Nam . . . we arrived at Mang Hon around August 1959 and reached Chiang 8 days later.

At Chieng, I went out with a group of Viet Cong cadre to propagandize among the tribal compatriots. About November 1959 we urged other tribal youths in the Chieng area to volunteer for military drill. A platoon of youths from Chieng was organized under the command of Vietnamese cadre. . . . They had military drill and they cleared land. . . .

[Y Lon gave details of his unit's attack on Dak Dru and of his capture together with three other Viet Cong the following day while carrying out a reconnaissance mission near Dakrotah.]

At the present time, in the remote areas of the southern plateau region, especially in the area of the Laos-Viet-Nam border, the Viet Cong have organized militia and self-defense units to guard the villages. They have forced the people to dig spiked ditches and have armed them with knives, machetes, and sticks, and some have bows with poison arrows.

Each time the Republic of Viet-Nam Army approaches a village, the self-defense militia guarding the village runs and reports to the Viet Cong troops and they use secret signals to inform the village people.

Ordinarily all our units are stationed in remote mountain areas far from the villages. Only the command cadres can enter the villages to contact the administrative units.

Usually we are given two types of training, military and political. Our program is organized as follows: in the morning from 5 to 11 o'clock we study physical training, politics, and the policies proposed for the national struggle; in the afternoon, we have military studies, especially on close combat fighting, bayonet attack, and post attacks.

Every day after we finish training, we indulge in sessions of stocktaking and criticism. But before these sessions the command cadre have met and reported to each other.

There is usually a shortage of food. Each day we receive two tins of rice which is supplied by the local people. We became more and more indifferent because they would never give us permission to visit our families. Parents did not know where their children were and were never allowed to see their children. The Viet Cong always said that "individuals do not count and must sacrifice themselves for the people and the Fatherland." . . .

The Le Hoa Case

(See Part I, section VI, C, 4, pp. 29-30)



Map showing the route Le Hoa and his group followed from their departure at Vinh in July 1961 to Le Hoa's surrender in Binh Dinh Province in South Viet-Nam on October 12, 1961.

K I N

[-] AN KHAI CUNG

tên LÊ HOA, Hạ-sĩ V.C., bị bắt tại
(BÌNH ĐỊNH) ngày 12.10.1961.

I.- PHÂN LÝ LỊCH :

- Họ và tên : LÊ HOA (tự BA)
- Ngày và nơi sinh : 1931 tại xã Đức Tân, quận Mộ Đức tỉnh QUẢNG NGÃI.
- Tên cha mẹ : LÊ TỰ (c), LÊ THỊ CỬU (đã tái giá)
- tên em : LÊ THỊ TƯ lấy chồng ở xã Đức Tân, Mộ-Đức, QUẢNG NGÃI.
- tên vợ : LỮ THỊ TẠO, độ 25 tuổi, ở tại làng.
- Trình độ học vấn : biết đọc biết viết quốc-ngữ
- Tôn giáo : Thờ cúng ông bà.
- Xu hướng chính trị : Không đảng phái.

II.- QUÁ TRÌNH HOẠT-ĐỘNG :

- Từ bé đến đầu năm 1949 : đương sự sống với gia đình làm nghề đánh cá và đi đò lúa trên vùng thượng Ba-Tơ
- Cuối 1949, vào dân quân xã, có nhiệm vụ canh gác miền biên (không thoát ly)

INTERROGATION REPORT of

LE HOA, corporal of the Viet Cong, captured at Binh Dinh Province on October 12, 1961

I. Personal history

Name : Le Hoa alias Ba
Date and place of birth : 1931, village of Duc Lan, district of Mo Duc, province of Quang Ngai
Name of parents : Le Tu (deceased) and Le Thi Cuu (remarried)
Sister : Le Thi Tu, married to a man in Duc Tan, Mo Duc, Quang Ngai
Wife : Lu Thi Tao, about 25, same village
Education : Can read and write
Religion : Ancestor worship
Political affiliation : None

II. Past activities

- Until 1949, lived with family, fishing and trading fish for rice in the midlands area of Ba To.

- End of 1949, joined village defense corps with the mission of watching the seashore (did not have to leave his family).

- July 1954, was recruited as a soldier of the district guard of Mo Duc, then stationed at Duc Thanh (district of Mo Duc). Effective strength of the district guard was about 90 men, under the command of district guard chief Ha Yen and his deputy, Hanh.

- October 1954, moved with district guard to Qui Nhon, then boarded a Polish ship to be regrouped to the North.

- Landed in Sam Son (Thanh Hoa Province). Had 2 days of rest then moved with the district guard to the village of Nam Thanh, district of Nam Dan, province of Nghe An. The entire group was assigned to building dams, fighting droughts, fighting floods, and so forth.

- June 1956, the district guard of Mo Duc was disbanded. The group integrated into Regiment No. 803, Division 324, then stationed at Anh Son, Nghe An Province. Le Hoa was assigned to Company 3, Battalion 1, as a private.

(Period June 1956 to June 1961 was occupied by military training, drill, et cetera.)

- June 1961, Le Hoa was ordered to report to the headquarters of Regiment 803 at Anh Son, together with the following: Thuong, a sergeant; and Corporals Hoa, Thoai, Giap, Yem, Duoc, Cong, and Doan. At the headquarters, a Major Thu, commanding Regiment 803, gave the group a welcoming party. He then told them they had been selected for training. Two days later, they were transferred to Vinh, where they were billeted at the camp of Regiment 271.

The next day, the Viet Cong brought another group of about 50 men to the camp. (The men belonged to various units formerly from Interzone 5 in South Viet-Nam, including natives of the South or Northerners who formerly participated in the "advance toward the South," all of them regrouped.) They had a political training course for 15 days. The lecturers were a Lieutenant Son, a native of Binh Dinh Province, and Lieutenant Luan, from Phu Yen. Both belonged to the Political Section of the Command Staff of Military

Zone No. 4. The theme of the course was "The Situation in the South" and the duties of cadres who had been regrouped and would return to the South to reinforce the Front for Liberation of the South.

- At the beginning of July 1961, the training sessions ended. Each trainee was promoted one rank except Le Hoa. (No reason given.)

All the trainees were grouped into units. Unit No. 1, to which Le Hoa was assigned, was to be sent to Binh Dinh and was still composed of the persons listed above. Thuong was promoted to 2d Lieutenant, commanding the unit, and the 7 others were promoted to 1st Sergeants. Only Le Hoa remained a corporal.

One day before departure, a Lt. Col. Khue from the Command Staff of Zone No. 4 came and visited the trainees. They had a farewell party. Next day, the trainees each received one khaki uniform, one set of black cloth underwear, one hat, one woolen coat, one hammock, one haversack, a water bottle, cooking pan, 2 kilograms of salt, and some medicine. No money or weapons were distributed at this time.

III. The trip to the South

Vinh-Ben Hai River

- On July 16, 1961, at about 7 o'clock the entire unit boarded a truck belonging to Regiment No. 271 at Vinh and traveled along Highway No. 1 to Ha Tinh. The other unit (50 men) were to be sent away too, but Le Hoa did not know where or when.

From Ha Tinh the truck followed Highway No. 3 to the district of Huong Khe, then crossed the river by ferry, and reached a military post on the border between the provinces of Ha Tinh and Quang Binh at about 4 p.m. There the unit rested all night.

- On July 17, 1961, heavy rain forced the unit to remain at the military post.

- On July 18, 1961, the unit left the post. They followed the main road for 2 or 3 kilometers, then took a track called the "Unity Route," a partly dirt trail, partially covered by vegetation which the unit had to clear as it went along. At 4 p.m. the unit halted, cooked a meal, and hung hammocks for a night's rest.

- July 19, 1961, at 6 a.m. unit departed under the guidance of a tribesman. They halted at 2 p.m. at which time a new guide came with some rice for the group. The unit spent the night there and also the following day and night.

Ben Hai-Hara

- On the night of July 21, 1961, at 7 p.m. the unit departed. It crossed the Ben Hai River (into South Viet-Nam) at 2 a.m. At 4 a.m. it crossed a wide road, then came to a relay station at 5 a.m. The group rested there all of July 22.

- July 23, 24, and 25, the unit continued marching south. After 3 days of marching, the unit crossed a high mountain and saw the sea. Le Hoa believes this was in the province of Thua Thien.

- Five or 6 days later, on August 2, 1961, the unit reached Quang Nam Province.

- Sixteen days later, August 18, 1961, the unit had crossed the territory of Quang Nam and were near Tra Bong. The trip through Quang Nam had been very tiring because of the hills.

- August 20, 1961, the unit crossed a road.

- August 23, the unit had crossed the territory of Quang Ngai Province and came to the mountain passes of Binh De and Tam Quan.

- Seven days later, on August 30, 1961, the unit reached the area of Ha Ra (10 kilometers from An Khe). Two days before, the unit had crossed a large river on a suspended bamboo bridge.

Here, the tribesman who had served as a guide led the unit to Dong, a native of Quang Nam with the rank of platoon commander. Dong told the unit that from then on he would be in charge of the group. He instructed them to rest before receiving orders for action.

In the camp Le Hoa met 21 young men from Binh Dinh who had left their families and joined the Viet Cong. The young men were responsible for transporting rice to the base. Le Hoa remembered that once two of the young men had brought nine rifles and three submachineguns to the camp. . . .

IV. Circumstances of Le Hoa's capture

After arriving at Ha Ra, Le Hoa and his group were able to rest a few days. Then they began to take part in production. After 1 day of work Le Hoa became ill and rested for 2 days.

During this sick leave he heard the young men who had left their families discussing escape from the Viet Cong who had taken them from their homes. They discussed some young men who had already returned to their homes. From that moment Le Hoa said he decided to escape and surrender. . . . He had been told that if he followed the direction of the sunrise he would arrive at the lowlands.

About midnight (October 8), Le Hoa left the camp carrying with him a MAT 49 submachinegun. He walked all that night and the following day. He arrived at a highland village. He begged for food and then went on until 9 p.m. Then he stopped and rested in a cave. The next morning, he continued walking.

On October 12, at 9 a.m., he met a young boy with a buffalo. He asked where he was and was told he was not far from Cat Hiep village. The boy showed him the way to National Road No. 1 and Le Hoa continued his trip. Meanwhile, the young boy had reported to the Self-Defense Corps unit in the village.

After walking for a while, Le Hoa met a man carrying potatoes and asked him the way. Suddenly, two Self-Defense Corps soldiers with a rifle came up on a bicycle and captured him. Le Hoa offered no resistance and obeyed his captors' orders. One man tied him and they took him to their post about 3 kilometers away. At the post, Le Hoa was well treated by the village officials who gave him something to eat. Then he was sent to Phu Cat, about 5 or 6 kilometers from the Self-Defense Corps post. He arrived at about 2 p.m. on October 12, 1961, and then was transferred to Qui Nhon.


The Diary of Nguyen Dinh Kieu

(See Part I, section VI, C, 5, pp. 30-31)




Map showing the route followed by Viet Cong Captain Nguyen Dinh Kieu and his men from North Viet-Nam through Laos into South Viet-Nam.

Photo of the cover of the diary of Viet Cong Captain Nguyen Dinh Kieu found in his possession at Dakakoi on September 26, 1961.



A chart of the Viet Cong company commanded by Captain Nguyen Dinh Kieu, which was contained in his diary.



1. *Đến với nhà của anh*
 2. *Đến với nhà của anh*
 3. *Đến với nhà của anh*
 4. *Đến với nhà của anh*
 5. *Đến với nhà của anh*
 6. *Đến với nhà của anh*
 7. *Đến với nhà của anh*
 8. *Đến với nhà của anh*
 9. *Đến với nhà của anh*
 10. *Đến với nhà của anh*

[illegible][illegible]

(page 82)

May 30, 1961

Under the heading *Bch toe* (probably the abbreviation for "Command Staff Organization"), Captain Kieu assembled notes and ideas on the current situation and on what had to be done, apparently in preparation for the move to the South. ("We still have enough time to get ready. . . ."):

- 1—Alertness is necessary ("We should not relax in political matters . . .").
- 2—Better combat disposition is needed ("more mobility . . .").
- 3—Party activities must be stepped up during operations.

("Before departure, GH [probably a political cadre] must come and discuss the situation, the difficulties we are going to face, our objectives, etc. . . .")

- 4—Command staff must realize our problems ("There will be long marches, no transportation, little food . . .").

(page 83)

- 5—Indoctrination (propaganda for the population and international affairs).

("Our allies have great admiration for us. But precisely at this moment we must not show any vanity which could lead our allies to think that the Vietnamese do not have any modesty.")

"See to it that our troops use only our own dry food supply and do not touch the property of the population. Beware of relationships with women Political cadres must reaffirm this before departure"

- 6—Protect secrecy ("Never leave used packages of cigarettes at camp sites . . .").
- 7—"Think of the problem of unity between the army and the population, between the political

(page 84)

cadres and the army."

- 8—"We must organize a system for relations with families."
- 9—Administrative problems ("Avoid carrying too bulky items.").

May 31 (in pencil) "The sandals and shoes distributed are a little tight."

(pages 85-86)

(Notes on a Party cell meeting dated June 30.)

(page 87)

(On this date, it is apparent the unit was in Laos.)

June 21. "We rest at Thapachon, Kham Muon (Laotian province of Khammouane) It has taken us two and a half days of walking to reach here. This friendly country is really beautiful and rich. Why are its people so poor? . . ."

June 22. We arrive at Muong Xuan. This place has been burned down once by the French. Now it is again burned down by Fu Mi [Phoumi, a Laotian leader]. How much devastation! How many losses! . . ."

(page 88)

June 27. "We are leaving for Nam Mi. So far, the troops' morale is good We must be careful with the rice; we may run short of it"

June 28. "We arrive at Nam Mi. We rest here for one day. This area has been liberated only recently. The people are kind but show no understanding of politics We shall go southeast through Ban Ca Den"

June 29. "We arrive at Sepon [Tchepone]."

June 30. }

July 1. } "Rest. Heavy rain. Party activities."

July 2. }

(The following few entries are in pencil, apparently written before the above which are in ink:)

June 15, 1961. "At 1515 we depart, direction southeast."

"At 1820 we stop for rest at a place 4 kilometers away from Y Ly."

"At 2400 we take the ferry at Huong Khe across the river."

"At 0300 on the 16th of June we arrive at T. Lang [probably Thanh Lang]."

"D goes and contacts the border defense corps to get help with food." (end of portion in pencil)

(page 89)

(notation on forces)

C1+4+command staff+4

C2

C3

"Sepon-Tusa (Tchepone to Tusa) took us 8 days of travel, 4 days marching, one of rest, etc.
..."

June 16-17. "rest at Thanh Lang"

June 18. "departure for Fong Khai . . ."

July 8. "There is no rice at the places where there should be. Then how can we continue, and it is already the 8th of July . . ."

July 9. "We sleep at Thanh Cau (or Can)."

July 10. "We sleep at Cape (or Cabe). At night we depart from Cape for Tusa . . ."

"At 4 a.m. we arrive at the foot of the mountain. Why is it that the South is located in the skies? We keep going but when shall we reach the blue clouds and when shall we reach our beloved South?"

July 11. "We have been on the road for almost a month now. The mountain slopes are cruel . . ."

July 12. "Rest at Tusa. The road from Cape to Tusa, where we arrived only at 1630 today, has been

(page 90)

the most difficult and the longest."

July 18. "We have departed [several illegible words] for the border. We have been on the road for 5 days."

(notes on trouble with food supply, illness, etc.)

(page 91)

July 18. "From this day on, I am in the Fatherland again . . . We take along only a 2-day supply of food . . . The capacity of the population here for understanding politics seems higher . . ."

"We pass an area with enemy posts. There are three of them where we cross National Highway 14. Let's watch out for enemy patrols from Highway 14 to Dakley. Enemy planes are flying all day long. But we are relatively safe . . ."

"Our relay stations are distant from one another. Some of them can be reached only after 7 p.m. and sometimes much later than that. These stations have more security. They are built near the mountains and have living quarters . . ."

(page 92)

" . . . We must do all we can to take care of the health and morale of the troops. A group of political cadre is accompanying us. We must avoid the enemy. That is why we have to take a longer route. We rest for one day after passing two or three relay stations . . ."

(page 93)

" . . . We passed Cadou-Sedang. We do not reveal the area where we are going to operate. We must ask about our route. The signals are provided by the relay stations and each day we check in with one station . . ."

(page 94)

" . . . We return for three days to the relay station in the western zone of Quang Nam. I feel here as though I were in a 'free area.' Enemy planes follow us. What are they looking for? . . . Here is a place which used to be a safe zone during the war against the French. . . . The problems of rice and salt have become critical. The maximum ration is 2 lon a day . . ."

July 23.

"I was seriously ill Fortunately, the 24th is a day of rest."

July 25-26. "Although very tired, I must have the necessary courage to continue. What is more thrilling than to stand here on my beloved fatherland looking at the beautiful Truong Son mountain range?"

(page 95)

Aug. 5. "Rest at BTC [?]. We have one day to prepare to go to Quang Ngai. Here is Tra My, in the province of Quang Nam, rich and fertile."

Aug. 13.

"Arrive at Co Lo.

"Effectives were 37 at departure.

Now the following are missing:

Hrim, Dich, Mom, Du.

"Preparations, equipment, weapons, everything is in good shape."

(page 96)

(Notes on the qualifications of members of the company.)

(Notes on meeting of Party committee covering pages 96-99.)

(pages 101-2)

(A note to his wife, Thu Huong.)

"After fighting here, on our glorious fatherland, I am writing to you and to our child. I have already written to you on the way. Thu Huong, I have not received any letters from you for 4 months. The working conditions are difficult"

(page 103)

"Duty situation—

"Prepare a safe base from which we can start operations to harass the enemy"

(page 104)

". . . Exploit then the situation in the plains (Binh Son, Son Tinh, Quang Ngai, Mo Duc)."

"Winter-Spring 1961-62 operations: Start with small operations.

Gather all military power in Safe Base No. 1 (CKI), then launch simultaneous attacks

(page 105)

all over the mountain area. After this, leave the mountain area to local forces and go as far as possible toward the midlands. . . . D₅ operate on Highway No. 5. Konbrai, Mangden, Konklung: attack enemy rescue groups, paralyze their transport, reduce their manpower. . . ."

(Pages 105-16 contain notes on military matters, evaluations of personnel, new recruits, etc.)

(page 117)

(brief evaluation at Party meeting of battle of Konbrai):

"Good secrecy was observed. No man left to visit his family. No sign of low morale. We have not yet proceeded to the counting of our casualties. The spirit of the army is high with this first victory. . . ."

(page 118)

(lists new weapons received)

Diary concludes with an entry on September 15 which discusses plans for operations at Kon Mong and includes a hand-drawn map of the area north of Konbrai.

Capt. Kieu was killed on Sept. 26, 1961, at Dakakoi and the diary was picked up on that date.


APPENDIX I

The Calu Case (2)

(See Part I, section VI, D, 1, pp. 32-33)

In the attack of March 29, 1961, against the Calu station of a Viet Cong infiltration trail (see Part I, section VI, C, 1, p. 28 and Part II, appendix D), armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam captured the notebook of a VC officer, probably the commander of the Calu post. In his notebook, the officer had listed weapons brought in to the station for distribution to VC forces in Quang Tri, in Zone 5, and in other areas.

Below is a photograph of the cover of the notebook.



may, nên chắt giữ lấy nước
đi về nhà để cho nước trong
đây, rồi sẽ bán cho dân
đó. Thôi vậy, giờ đi về nhà
tho.

29 = 4 1/2 (3) 1 1/2 + 1 1/2

17 : 5 3 1 0

15 5 1 2

23 5 2 1

21 7 1 2 =

8 : 1 (4) 1 2 =

6 7 3 1

4 - 4 3 3 - 1 1/2 2 1/2

2 - 6 5 1 1

42 14

13/2

long L. + v

Aug 20th

- [illegible]

Another page from the Calu cadre's notebook. Note the name and address, in Russian, of a Vietnamese living in Moscow.

[illegible]

~ ~, 18 tháng 10 (Lê)
- 1/2 giờ 10 & 1 giờ
- 1/2 giờ 10 & 1 giờ

- my own NY 2011 mini 'dollar' -
- Dr. plus co. and paper to the 1000 2000 5000
- this was the first time the 1000 2000 5000
- 1000 2000 5000 1000 2000 5000 1000 2000 5000

Kyda Mochba

f. 165

Ступенчатая утка

Дом 23, Корпус 1

Коту Фат Митов Бина

48. *Agave* *Agave* *Agave*

- $\log_2 16 = 4$ (vì $2^4 = 16$)
- $\log_2 32 = 5$ (vì $2^5 = 32$)
- $\log_2 64 = 6$ (vì $2^6 = 64$)
- $\log_2 128 = 7$ (vì $2^7 = 128$)
- $\log_2 256 = 8$ (vì $2^8 = 256$)
- $\log_2 512 = 9$ (vì $2^9 = 512$)
- $\log_2 1024 = 10$ (vì $2^{10} = 1024$)
- $\log_2 2048 = 11$ (vì $2^{11} = 2048$)
- $\log_2 4096 = 12$ (vì $2^{12} = 4096$)
- $\log_2 8192 = 13$ (vì $2^{13} = 8192$)
- $\log_2 16384 = 14$ (vì $2^{14} = 16384$)
- $\log_2 32768 = 15$ (vì $2^{15} = 32768$)
- $\log_2 65536 = 16$ (vì $2^{16} = 65536$)
- $\log_2 131072 = 17$ (vì $2^{17} = 131072$)
- $\log_2 262144 = 18$ (vì $2^{18} = 262144$)
- $\log_2 524288 = 19$ (vì $2^{19} = 524288$)
- $\log_2 1048576 = 20$ (vì $2^{20} = 1048576$)
- $\log_2 2097152 = 21$ (vì $2^{21} = 2097152$)
- $\log_2 4194304 = 22$ (vì $2^{22} = 4194304$)
- $\log_2 8388608 = 23$ (vì $2^{23} = 8388608$)
- $\log_2 16777216 = 24$ (vì $2^{24} = 16777216$)
- $\log_2 33554432 = 25$ (vì $2^{25} = 33554432$)
- $\log_2 67108864 = 26$ (vì $2^{26} = 67108864$)
- $\log_2 134217728 = 27$ (vì $2^{27} = 134217728$)
- $\log_2 268435456 = 28$ (vì $2^{28} = 268435456$)
- $\log_2 536870912 = 29$ (vì $2^{29} = 536870912$)
- $\log_2 1073741824 = 30$ (vì $2^{30} = 1073741824$)
- $\log_2 2147483648 = 31$ (vì $2^{31} = 2147483648$)
- $\log_2 4294967296 = 32$ (vì $2^{32} = 4294967296$)
- $\log_2 8589934592 = 33$ (vì $2^{33} = 8589934592$)
- $\log_2 17179869184 = 34$ (vì $2^{34} = 17179869184$)
- $\log_2 34359738368 = 35$ (vì $2^{35} = 34359738368$)
- $\log_2 68719476736 = 36$ (vì $2^{36} = 68719476736$)
- $\log_2 137438953472 = 37$ (vì $2^{37} = 137438953472$)
- $\log_2 274877906944 = 38$ (vì $2^{38} = 274877906944$)
- $\log_2 549755813888 = 39$ (vì $2^{39} = 549755813888$)
- $\log_2 1099511627776 = 40$ (vì $2^{40} = 1099511627776$)
- $\log_2 2199023255552 = 41$ (vì $2^{41} = 2199023255552$)
- $\log_2 4398046511104 = 42$ (vì $2^{42} = 4398046511104$)
- $\log_2 8796093022208 = 43$ (vì $2^{43} = 8796093022208$)
- $\log_2 17592186044416 = 44$ (vì $2^{44} = 17592186044416$)
- $\log_2 35184372088832 = 45$ (vì $2^{45} = 35184372088832$)
- $\log_2 70368744177664 = 46$ (vì $2^{46} = 70368744177664$)
- $\log_2 140737488355328 = 47$ (vì $2^{47} = 140737488355328$)
- $\log_2 281474976710656 = 48$ (vì $2^{48} = 281474976710656$)
- $\log_2 562949953421312 = 49$ (vì $2^{49} = 562949953421312$)
- $\log_2 1125899906842624 = 50$ (vì $2^{50} = 1125899906842624$)
- $\log_2 2251799813685248 = 51$ (vì $2^{51} = 2251799813685248$)
- $\log_2 4503599627370496 = 52$ (vì $2^{52} = 4503599627370496$)
- $\log_2 9007199254740992 = 53$ (vì $2^{53} = 9007199254740992$)
- $\log_2 18014398509481984 = 54$ (vì $2^{54} = 18014398509481984$)
- $\log_2 36028797018963968 = 55$ (vì $2^{55} = 36028797018963968$)
- $\log_2 72057594037927936 = 56$ (vì $2^{56} = 72057594037927936$)
- $\log_2 144115188075855872 = 57$ (vì $2^{57} = 144115188075855872$)
- $\log_2 288230376151711744 = 58$ (vì $2^{58} = 288230376151711744$)
- $\log_2 576460752303423488 = 59$ (vì $2^{59} = 576460752303423488$)
- $\log_2 1152921504606846976 = 60$ (vì $2^{60} = 1152921504606846976$)
- $\log_2 2305843009213693952 = 61$ (vì $2^{61} = 2305843009213693952$)
- $\log_2 4611686018427387904 = 62$ (vì $2^{62} = 4611686018427387904$)
- $\log_2 9223372036854775808 = 63$ (vì $2^{63} = 9223372036854775808$)
- $\log_2 18446744073709551616 = 64$ (vì $2^{64} = 18446744073709551616$)
- $\log_2 36893488147419103232 = 65$ (vì $2^{65} = 36893488147419103232$)
- $\log_2 73786976294838206464 = 66$ (vì $2^{66} = 73786976294838206464$)
- $\log_2 147573952589676412928 = 67$ (vì $2^{67} = 147573952589676412928$)
- $\log_2 295147905179352825856 = 68$ (vì $2^{68} = 295147905179352825856$)
- $\log_2 590295810358705651712 = 69$ (vì $2^{69} = 590295810358705651712$)
- $\log_2 1180591620717411303424 = 70$ (vì $2^{70} = 1180591620717411303424$)
- $\log_2 2361183241434822606848 = 71$ (vì $2^{71} = 2361183241434822606848$)
- $\log_2 4722366482869645213696 = 72$ (vì $2^{72} = 472236$

APPENDIX J

The Ly Son Case

(See Part I, section VI, D, 2, pp. 33-36)

On January 31, 1960, a junk from North Viet-Nam with six men aboard landed at the island of Ly Son off the Quang Ngai coast. They claimed to be fleeing from Communist rule in the North. In April, a high-ranking agent of the Viet Cong was captured in South Viet-Nam and exposed the real purpose of the voyage of the six men: to bring supplies from the North to a Viet Cong unit in the South. Confronted by the testimony of the agent, all six of the captured men confessed that they had been on a VC supply mission. They provided extensive details of their voyage and of the special infiltration unit in North Viet-Nam to which they were attached.

Below is a picture of Nguyen Bat (third from the left), leader of the group, and his five VC companions.



Below is a map showing the planned and actual voyages of Nguyen Bat and five other Viet Cong agents captured in the Ly Son Case.



H 0 - 30 LÍ - LỊCH

của

NGUYỄN-BAT tức ĐUONG - Tử của sông GIANG (Bắc-Việt)
dùng thuyền vượt biển vào Nam, tiếp-tổ lương-thực,
quân-dụng, quân trang và vũ-khí cho cán-bộ Việt-Đông
nam vùng.

- 0 -

Xuất phát : 27-01-1960
Tới Ly-Sơn : 31-01-1960
Hội 3/Điền : 12-03-1960
Hội Hải-Gòn : 14-04-1960



X

X

X

- 1.- Tên người vượt tuyến : NGUYỄN-BAT (tên khai sinh)
tức ĐUONG (tên chữ kiểu-tra
giả do V.C đặt vào đầu tháng
12/1959).
- 1/a Bí danh : NGHIA (tên đảng-viên 0.6)
- 2.- Nơi-sinh : Xã Thanh-Châu tức Tây-Nghĩa
quận Duy-Xuyên tỉnh Quảng-Nam
- 2/a Nơi-tịch : Việt-Nam
- 3.- Ngày-sinh : 1927
- 3/a Nghề-nghiệp : Trung-Úy, Đại-dội pháo, phụ
trách giao liên thủy vận trong
đoàn 603 quân-đội V.C.
- 3b/ Hôn-giáo : Thờ tổ tiên
- 4.- Địa-chỉ trước ngày V/t : Đơn-vị 603 thuộc đoàn 959, tổng-
cục hậu cần, trú quân tại phía
Nam sông GIANG, huyện Quảng-
Trạch tỉnh Quảng-Bình Bắc-Việt.
- 4/a Hướng địa-chỉ trước địa-chỉ trên :
- 7-10-59 : xuống tàu Ha-Uy tập kết ra Bắc.
- 23-10-59 : tàu Ha-Uy cập bến Sầm-Sơn Thanh-Hóa, tạm
trú tại bãi bờ Sầm-Sơn 3 ngày đêm.

... / ...

PERSONAL HISTORY

of

NGUYEN-BAT alias Duong—From the mouth of the Gianh River (North Viet-Nam), he used a boat to cross the border into the South to supply foodstuffs, military supplies, equipment and arms to the Viet Cong cadre in the South.

Departure : Jan. 27, 1960
Arrive at Ly Son : Jan. 31, 1960
Arrive Thua Thien : Mar. 12, 1960
Arrive Saigon : Apr. 14, 1960

1. Name of person crossing border : Nguyen-Bat (name on birth certificate) alias DUONG (name on forged identification card given him by the Viet Cong at the beginning of December, 1959)
 - 1/a Pseudonym : Nghia (assigned on joining Communist Party)
2. Place of birth : Thanh Chau village, also known as Duy Nghia, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province
 - 2/a Citizenship : Viet-Nam
3. Date of birth : 1927
 - 3/a Occupation : First Lieutenant, assistant company commander in charge of Ocean Transportation unit in Doan 603 of the Viet Cong armed forces
4. Address before crossing : Ancestor worship
 - 4/a Addresses prior to above : Don-vi 603, subordinate to Doan 559 of the Rear Services Directorate, stationed south of the Gianh River, Quang Trach District, Quang Binh Province, North Viet-Nam
 - October 7, 1954 : Aboard a Norwegian ship for regrouping to the North
 - October 23, 1954 : When the Norwegian ship docked at Sam Son in Thanh Hoa, he stayed there on the Sam Son coast for 3 days and nights.

A summary of Nguyen Bat's confession follows:

From October 1954 to May 1955, Bat was stationed in Thanh Hoa Province. From May to July 1955, he served in the Coast Guard Bureau of the North Viet-Nam General Staff in Hanoi. From July to October, he received special training in coastal defense work. From October 1955 to March 1957 he was a member of Bach Dang naval unit patrolling the North Viet-Nam coast from Haiphong to Thai Binh. He then had 18 months of political training. He said he worked at the Haiphong fish cannery from September 1958 to

July 1959. From the latter date until his capture he was a member of Doan 603, the special maritime infiltration unit of the Viet Cong.

Bat said his father, Nguyen Giap, was dead. His mother, Do Thi Chinh, was living in the village of Duy Nghia. He said he had 5 brothers and two sisters, all in the same village in Quang Nam. Bat is unmarried.

Bat joined the Viet Minh in 1948 in the war against the French. He was progressively: a soldier in a transportation company; deputy chief of a small boat unit; commander of a small boat

unit; deputy commander of a larger boat unit; a deputy company commander. In 1954 he was regrouped to the North with his unit, the 812th regiment. Meantime, in 1951, he had become a member of the Communist Party.

In July 1959, when the North Viet-Nam authorities decided to establish Doan 603, the special unit for transporting agents and supplies to the Viet Cong in the South, Bat was picked as one of the original complement of 107 men. They went through a period of political training and the unit was activated in August.

Doan 603 was organized into two companies. One was responsible for administration, personnel, boat building, and other command and supply functions. The second company, of which Bat was commander, was responsible for carrying out assignments to the South by sea.

On October 20, 1959, five men were picked to carry out a supply mission to South Viet-Nam. They were: Nguyen Bat, Nguyen Xanh, Nguyen Nu, Huynh Lach, and Tran Muc. The following day they went to Vinh to get two fishing boats, each about 5 tons and built to look like fishing boats in the South. From late October to late November the men sailed one of the boats to become familiar with it and to practice chart reading, navigation, and boat handling. In late November and early December they were given leave to visit Hanoi before departing on their assignment.

On December 8 they met Nguyen Nua, who was to accompany them as a guide on their return trip. Nua was a "stay-behind" cadre of the Viet Cong who had remained in the South, in Quang Nam Province, until 1958.

Plans for the voyage:

They were to leave from the mouth of the Gianh River and to sail southeast, then south until they arrived at the planned landing site on the Quang Nam coast. They were to wait until after sunset before landing. They were to exchange flashlight signals with the shore party before landing. A waving red light would indicate that it was unsafe to land.

If captured with all their supplies and weapons, they were to admit they came from the North. But they were instructed to be vague about their landing site and where they came from. They were told to say only that the supplies came from the "Hanoi Office of Rear Services."

If they had managed to dispose of all their supplies and weapons before capture, they were to tell the authorities they had come from Vinh in the North to seek freedom. If they disposed of their weapons but not the supplies, they were to tell the authorities that they were from the South and were to use their forged boat papers and identity cards.

The men were told they could scuttle their cargo if:

- they encountered severe weather that prevented them from reaching their destination.
- a patrol boat of the Republic of Viet-Nam approached within 3 miles.
- if they encountered a group of small boats that seemed to be police craft.

Should they meet a single small boat that tried to check on them, they were instructed to use their weapons to destroy it and its occupants.

They were advised to use forged papers only in contacts with village or district officials, not with provincial or national authorities who would be likely to recognize them as forgeries.

Nguyen Bat listed the following items in the cargo he and his companions brought to the South: 12 bolts of nylon cloth, 5 large rolls of white paper, 3 bolts of black cloth, 20 cases of medicine, 2 cases of rice seed, 2 rolls of electric wire, a case of electric light bulbs, a case of batteries, one electric motor, a mimeograph machine, a case of printer's ink, 15 packages of documents, and 4 bundles of warm clothing (100 items).

Bat said each man aboard carried: 2 suits of black cotton, a long-sleeved jacket, 1,000 piasters (about \$13.60) in Southern currency, one kilogram of dried fish, a pot for cooking rice, a package of assorted medicines, a bag of tobacco with lighter and alcohol, and 20 kilograms of rice.

Each man also was given: an identity card, a card proving service in the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam, a voting card.

The boat also carried: 6 submachineguns (MAT 49), 24 clips of ammunition, 18 grenades, 6 knives. They were to be delivered in the South and used for self-defense if necessary on the voyage.

After delivering their cargo to the Viet Cong in Quang Nam, Bat and his crew were to destroy their boat and return to the North overland. Nua was to guide them on this journey over secret trails to the North.

Bat and his crew made three unsuccessful attempts to carry out their assignment. They left

the Gianh River on December 9, on December 14, and again on December 29. Each time, bad weather forced them to turn back. Finally, on January 27, 1960, they set off again determined to complete their task.

Once again they ran into heavy weather. The rudder was broken. In a short time the spare rudder also broke. They drifted southward unable to control their direction. On the morning of January 31, they sighted a light. At first they feared it might be a patrol boat. Then they decided it was Ly Son Island, off the Quang Ngai coast.

They had the choice of continuing to drift at sea or trying to move in toward the island. They chose the latter course for their supply of fresh water was almost gone. They decided, too, to abandon their cargo and weapons.

Bat's statement concluded:

"I talked with the others about letting the boat move toward Ly Son Island because if we just let it drift we would die out in the middle of the ocean because the fresh water in the boat was almost gone. The boat did not have a rudder and we knew we had to go somewhere and hide.

"After everyone expressed his ideas, I had all the supplies and weapons thrown overboard. But the nylon cloth, even though it had a stone tied

to it, continued to drift along the surface. The crew, after throwing the cases of medicine, rice seed, and the four packages of clothing over the side, had to fish them out again in order to open them up and let the water in. Otherwise they would have kept floating. The clothing had to be tossed over piece by piece.

"When we opened up the packages with the warm clothing, it was such a shame [to abandon them] that each of us took one [coat] and a piece of nylon cloth to wrap them in and protect them.

"Having thrown out the cargo and the weapons, we destroyed all the papers we had brought along with us. The 1,000 piasters for each person were given back to Nua and he wrapped them in a fat roll. At first Nua did not want to throw the money away but we decided it would give us away.

"Then we let the broken rudder go so the boat would drift in to Ly Son Island. We landed around 3 p.m. on January 31, 1960. All of us declared that we had crossed the 17th parallel to seek freedom."

Sample pages from the interrogation records of the other members of Nguyen Bat's crew are reproduced below. Their accounts, though given individually to Republic of Viet-Nam authorities, follow Bat's confession even in minor details.

H O - S O L Y - L I C H
của



NGUYỄN-NỮA - Xuất phát 27-10-60, tới đảo Ly-Sơn, QUẢNG NGÃI
31-1-1960.

Tới ty OA QUẢNG-NGÃI : 09.02.60
Tới HUẾ : 12.03.60
Tới BÀ-NĂNG : 12.4.60
Tới SAIGON : 14.04.60

- 1/- Tên người viết tuyên : NGUYỄN-NỮA
 - 1/a Bí danh : THANH (tuyên thệ chính thức đảng viên
:1949 và đang trong bộ đội VC)
 - 1/b : NGÔ CHAU (trong thẻ kiểm tra gia đo VC.
: cấp đảng trong chuyến tiếp tế vũ khí
: vào miền Nam 1960)
- 2/- Nơi sinh : Thôn Bầy, xã Duy-Nghĩa, huyện Duy-Xuyên
: Tỉnh QUẢNG NAM (trước 1945 gọi là xã
: Tây-Sơn)
- 2/a Cuộc tịch : VIET NAM
- 3/- Ngày sinh : 1923
 - 3/a Nghề nghiệp : - Nghề biển 1923 - 1950
: - Bộ đội 1950 - 1954
: - Cán bộ nằm vùng 1954 - 1958
: - Ra Bắc Việt (HANOI) 1958 - 1960
- 3/b Tôn giáo : Vô tôn-giáo
- 4/- Địa chỉ trước ngày v/t : Thanh-Khê (sông Giành) huyện Thanh-
: Trach, tỉnh QUẢNG-BÌNH
- 4/a Những địa chỉ trước địa chỉ vừa kể trên :
 - Duy-Nghĩa, Duy-Xuyên, QUẢNG-NAM 1923 - 1950
 - Bộ đội VC liên khu V, 1950 - 1954
 - Bộ đội nằm vùng quận Hòa-Vang 1954 - 1958
 - HÀ-NỘI (xin tiếp) 1958 - 1960
- 5/- Tên người cha : NGUYỄN-HỢI
 - 5/a Bí danh : Không
 - 5/b Nơi sinh : Duy-Nghĩa, Duy-Xuyên, QUẢNG NAM
 - 5/c Ngày sinh : Chết 1947, thọ ngoài 50 T.
- 6/- Tên người mẹ : TRẦN THỊ ĐÔNG
 - 6/a Nơi Sinh : Duy-Nghĩa, Duy-Xuyên, QUẢNG NAM
 - 6/b Ngày sinh : 1947 (thọ ngoài 40 T.)
- 7/1 Anh em : NGUYỄN-ĐÔI
 - 7/1a Nơi sinh : Duy-Nghĩa, Duy-Xuyên, QUẢNG NAM
 - 7/1b Ngày sinh : Trạc 40 T.
 - 7/1c Địa chỉ : Duy-Nghĩa
 - 7/1d Nghề nghiệp : Làm biển
- 7/2 Anh em : NGUYỄN-VŨ (tàng tặc)
 - 7/2a Nơi sinh : Duy-Nghĩa, Duy-Xuyên, QUẢNG NAM
 - 7/2b Ngày sinh : Trạc 35 T.
 - 7/2c Địa chỉ : Duy-Nghĩa
 - 7/2d Nghề nghiệp : Làm biển và làm ruộng
- 8/1 Chị em : NGUYỄN-THỊ-BƯA
 - 8/1a Nơi sinh : Duy-Nghĩa, Duy-Xuyên, QUẢNG NAM.



HỒ SƠ LÝ - LỊCH
của

TRẦN-MỘC tức HUỖNH - Cán-bộ miền Nam tập kết.

Kiểm phát ngày : 27.01.60
Đến Ly-Sơn : 31.01.60
Đến Thừa-Thiên : 12.03.60
Tới Saigon : 14.04.60

- 1/- Tên người v/t : TRẦN - MỘC
1/a Bí danh : Huỳnh (tên lúc nhập đảng CS)
- 2/- Nơi sinh : Xã Đức-Thắng, huyện Mộ-Đức, tỉnh Quảng-Ngãi.
2/a Quốc-tịch : Việt-Nam.
- 3/- Ngày sinh : 1927
3/a Nghề nghiệp : - Làm đội-trưởng du-kích
- Tập đoàn đánh cá xã Hải-Bình, Huyện Tĩnh-Gia (Thanh-Hóa)
3/b Tôn-giáo : Phật-giáo
- 4/- Địa-chỉ trước ngày v/t : Xã Thanh-trạch, huyện Bồ-Trạch, Tỉnh Quảng-Bình (Đánh trại 603).
4/a Những địa-chỉ trước địa-chỉ vừa kể trên :
- Tập kết ra Bắc năm 1954
- 1955 - 1958, đi công-trường đắp đường quốc lộ số 1 từ Minh-Bình vào Nghệ-An.
- Tháng 2/1958, tập đoàn đánh cá xã Hải-Bình, huyện Tĩnh-Gia (Thanh-Hóa).
- 5/- Tên người cha : Trần Chuẩn
5/a Bí danh : không
5/b Nơi sinh : Xã Đức-Thắng, huyện Mộ-Đức, tỉnh Quảng-Ngãi.
5/c Ngày sinh : 72 tuổi
5/d Địa-chỉ : Xã Đức-Thắng
5/e Nghề-nghiệp : Lừa cá 2 mắt (không làm gì)
- 6/- Tên người mẹ : Nguyễn-thị-Chuẩn
5/a Nơi sinh : Xã Đức-Thắng
5/b Ngày sinh : 70 tuổi
5/c Địa-chỉ : Xã Đức-Thắng
5/d Nghề-nghiệp : Nội-trợ.
- 7/1 Anh em : Trần-Ký-Sắt
7/1a Nơi sinh : Xã Đức-Thắng
7/1b Ngày sinh : Ngoài 40 tuổi
7/1c Địa-chỉ : Xã Đức-Thắng
7/1d Nghề-nghiệp : Đánh cá

...../... 2

NGUYỄN-NỮ - Cán-bộ V.C từ miền BẮC dùng thuyền tiếp-tế lương-thực và vũ-khí cho cán-bộ V.C nằm vùng.

WOW

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HỒ SƠ LÝ LỊCH

của

HUYỀN-LÁCH tại HUỖNH-SƠN - cán-bộ tiếp-tế V.C.

Xuất phát ngày : 27.01.60

Tới Ly-Sơn : 31.01.60

Tới QUẢNG NGÃI : 09.02.60

Tới SAIGON : 14.04.60

1/- Tên người V/t

: HUYỀN LÁCH (theo giấy khai sinh)

1/a Bí danh

: - HUỖNH-SƠN (lấy 1955 gia-nhập bộ-đội)
- HOÀNG KIM (lấy thẻ cử-tri giả 1959)
- CHAU (lấy 1956 khi gia-nhập Đảng)

2/- Nơi sinh

: Thôn Tám, xã Thăng-Phước, huyện Thăng-Bình, tỉnh QUẢNG NAM.

2/a Quốc-tịch

: VIỆT-NAM

3/- Ngày sinh

: Sinh năm 1929 (31 tuổi)

3/a Nghề-nghiep

: Bộ-đội vận-tải 603 (tiếp-tế miền Nam)

3/b Tôn giáo

: Phật giáo

4/- Địa-chỉ trước ngày V/t

: Thôn Thanh-Xê, xã Thanh-Trạch, huyện Bô-Trạch, tỉnh QUẢNG-BÌNH.

4/a Những địa-chỉ trước địa-chỉ vừa kể trên :

- 1929 - 1952, sống tại xã Thăng-Phước
- 11/1952 , gia-nhập bộ-đội vận-tải tiểu-đoàn V.C. 242
- 1954 , Đại-đội 240 đóng tại Đại-Lục QUẢNG NAM.
- 8/1954 , C.425 tại QUY NHƠN.

....//.. 2

HỒ - SƠ LỊCH

của

NGUYỄN - XANH (Cán-bộ tiếp-tê V.C.)



Buất-phát ngày : 27.01.1960

Tới Ly-Sơn : 31.01.1960

Tới Quảng-Ngãi : 09.02.1960

Tới Huế : 12.03.1960

Tới Bà-Năng : 12.04.1960

Tới Saigon : 14.04.1960.


- 1/- Tên người vượt tuyến : NGUYỄN-XANH (tên lấy 1951 khi gia nhập bộ-đội)
 - 1/a Bí danh : - Nguyễn-Bà (tên bí còn nhỏ ở nhà)
 - Nguyễn-Tốt (bí danh khi vào Đảng ngày 28.7.1955)
 - Nguyễn-Lưu (bí danh đảng khai ở Quảng-Ngãi)
 - Phạm-Bư (tên trong căn-cứu giả ở Bà-Ngãi cấp khi đi công-tác tiếp tê vào Nam)
- 2/- Họ sinh : Bà Tỉnh Thủy, huyện Tam-Kỳ, tỉnh Quảng-Nam.
 - 2/a Quốc-tịch : Việt-Nam
- 3/- Ngày sinh : 03.3.1919
 - 3/a Nghề-nghiep : Tiểu-đội trưởng VC
 - 3/b Tôn-giao : Phật-giao
- 4/- Địa-chỉ trước ngày v/t : Đoàn 603 (tiếp-tê cho miền Nam) đồn trú tại xã Thanh-Trạch, huyện Bồ-Trạch, tỉnh Quảng-Bình.
 - 4/a Những địa-chỉ trước địa-chỉ vừa kể trên :
 - 1934 xã Tam-Thanh (cũ xã Hòa-thanh-Thương)
 - 1946-51, VN cướp chính-quyền, d/s di dân quân và tự-vệ xã
 - 09/1951, đi bộ-đội thuộc tiểu-đoàn 248 vận-tải tiếp-tê Liên-khu V (Bình, Bình, Thuận) đóng tại Tuy-Hòa thuộc tỉnh Phú-Yên.
 - 12/1953, Pháp đổ bộ Tuy-Hòa, tiểu-đoàn 248 chuyển đến Bình-Bình
 - 06/1954, công-tác tại cửa Hồ-Bi thuộc tỉnh Phú-Yên, di Bình-Thuận.
 - 09/1954, chuyển đến Cap St Jacques đợi tập kết nhập vào trung-đoàn 812 thuộc tỉnh-đội Bình-Thuận. Vì mất liên-lạc với tiểu-đoàn 248 trong thời gian định chiến d/s vẫn đi công-tác.
 - 10/1954, tập kết ra Bắc đóng tại huyện Tĩnh-Gia thuộc Thanh-Hóa.

APPENDIX K

al Equipment From North Viet-Nam and the Communist Bloc

part I, section VI, D, 4, pp. 37-38)


are reproduced pictures of three Chinese medical charts printed in Peiping. The Vietnamese translations of medical terms are written in. The charts were captured by Republic of Viet-Nam forces in an attack on a Viet Cong post and military unit near Darlac in August 1961.



Below are reproduced pictures of Soviet, Chinese, and other Communist-bloc medicines, medical instruments, and other equipment captured by forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam in actions against the Viet Cong. Articles manufactured in the Communist bloc are not available in South Viet-Nam and must have been introduced from outside.



In an attack on a Viet Cong unit near Ban Me Thuot on October 3, 1961, Viet-Nam Government forces overran a VC medical aid station. The diary of the medical officer was captured (see the Mai Xuan Phong Case in Part I, pp. 41-42). Among the captured equipment were medical supplies, including vials of novocain, atropine, and other drugs manufactured in a state-owned pharmaceutical plant in North Viet-Nam. A picture of some of these vials is reproduced below.



APPENDIX L

1. North Vietnamese Forces in Laos

(See Part I, section VI, E, 1, p. 39)

During the fighting in Laos a number of officers and men of the Army of North Viet-Nam have surrendered or been captured. They have admitted they were ordered to go to Laos to fight alongside the Pathet Lao against the forces of the Royal Lao Government. One such prisoner was Private Second Class Ne Tong, pictured below. He identified himself as a member of Company 2, First Battalion, Regiment 120, of the Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

A summary of Ne Tong's statement to his captors follows:

On December 11, 1960, Regiment 120 of the Army of North Viet-Nam was ordered to move from its base at Phu Quy to the area of Nong Het in Laos. The unit moved by truck along Route #6



to Cua Rao. It then marched, via Route #7, to the Nong Het area.

On December 15 the unit took part in the attack on the Royal Lao Army outpost at Nong Het. Ne Tong was wounded in the right arm and was captured.

Another soldier of the Army of North Viet-Nam captured in Laos was Private Vi Van Sang, pictured below.



Sang was a member of Independent Battalion 925 of the Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. He said he was ordered on February 19, 1961, to go to Laos. He traveled with two sections of 42 men each from his battalion. They marched for 4 days to the Nong Het area in Laos. Then they were moved by truck convoy to the Plaine des Jarres. They were attached to Pathet Lao Battalion #6. Sang took the Lao name of



Lieutenant Nguyen Van Nham.

Boun Kong, a common practice among Vietnamese fighting in Laos.

From the Plaine des Jarres, Sang's unit marched to the Muong Kassy area. They took part in the attack on Muong Kassy on March 11. Eight days later the unit fought in the battle of Pha Tang. Sang was wounded by shrapnel in this engagement and was taken prisoner. He was hospitalized in Vientiane.

Sang said his detachment of 42 specialists in mortars and machineguns who were assigned to fight in Laos was commanded by Sublieutenant Pham Van Duong of the 925th Battalion.

Still another North Vietnamese who took part in the fighting in Laos was Sublieutenant Nguyen Van Nham from the Huong Khe District of Ha Tinh Province. He was a platoon commander in Company 1, 6th Battalion, of the 335th Division, Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

On December 25, 1960, Nham was ordered to go to Laos. He traveled from Moc Chau in the northwest to Hanoi. On December 26 he flew from Gia Lam airport to Vang Vieng in Laos. Nham was accompanied by nine specialists in the use of mortars.

He took part in actions at Phou Pha and Ban Hin Heup. On January 30, 1961, Nham was wounded and captured in a fight near Ban Hin Heup.

The Do Luc Diary

(See Part I, section VI, E, 2, p. 40)


After a fight at Daktrum on September 3, 1961, forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam found a diary in the uniform of a Viet Cong soldier who had been killed in the engagement. Together with the diary were several pictures. One (reproduced on right) shows two men and a young boy. The men are wearing the uniform of the Army of North Viet-Nam.

The Do Luc diary opens on a melancholy, pitiful note. On July 28, 1961, Do Luc wrote a brief note on the first page. Apparently the lonesome soldier pretended it was a message to him from his loved one, Nguyen Thi Minh Chau, in the North. It reads:

"We are in love and we have talked about that many times. Even though mountains and rivers will separate us, I shall wait until the revolution succeeds! My heart aches when I look toward the South, my darling! Is it not true that in the South there is still boiling oil, burning fire and many painful and mournful situations, my darling?"



A photo of the first page of the Do Luc diary is reproduced below



Do Luc made his first entry in his homemade diary on May 4, 1961. On that date he wrote:

"Leaving temporarily the beloved North to return to my native South to liberate my compatriots from the yoke of misery imposed by My-Diem (U.S.-Diem). This has been my ideal for a long time."

An entry of the same date with the time 1:30 a.m. noted:

"Here is the Viet-Nam-Laos border. I will always remember the international love which is engraved deep in my heart."

This was apparently a reference to his earlier service in Laos, which he described later.


By the middle of June, Do Luc and his companions had passed through Laos and had entered South Viet-Nam. On June 17 he wrote:

"Having been away for several years from the territory of Interzone 5 'Quang Nam,' my heart is both happy and sad. What shall I do now to be a worthy son of Interzone 5?"

On August 6, Do Luc wrote as follows:

"A few lines to remind me of this remote place! Not enough rice; meals tasteless because there is not enough salt; clothing is not warm enough for this very high peak.

"Nevertheless, in his determined heart, the fighter for liberation of the South remains faithful to the Party, to the people of the South, and he remains faithful to his only love."



Beginning on August 14, 1961, Do Luc began a review of some of his experiences. He wrote:

"Memory!

"One afternoon which is turning into evening. I am sitting on the peak of a high mountain. This is a famous scenic place. This is the highest peak of the whole chain of mountains, and it is all covered with mist. All this scenery arouses nostalgia in my heart! I try to recall my life since I was a young boy.

"I answered the call of the Party when I was very young, and what did I do for the people of my village? I devoted myself to the people. I took part in propaganda and aroused the people to carry out the policy of the Party and the Government and helped organize village defense and fighting forces. On March 25, 1954, I began my fighting career and I contributed my part in fighting the French Expeditionary Force. With the army of Interzone 5, I saw the end of the war on July 20, 1954, and then on April 26, 1955, I left my native place and all the ties with my family and friends to go North as a victorious fighter.

Since that day, my spirit has matured together with that of the regular army. We have built up a beautiful and prosperous and strong North; the construction sites and factories spring up quickly everywhere under a bright sky and under the superior socialist regime. Close to me there was a unique source of consolation in my life. My life was beautiful, my happiness immeasurable. Enough to eat; warm clothing in my daily life; earning a living was fairly easy; often I enjoyed songs and dances which deal with the healthy life of all the people in the North and with the maturity of the Army."

In the following entry Do Luc wrote:

"Then, one morning, while my life was touched with a fresh, joyous and peaceful atmosphere, in harmony with the reconstruction program in the North, while my life was a normal one and I was happy with my only love . . .

"Suddenly, on December 15, 1960, . . .

"I answered the needs of the international solidarity of the Vietnamese-Laotian proletariat. I

had to leave my beloved fatherland and my sweet life and go to help our friends with a spirit of unselfishness, of class solidarity, of love for my fatherland, and the spirit of the international proletarian revolution, in order to annihilate the reactionary clique of Pumi Buon Um (Phoumi-Boun Oum) so that mankind and the two countries, Viet-Nam and Laos, could achieve prosperity and happiness.

"Thus, I succeeded in meeting the needs of a friendly country.

"Our friends' war has stopped and the guns are silent. On the call of the Party, I returned to my beloved fatherland! My life returned to normal. I enjoyed again the peaceful atmosphere and my happiness. I continued training daily for the defense of the territory of the North and for the continuation of the liberation of the South. But I was back with my only love. Hurrah! How happy and how sweet. But my life could not continue that way!

"For the third time my life turned to war again. For the liberation of our compatriots in the South, a situation of boiling oil and burning fire is necessary! A situation in which husband is separated


from wife, father from son, brother from brother is necessary. I joined the ranks of the liberation army in answer to the call of the front for liberation of the South.

"Now my life is full of hardship—not enough rice to eat nor enough salt to give a taste to my tongue, not enough clothing to keep myself warm! But in my heart I keep loyal to the Party and to the people. I am proud and happy.

"I am writing down this story for my sons and my grandsons of the future to know of my life and activities during the revolution when the best medicine available was the root of the wild banana tree and the best bandage was the leaf of rau lui, when there was no salt to give a taste to our meals, when there was no such food as meat or fish like we enjoy in a time of peace and happiness such as I have known and left behind. But that day will not take long to return to my life."

On the back pages of his diary, Do Luc had listed a number of Vietnamese words with their equivalents in the language of one of the mountain tribes in the area where he was stationed.

(See page reproduced below.)



In the back pages of his diary, Do Luc also listed "10 disciplinary rules for military security" as follows:

"1. Do not disclose army secrets. Do not be curious about your own responsibilities and duties.

"2. Do not discuss the duties you must carry out.

"3. You must respect absolutely the regulations which protect documents during your activities. Do not carry with you those things that regulations prohibit you from carrying. If you are captured by the enemy, be determined not to give in."

(Ironically, this regulation on documents was violated by the diary in which he wrote down the rule!)

"Slogans:—absolute loyalty to the revolution
—death is preferable to slavery

"4. Keep secret our method of hiding weapons.

"5. Do not take the liberty of listening to enemy broadcasts or of reading their newspapers or documents. Do not spread false rumors.

"6. Do not have any relations with any organization with evil segments of the population which are harmful to the revolution.

"7. Do not take your family or relatives or friends to military camp sites.

"8. Keep order and security among the population as well as among yourselves.

"9. Do not cease to carry out self-criticism or being vigilant, and continue your training.

"10. Implement seriously these ten rules, mentally as well as in deeds."

The map below shows Do Luc's itinerary from 1954 to 1961.




APPENDIX N

The Vo Van Tan Case

(See Part I, section VI, E, 2, p. 41)

Vo Van Tan, whose picture appears below, was a private, first class, in the First Battalion of Regiment 664, Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (North Viet-Nam). In June 1961 he was assigned to a special unit, Independent Battalion #2, to go to South Viet-Nam. In August, after a battle, Tan decided to defect. He stole some rice and money and made his way to Saigon. On September 18 he was arrested by the police at the An Dong bus station during a routine check of identification papers.



BẢN KHẨU CUNG

của

VỎ VĂN TẤN tự VỎ HOA MI tự
VỎ-MAI-HÀ bí danh VỎ QUANG VINH,
Thượng-sĩ thuộc Tiểu-đoàn II Cán-Bộ
Việt-Cộng, đặc phái trở vào Nam hoạt
động, bị bắt ngày 18/9/61 tại SÀI GÒN.



I.- LÝ LỊCH

- VỎ VĂN TẤN tự VỎ HOA MI tự VỎ MAI HÀ, bí danh VỎ QUANG MINH.
- Sinh năm 1927 tại xã Hưng Lợi, Huyện Giồng Riềng, tỉnh Rạch Giá (KIÊN GIANG).
- Con ông VỎ VĂN QUANG (c) và Bà Nguyễn thị HẰNG (c).
- Thợ mộc
- độc thân
- Khai chưa tiền án.
- Anh chị em ruột : không có.

Nhận dạng :

Cao 1m.52 - Trung người. Da bánh ít. Mặt trái soan. Gò má cao. Mắt sâu. Lông mày đen và dài. Miệng rộng. Một nốt ruồi cách 2 phân trên đầu lông mày trái, gần giữa trán. Rái tai trái lép một miếng nhỏ.

II.- TRƯỜNG HỢP BỊ BẮT

Thượng sĩ quân đội Việt-Cộng thuộc Tiểu đoàn 2 Độc Lập (tiểu đoàn cán-bộ) đặc phái vào Nam tăng cường cho các đơn-vị V.C., đào ngũ và đánh cướp tiền của đơn-vị trốn vào Sài Gòn, bị bắt tại bến xe An Đông (Saigon) ngày 18/9/61.

III.- TIN TỨC CHANH THƠ

~~Huân chương của Bộ V.V.C. cấp kết nạp và hoạt động~~
~~giải thưởng~~
~~ngày 7/10/61~~

- Trước năm 1945 : ở chẵn trâu cho người có ruộng, sau theo ông già vừa làm ruộng vừa học nghề thợ mộc.
- 1946 : gia nhập Thanh-niên Tiên-Phong xã Hưng Lợi, huyện Châu Thành tỉnh Rạch Giá.
- 1948 : sau khi Thanh-niên tiên-phong giải tán, gia nhập đoàn Thanh Niên Cứu Quốc xã Hưng Lợi.
- 11-1952 : do sự giới thiệu của tên MIÊN, tiểu đội trưởng Du-kịch xã ấp Hưng Đông xã Hưng Lợi, y được kết nạp vào Tiểu đội trên và tham gia (cùng đơn-vị chủ lực địa-phương) công tác chặn viện các đồn bót lẻ tẻ trong xã.

.... / 2

INTERROGATION REPORT

for

VO VAN TAN, alias Vo Hoa Mi, alias Vo Mai Ha, secret name of Vo Quang Vinh, Private, First Class, Battalion 2, Viet Cong cadre, charged with returning to South Viet-Nam for active duty. Arrested in Saigon, September 18, 1961.

I. Biographical data

- Vo Van Tan, alias Vo Hoa Mi, alias Vo Mai Ha, secret name Vo Quang Vinh
- Born in 1927 in Hung Loi hamlet, Giong Rieng district, Rach Gia province (now Kien Giang)
- Father is Vo Van Quang; mother is Nguyen Thi Hang
- Carpenter
- Single
- Declared he has no police record
- No sisters or brothers

Measurements:

1.52 meters; medium build; complexion—clear brown; high cheekbones; deep-set eyes; long black eyebrows; large mouth; mole 2 mm. over right eyebrow near middle; left ear close to head.

II. Circumstances of arrest

Private, first class, in Viet Cong Independent Battalion 2 (cadre battalion). Was assigned to South Viet-Nam to increase the potential of Viet Cong units. He deserted, stole the money of the battalion, and escaped to Saigon. He was arrested at An Dong bus station in Saigon on September 18, 1961.

III. Specific information

- Before 1945: he kept buffaloes for his aunt. Later he worked in the rice fields with his father and at the same time was trained to be a carpenter.
- 1946: he joined the Youth Commandos of Hung Loi village, Chau Thanh district, Rach Gia province.
- 1948: after the Youth Commandos were disbanded, he joined the Youth for Liberation of the Country.

- November 1952: He was sponsored by a man named Mien, who was head of a guerrilla platoon in Hung Dong hamlet, Hung Loi village, and was accepted as a member of this platoon which took part (together with other local platoons) in attacks on scattered outposts near the village.

(end of page 1)

A summary of the remainder of Vo Van Tan's confession follows:

In October 1954 he boarded a French ship to go to the North. At O Cap he transferred to a Russian ship together with about 3,000 other Vietnamese. On October 5, 1954, they arrived at Sam Son in Thanh Hoa province in North Viet-Nam. He was assigned to the 338th Division.

In 1961, in preparation for their assignment to South Viet-Nam, Tan and some of his comrades were given a special course to familiarize them with the use of French and U.S. weapons. On June 20, 1961, they began their journey to the South, starting at Hoa Binh, then passing through Hanoi and Thanh to Vinh, where they rested. From Vinh they traveled southwest into Laos. Tan noted the passage of his unit, Independent Battalion No. 2, through "Cam Muon," the Laotian province of Khammouane.

They entered South Viet-Nam through Quang Nam Province. Tan said they passed through Kontum and Darlac Provinces and operated in the area around the city of Ban Me Thuot.

On August 26, 1961, Tan said, his unit encountered troops of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam and suffered heavy casualties. He said they were saved only by a Viet Cong unit that was nearby and came to their aid. Tan and the rest of the survivors managed to escape into the jungle. Tan told his interrogators that he deserted within 24 hours following this engagement.

He stole a bag of rice and 95,000 piasters (about \$1,292) from his unit and left for Saigon. Traveling entirely at night, he reached his goal but he was picked up almost immediately by South Vietnamese police.

The map below shows Vo Van Tan's travels.



APPENDIX O


The Mai Xuan Phong Diary

(See Part I, section VI, E, 2, pp. 41-42)

On October 3, 1961, in Darlac Province a unit of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam overran a Viet Cong camp. The VC group had included a small medical detachment. The ARVN

forces captured some medical supplies and a diary kept by the Viet Cong medical officer, a man named Mai Xuan Phong. The first dated entry in the diary is for April 20, 1961; the final one, for September 21, 1961. In the back pages of his notebook Phong wrote the words of a popular Vietnamese song.

The cover of the Mai Xuan Phong diary is pictured below.



Excerpts from the Mai Xuan Phong diary follow:

(page 4)

The most precious thing for a man is his life, because one has only one life. One must, then, live in such a way that one does not have to regret the wasted years and months, that one does not have to be ashamed of a pitiful past, that one is able to say before passing away: my whole life, my whole

strength have been devoted to the most elevated and the most beautiful cause—the struggle for the liberation of mankind. . . .

(page 5)

. . . And one has to live in a hurry. A stupid accident, disease, or any tragic hazard may suddenly put an end to one's life. . . .

(page 6)

April 20, 1961

Departure for a new mission to which I have been assigned. There are so many happy memories which will encourage me to fulfill my duty

April 22, 1961

We left the beloved fatherland at exactly five minutes to 12. Here is a friendly country. We have to cross a very mountainous border region.

(page 7)

May 14, 1961

At 15 minutes before 9:00 we arrived at Highway No. 9 which has just been liberated. On the highway lie the remnants of four enemy GMC trucks and two armored cars which our forces have destroyed. We arrived at the post of Muong Phin (Muong Phine) which has just been liberated. We slept at Muong Phine and, next day, we cross Highway No. 9.

(unintelligible code sign "6-5 * +")

We stop here and help build a road to allow trucks to bring in rice supplies. For two days, we have been short of food and had only glutinous rice. This portion of our route is really hard. The sun is burning hot. We do not have enough drinking water

(page 8)

but our patriotism and our determination to liberate the native land will help us overcome all the difficulties and accomplish our duty.

(signature)

June 1, 1961

At 15 minutes to 2:00 we arrived at the regrouping station located on the border between Laos and Viet-Nam, at the border of Quang Nam [Province]. I have been away from the beloved fatherland for one month and 20 days (Note: bad arithmetic, should be one month and 10 days!), and I have been away from my native South for 6 years.

(signature)

(page 9)

At exactly 3:00 p.m. on the 10th of June '61 we arrived at the boundary of Contum (Kontum) province


(signature)

We entered Cambodia on July 10, 1961—across the border of Cambodia and Viet-Nam in the province of Gia Rai

(page 10)

We arrived at the operational base in Dac Lac (Darlac) province, in the southwest highlands, on August 7, 1961

On August 9, I received orders to go on a mission and join an armed unit. This unit has just been organized. It does not have living quarters yet and is not yet fully equipped. The unit is composed of only two squads, all mountain tribesmen except for two Vietnamese who came from the North. As for me, in my capacity as medical assistant, I find that there are no conditions or means for me to operate. There is not sufficient medicine. Life in this base is really difficult



(page 11)

But I shall overcome all these difficulties in order to fulfill my duty in the revolution in the South.

After three months and nine days, after having crossed many a border—Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam—after having gone through all this hardship and danger, I think that I have accomplished at this point a part of my duty.

August 9, 1961

(signature)

(page 12)

September 20, 1961

Today we begin our tour of armed propaganda. We shall attack the enemy and establish popular bases among the population of the land development centers in Dac Lac (Darlac) province, in the southwest highlands

September 21, 1961

I received instructions to report to K (note: probably the Viet Cong operational headquarters

in the Ban Me Thuot area) in order to be assigned a new mission

(page 14)

September 21, 1961


At 5:30, our forces launched a massive attack on the land development center of Quang Nhieu, Ba Moi Thuoc (Ban Me Thuot), and we proceeded to armed propaganda. We gathered together about 400 people and propagandized on the policy of the Front for Liberation of the South

We have secured good results. We have awakened these people after the dark years they lived under My-Diem. We seized many documents and much military equipment

(signature)

The inside cover of the Mai Xuan Phong diary bears the seal of the Tong Cong Ty Bach Hoa (literally, General Company for a Hundred Things), a state-owned enterprise in North Vietnam.

The inside cover of the Mai Xuan Phong diary is reproduced below.



The map below shows Mai Xuan Phong's itinerary.



ITEM 1

(See Part 1, section VI, F, 1, pp. 43–44)

The medical record, reproduced below, showed that Cuong was suffering from a lung ailment. The record sheet is headed "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam." It is from the "Military Medical Office, Medical Section 108."



The "Announcement Certificate" below is a receipt for the certificate of introduction for Cuong from the Lao Dong Party (Communist Party). It is dated April 1961 and shows that he was a member of the Party since 1947. He apparently brought it from the North to present to his new Party unit, F 351, in the South.

(FRONT)

ĐẢNG LAO ĐỘNG VIỆT-NAM

PHIẾU BÁO

Ban Tổ chức _____

Đã tiếp nhận giấy giới thiệu S.H.Đ. _____

Số _____

Kính gửi: BAN TỔ CHỨC F351

Xin báo đã tiếp nhận giấy giới thiệu sinh hoạt Đảng số 479 46
ngày 4/4/61 của Bao
Đồng chí Huyên Cường vào Đảng 4/47
Chính thức 7/47

Ngày _____ tháng _____ năm _____
T/M Ban Tổ chức _____

Chú ý — Hướng dẫn cách ghi xem ở mặt sau

(BACK)

Chú ý:

— Khi cơ quan giới thiệu sinh hoạt Đảng cho đồng viên phải viết kèm phiếu báo.

— Mục Kính gửi Ban Tổ chức.... thù nơi gửi viết luôn, tức là viết trả lại cho cơ quan mình.

— Ngày vào Đảng, ngày chính thức cũng cơ quan gửi ghi vào luôn.

— Cơ quan tiếp nhận giấy giới thiệu sinh hoạt Đảng chỉ xem lại ngày vào Đảng, ngày chính thức trong giấy giới thiệu sinh hoạt Đảng rồi ghi số, ngày tháng và ký tên đóng dấu...

Below is a photograph of a "Certificate of Introduction" from the Lao Dong Party in the name of Huynh Van Cuong. It lists his Party alias, Quoc Cang, and notes his entry into the Party on April 3, 1947. It is from his regular organization, chapter 11, section E 400, and lists his next assignment as "administrative headquarters for cadre." It requests that Cuong be permitted by his new organization in the South, "F 351," to carry out "special missions."

(FRONT)

SS: /GTSHD Kinh chuyển:

Để nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại

Ngày tháng năm 195

ĐẢNG LAO ĐỘNG VIỆT-NAM

Chi bộ A

E 400

SS: A11 /GTSHD Kinh gửi: Phòng chính trị, E 400

*
Đồng chí Huynh Van Cuong, tuổi 35
Bi danh Quoc Cang
Được kết nạp vào Đảng ngày: Tháng 4 năm 1947
Được tuyên bố chính thức ngày: Tháng 4 năm 1947
Hiện công tác ở: Chi bộ A, Phòng 400
Ngày đi công tác ở: Phòng chính trị

Được phân cấp tuổi Đảng loại: của và đã lãnh hết tháng năm 195

Đã đóng Đảng phí hết tháng 3 năm 1951

Mong các đồng chí giới thiệu cho đồng chí Huynh Van Cuong được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng.

Kính theo:

Độc điểm:

Cao: 1m 68 Ngày 3 tháng 4 năm 1951

Đến và đi lại:

Số chứng minh thư: 034 1777 Thay mặt cùng chứng thực: Ủy ban chính trị

SS: /GTSHD Kinh chuyển:

Để nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại

Ngày tháng năm 195

SS: 711 /GTSHD Kinh chuyển: Ban Chính trị F 351

Để nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại

Ngày 3 tháng 6 năm 1951

Photograph of a "Certificate of Introduction"—*Continued*
(BACK)

<p>Số 46/GTSHD</p> <p>Kính chuyển: Cục Cao cấp Tư pháp Chính trị Cục</p> <p>Để nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại</p> <p>Ngày 1 tháng 4 năm 1961 Tướng Bạo Tố Chính</p> <p><i>[Signature]</i> Hoàng Văn Cui</p>	<p>Số 1/GTSHD</p> <p>Kính chuyển:</p> <p>Để nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại</p> <p>Ngày tháng năm 196</p>
<p>Số 1/GTSHD</p> <p>Kính chuyển:</p> <p>Để nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại</p> <p>Ngày tháng năm 196</p>	<p>Số 1/GTSHD</p> <p>Kính chuyển:</p> <p>Để nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại</p> <p>Ngày tháng năm 196</p>
<p>Số 1/GTSHD</p> <p>Kính chuyển:</p> <p>Để nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại</p> <p>Ngày tháng năm 196</p>	<p>Số 1/GTSHD</p> <p>Kính chuyển:</p> <p>Để nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại</p> <p>Ngày tháng năm 196</p>

Party Leadership of Front Organizations

(See Part I, section VI, F, 2, pp. 44-46)

Below is a page from the "Draft Program of Action and Rules of Procedure of the Association of Peasants for Liberation" picked up by Republic of Viet-Nam authorities in Dinh Tuong Province in 1960.

ĐỢT - T H Ạ O

CHƯƠNG - TRÌNH VÀ ĐIỀU - L Ệ

TÓM TẮT C Ủ A

HỘI NÔNG - DÂN GIẢI - PHÓNG



A.- CHƯƠNG-TRÌNH :

Nông-dân Lao-Động chúng ta rất đông, gồm trên 90 phần trăm dân số của dân-tộc. Chúng ta là những người sản-xuất ra lúa gạo, thực-phẩm và nhiều vật-liệu khác cho công-nghệ. Chúng ta nuôi sống mọi người và làm giàu cho đất nước. Hàng ngày chúng ta đổ ra biết bao nhiêu mồ-hôi, công sức, tay chân bần đê biên đời hoang, rừng rậm, bưng sinh thành đồng ruộng và vườ² tước mệnh-mạng tuổi tốt. Đồng ruộng vườn tước ấy do tay chúng ta làm nên đang le chúng ta phải được quyền làm chủ, nhưng lại lọt vào tay Thực-Dân Đế-Quốc và Phong-Kiến địa-chủ.

Chúng ta lao động vất-và, song vì tô² tước nặng nề tay làm không đủ hàm nhai, manh quan tâm ao không lạnh, đau yếu không thuốc men. Ngoài ra hằng ngày bọn Chanh-Quyên thống-trị áp bức bóc-lột chúng ta rất nặng nề, nào là sưu cao thuế nặng, nào là bắt sâu, bắt lính, nào là tù đầy giết chóc, tra-tấn da-mạn, nào đồn dân dưới làng, nào bắt chúng ta vào ("Khu-Tru-Mật" "Dinh-Điện").

Nông-dân chúng ta đã có truyền thống đấu-tranh Cách-Mạng anh-dũng đã từng đứng lên chống Đế-Quốc Pháp, Nhật, và bọn Phong-Kiến Cường-hạo. Dưới sự lãnh đạo của giai-cấp Công-Nhân và Đảng Tiên-Phong Cách-Mạng là Đảng Cộng-Sản Đông-Dương tức là Đảng Lao-Động Việt-Nam hiện nay từ năm 1930 chúng ta đã tham gia các cuộc biểu-tình chống thuế, chống sưu, chống tô-tước và mọi áp bức bóc lột khác, đã quật khởi trong cuộc Nam-Kỳ khởi nghĩa năm 1940, đánh đổ Pháp, Nhật giành thắng lợi cho cuộc Cách-Mạng tháng 8 vĩ-đại và kháng-chiến 9 năm thắng giặc Pháp một cách anh-hùng.

Cách-Mạng tháng 8 đã thật sự giải-quyết quyền lợi ruộng đất cho chúng ta, đem lại cho chúng ta đại-vị xứng đáng của con người, đem lại cho chúng ta cơm ăn áo mặc, từ chỗ giam-tò, xoa nọ cu, giam tước đi đến tạm cất đất cho chúng ta. Ở miền Bắc hiện nay toàn bộ giai-cấp địa-chủ đã bị đánh đổ, Nông-dân lao-động chúng ta trở thành chủ nhưn ông ở thóm xóm, đời sống hằng ngày càng được cải-thiện không ngừng.

Nhưng ở miền Nam bọn Đế-Quốc Mỹ và bọn Phong-Kiến Ngô-Đình-Diệm manh tâm chia cắt đất nước chúng ta và trắng trợn xoa bỏ mọi quyền lợi mà chúng ta đã đổ xương máu mới giành được. Luật 57 cải-cách ruộng đất giả hiệu của chúng ta, tước bỏ quyền sở hữu ruộng đất của chúng ta, dùng tước bọn địa chủ cường hào ác bá cướp đất, tăng tô, xao cạp, Mỹ bỏ tiền ra bắt con em chúng ta đi lính dựng lên một Quân-Đội Phạt-Xất, lính sung dạn của Mỹ, do Mỹ chỉ huy ngày đêm đi đàn áp, bóc-lột, kềm kẹp chúng ta, gây ra không biết bao nhiêu tội ác. Trước mắt chúng chỉ có hai con đường : hoặc cam tâm chịu chết lần chết mòn theo tham dưới gong cùm của Mỹ - Diệm, hoặc phải vùng lên đấu-tranh để cứu mình, cứu nhà, cứu nước, để giành quyền sống. không thể khác nữa, chúng ta chọn con đường thứ hai, con đường Cách-Mạng.

....2....

Excerpts from the "Draft Program of Action and Rules of Procedure of the Association of Peasants for Liberation":

(Page 1)—"Our peasants have an old and glorious tradition of resistance against the imperialists, French and Japanese, and against the feudalists and exploiters. Under the leadership of the working class and the leadership of the Party, which is in the vanguard of the revolution, which was the Communist Party of Indochina, and which is now the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam, since 1930 we have taken part in all the demonstrations against taxes, forced labor, taxes on the rice crop, and all other kinds of exploitation"

(Page 2)—"The Association of Peasants for Liberation, together with all the other classes and revolutionary forces belonging to the Popular Front for Liberation of South Viet-Nam, will contribute to strengthening the links of solidarity among the working classes under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam"

TÀI LIỆU THAM-KHAO VỀ
TỔ CHỨC NÔNG HỘI

BÁO CÁO TÌNH HÌNH TỔ CHỨC NÔNG HỘI
VÀ HƯỚNG DẪN HỌC TẬP CHƯƠNG TRÌNH
ĐIỀU LỆ Ở XÃ

I.- VỀ TỔ CHỨC NÔNG HỘI .-

1/- Ban van-dong Nong-hoi Xa :

Vì CU nam tình-hình không sát với van-dong không ky, cho nên đến ngay tập-trung học-tập (30/12/60) chỉ có 5 uy-vien và do CUV fu-trach Nong-hoi là 6 người, còn 1 ở Lập-Vĩnh từ chối không đảm nhận nhiệm-vụ. Nay đã tìm được người thay thế, đã đủ 7 uy-vien, gồm có : 1 Co-nong, và 5 Trung-nong lớp dưới.

Vì tình-hình giai-cap ở đây đã sơ là Trung-nong và đã sơ đông-chi và nong-cot là Trung-nong, cho nên chưa thực-hiện được đã sơ Ban van-dong Xa là Ban-Co-nong.

Một điều nữa là trong Ban van-dong Xa chưa có Phu-nu. Do cùng là do y-thức van-dong Phu-nu của các đông-chi còn kém, còn ngại van đề kém văn-hóa của chi em. Mặt khác chi em ngại đi công-tác ra ngoài ấp, ban công việc gia-dinh, còn cái, ngại làm việc với các ông "Nông-dân" đang van-dong 2 CH làm uy-vien du-khuyết, nham các ấp chưa có đại-bieu (L. Binh, L. Châu).

Sau khi học-tập, Ban van-dong Xa fan-cong fu-trach các ấp, fan công đi hướng-dẫn học-tập và tổ-chức các Ban chấp-hành ấp. Chưa fan - TV vì chưa nắm chắc trình-độ của mỗi uy-vien. Chỉ fan-cong 1 uy-vien thường-trực là do CUV fu-trach Nong-hoi.

2/- Ban Cán-sự Nong-hoi ấp :

Đã thành-lập xong 9 Ban Cán-sự ấp còn 1 ấp Long-Châu chưa thành-lập vì do fu-trach Binh. Hai, ấp châu-vi Cầu-van thì không thành lập Ban Cán-sự mà có cán-bộ van-dong đơn-tuyên với đông-chi fu-trach Nong-hoi trong các Ban Cán-sự ấp có đại-bieu Phu-nu nhưng chưa khắp (lý do như trên) thì nh-fan giai-cap ở đây có nhiều BN hơn ở các Xa.

Vì fan lớn uy-vien Xa fu-trach 2 ấp và còn ban mà mắng cho nên đến tới mai (30/1/61) mới học xong Ban Cán-sự ấp.

Uy-vien Ban van-dong không kiêm trọng Ban Cán-sự, mà chỉ hướng - dẫn giúp-đo Ban Cán-sự.

3/- Tổ Nong-hoi : (ke-hoạch).

Vì thời gian đến cuối bước chỉ còn 2 ngày mà mất hết 1 buổi họp kiểm-điểm tình-hình và tổ-chức Ban cán-sự, cho nên yêu-cau tổ-chức Tổ Nong-hoi chỉ thực-hiện được ở 1 số ấp hơi trước, còn các ấp khác mỗi uy-vien Ban van-dong và Ban Cán-sự chỉ có thể van-dong được 1 vài hội-vien.

Uy-vien Ban van-dong và Ban Cán-sự không trực-tiếp làm Tổ-trưởng Tổ Nong-hoi. Uy-vien Ban van-dong vừa trực-tiếp hướng-dẫn Ban Cán-sự vừa trực-tiếp hướng-dẫn 1 Tổ Nong-hoi nơi mình ở để rút kinh-nghiem chung.

4/- Thắc-mắc về tổ-chức Nong-hoi :

- Có tổ-chức nong-cot và TVBM và Nong-hoi không ?

Excerpts from "Research Document on the Organization of Peasants Association":

(Page 4)—"Our final victory will depend on our policy in rural areas. The Front's policy should be in deep harmony with the laboring class and should be placed under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam"

(Page 6)—"Under what leadership should the Peasants Association be placed?

"The Peasants Association accepts the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam because: imperialism and feudalism, concretely represented by the U.S.-Diem clique, are the peasants' enemies and have always exploited and oppressed the peasants; on the other hand, the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam has always led the fight against imperialists and feudalists, and for the liberation of the people"

Below is a page from a letter from the commanding officer of Company 265 of the "Army of Liberation of the South" addressed to officers and men of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam at Truc Giang in Kien Hoa Province, dated June 5, 1960.

Giải-Phóng Quân Miền Nam
Việt-Nam

Sân Chỉ-Huy Đại-Đội
265

ĐỐI : Anh em binh sĩ, sĩ quan
trong hàng ngũ, quân-đội
chánh quyền Mỹ-Điệm ở
Trúc-Giang.

Các Bạn thân mến,

Sáu năm qua, đế quốc Mỹ và bè lũ phong kiến Việt-gian do tên Ngô đình Diệm cầm đầu, cố tận tâm sát phong trào cách mạng của nhân-dân ta, giết hại những người yêu nước, yêu hòa-bình để chúng đế bệ thực hiện âm mưu biến miền Nam thành thuộc địa và căn cứ quân sự của đế quốc Mỹ, chuẩn bị gây chiến tranh đánh miền Bắc, Lào, Miên hầu mong bắt nhân-dân ta và nhân-dân Miên-Lào làm nô lệ cho chúng.

Để đi sâu vào âm mưu giết người, chúng xua đẩy anh em binh sĩ, sĩ quan trong quân-đội miền Nam đi sâu vào con đường tội lỗi, tàn sát chèn giết giữa người Việt và người Việt với nhau. Ngoài thủ đoạn mua chuộc, dụ dỗ bằng chức tước tiền bạc, Mỹ-Điệm lại dùng thủ đoạn nham hiểm đen tối hơn là đưa ra chiêu bài chống Cộng, tố Cộng, cho rằng Cộng-Sân phá rối trật tự, an ninh v.v... để tạo lý lẽ tàn sát dân-tộc giết hại những người yêu nước, yêu hòa bình, hầu tị do bắt nhân dân ta và xua binh lính miền Nam ra mặt trận gây một cuộc chiến tranh Nam-Bắc tương tàn để giữ vững địa vị thống trị tội lỗi, mục nát của chúng.

Trong qua 10 năm kháng chiến và 6 năm đấu tranh chánh trị, đồng bào ta đã hiểu rõ Cộng-Sân không phải là người phá rối trật tự an ninh như Mỹ-Điệm nói, mà Cộng-Sân chính là những người yêu nước, yêu hòa bình và có công với Tổ quốc với dân-tộc nhất.

Những người Cộng-Sân luôn luôn đi đầu trong công cuộc chiến đấu chống Pháp thắng lợi, thiết thực đem lại ruộng cày, nhà ở cho nông-dân. Người Cộng-Sân Việt-Nam đã lãnh đạo nhân-dân Việt-Nam chiến thắng Điện Biên Phủ, ký hiệp định Genève, lập lại hòa bình ở Đông-Dương, giải phóng được miền Bắc và lãnh đạo toàn dân đấu tranh 6 năm qua, kềm hãm không cho Mỹ-Điệm gây một cuộc chiến tranh tàn khốc, thực tế nhờ người Cộng-Sân mà anh em binh-sĩ, sĩ quan trong hàng ngũ Mỹ-Điệm đỡ đổ máu vô ích vì âm mưu đen tối của Mỹ-Điệm.

Đã qua, người Cộng-Sân Việt-Nam lãnh đạo nhân-dân Việt-Nam đánh bại thực dân Pháp, bệ lũ phong kiến Bảo-Đại. Hiện tại và tương lai người Cộng-Sân Việt-Nam đã và sẽ lãnh đạo nhân-dân Việt-Nam đánh bại đế quốc Mỹ và bọn phong kiến Việt-gian Miên, đem chiếu bài chống Cộng để thực hiện chánh sách cứu nước, ban nước của chúng.

Người . . .

Below is a page from a letter, dated April 22, 1960 from the same source as that on the previous page.

GIẢI PHÓNG QUÂN MIỀN NAM
VIỆT NAM

Ban Chỉ-Huy Đại-Đội

Văn-phòng, ngày 22 tháng 4 năm 1960

Thân ái gửi anh em binh sĩ,

Chúng tôi đứng trên quan niệm dân-tộc này : sắc da vàng, giống nòi thuần và có trách nhiệm đối với gia đình anh. Đồng thời chúng tôi được hiểu gia đình anh xuất thân từ giai cấp bị bóc lột vì hoàn cảnh hay do ý. Vẫn còn trong hàng ngũ giặc, giết hại đồng bào ta gây nên cảnh tan tóc cột nhục tướng tàn, chính gia đình anh cũng vẫn nằm trong gia đình do trước nhất ai hết.

Nên chúng tôi viết thư này gửi đến anh mục đích là để cùng nhau bàn bạc tình hình thời cuộc nhiệm-vụ của cộng-dân đối với giai đoạn này để có phương hướng xuất định con đường đi và đường tránh, đồng thời gửi đến anh lời thăm hỏi sức khỏe an lành.

Anh ơi : lập trường cách mạng và nhiệm vụ phản đế phản phong của toàn dân do Đảng Lao-Động Việt Nam lãnh-đạo là phải tiêu diệt đế quốc và phong kiến để thực hiện người cày có ruộng, tạo điều kiện tiến lên Xã-Hội chủ-nghĩa và Cộng-Sản chủ-nghĩa. Nhưng trước mắt hiện nay phải tiêu diệt đế quốc xâm lược Mỹ, tập đoàn phong kiến quan liêu là Ngô-Trần hòa bình thống nhất Tổ quốc trên cơ sở độc lập dân-chủ để xây dựng một nước Việt-Nam.

Hòa bình thống nhất độc-lập dân-chủ và giàu mạnh.

Xuất phát từ lập trường cách mạng nhiệm vụ và quyền lợi nhiệm vụ tối cao nguyện vọng tối cao của dân tộc. Kẻ nài đi ngược lại nguyện vọng cao đẹp đó và cộng tác với Mỹ-Địch ngày nay là kẻ thù Việt-gian nhất định phải tiêu diệt.

Bởi gì ai ai cũng nhận rằng : Dân-tộc Việt-Nam đã từng anh dũng bất khuất đứng lên làm cách mạng chống thực dân Pháp can thiệp Mỹ gần 100 năm dưới sự lãnh đạo của Đảng Cộng-Sản nay là Đảng Lao-Động Việt-Nam anh minh nhất tinh hoa nhất, sáng suốt nhất là Hồ-Chủ-Tịch đã đưa cách mạng thành công cướp chính quyền tháng 8 năm 1945 dưới tay Phat-xít 10 năm trước kỳ kháng chiến nhất định thắng lợi. Hòa bình được lập lại ở Việt-Nam. Miền Bắc nước ta được giải phóng, hiệp định Genève ra đời ngày nay đã tạm ngừng thực hiện được trong nước một ánh tỏ rõ, hàng tay nghe mắt thấy với sự thật.

Nhưng . . .

Excerpts from the letters of the commanding officer of Company 265:

1. (June 5, 1960)—“In the past, the Vietnamese Communists have led the Vietnamese people in the victorious fight against the French colonialists and the feudalistic Bao Dai clique. Now and in the future, the Vietnamese Communists are leading and will lead the Vietnamese people in the struggle against the American imperialists and the feudal Diem clique”

2. (April 22, 1960)—“The policy of the revolution and the responsibility of the entire population in the fight against colonialism and feudalism, under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam, is to annihilate imperialism and feudalism, to give land to the tillers, and to lay the foundation for the building of socialism and communism”

Calls for More Aggressive Action

(See Part I, section VI, F, 3, p. 46)

Below is a page from "Instructions on the Creation of People's Self-Defense Units" seized by Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam authorities in Bien Hoa Province on February 8, 1961.

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CHI - THI .

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V/v XÂY DỰNG ĐỘI VTTV CỦA NHÂN DÂN

I/- Kiểm điểm tình hình ~~hiện~~ xây dựng Đội Võ-Trang đã qua 12 nhận thấy có mấy khuyết điểm sau đây cần được các cấp Đảng hết sức quan tâm và khắc phục sửa chữa kịp thời ~~đạt đến kỳ vọng~~.

A) Về tổ chức chưa tinh giản, kết nạp thành phần thiếu cơ bản trong sạch, giai cấp, tự giác cách mạng. Do đó chất lượng chưa đảm bảo. ~~nhệm vụ~~.

B) Xây dựng chưa lấy chính trị làm chính để có cơ sở chủ yếu phát huy khả năng quân sự.

Do khuyết điểm trên nên tình hình tổ chức và chất lượng thành phần của một số chiến sĩ trong các Đội Võ-Trang hiện nay chưa đúng tiêu chuẩn và do đó chưa đảm bảo nhiệm vụ Cách-Mạng mà Đảng đã đề ra.

II/- Đề khắc phục khuyết điểm trên chúng ta cần nhận rõ :

A) Công cuộc đấu tranh cách mạng ở miền nam hiện nay có đầy đủ tính chất đấu tranh giai cấp gay gắt và sự đối kháng giai cấp của kẻ thù rất ác liệt.

Cho nên việc xây dựng và tổ chức lực lượng võ trang của Đảng hiện nay phải là tổ chức võ trang của Công-Nông (Công-Nhân, Công-Nông Bán-Nông và Trung-Nông) mới có sức mạnh đánh ngã địch. Xây dựng cho chiến sĩ có một tinh thần chiến đấu vì giai cấp Công-Nông vì Nhân-Dân theo đường lối của Đảng dưới sự lãnh đạo của Đảng, nhận rõ lực lượng võ trang là của Đảng tổ chức xây dựng nên dù là quân chúng trong Đội cũng phải theo chế độ chính trị của Đảng tức là chiến đấu, công tác, học tập, sinh hoạt, tinh thần tự tưởng, kỷ luật, v.v... đều phải tuân theo lãnh đạo của Đảng, theo quân chủ trương chính sách của Đảng.

B) Nhận rõ tính chất lâu dài từ hoạt động hỗ trợ đấu tranh chính trị của quần chúng đi đến Tổng-Khởi-Nghĩa, phải trải qua chiến đấu, võ trang tuyên truyền, công tác quần chúng chịu đựng mọi gian khổ mệt tập trong hoạn nạn Cách-Mạng. Thấy rõ vai trò nòng cốt cho sự phát triển lực lượng võ trang sắp tới và nòng cốt cho các lực lượng võ trang khởi nghĩa của nhân dân mà xây dựng.

C) Trong xây dựng lực lượng võ trang phải lấy xây dựng chính trị làm chính vì tính chất giai cấp của quân đội Cách-Mạng, phát huy khả năng quân sự phải xuất phát từ tư tưởng lập trường chính trị của giai cấp mà ra. Không có lập trường chính trị thì không thể phát huy khả năng quân sự đúng yêu cầu của chính trị được. Quân sự không xuất phát từ tư tưởng chính trị thì quân sự ấy sẽ sai lạc với tính chất giai cấp sẽ rơi vào quân sự thuần túy v.v...
Hiện nay xây dựng chính trị cho Đội Võ-Trang là chính và đồng thời học tập quân sự là cần thiết.

III/- Chúng ta cần cấp xây dựng củng cố các đội võ trang dựa vào yêu cầu của nhiệm vụ vai trò hiện tại và tương lai. Về việc xây dựng đội võ trang xuất phát từ 4 điểm sau đây :

- 1) Hoạt động tác chiến, diệt ác hộ tống trao.
- 2) Công tác quần chúng cụ thể là công tác mặt trận, công tác tuyên truyền vận động tập hợp quần chúng tổ chức cơ sở cách mạng xây dựng lực lượng chính trị trong nhân dân.
- 3) Công tác tự cấp tự túc.
- 4) Xây dựng lực lượng.

Excerpts from "Instructions on the Creation of People's Self-Defense Units":

(On page 1)—Examining the past situation of the armed self-defense units, 12 (unit commander's code designation) was able to find some weak points which must be attended to and speedily corrected by *Party members* of all ranks

(Same page)—Our present and future responsibility is to create armed self-defense units. The creation of armed self-defense units is based on the following four points:

- 1) take the offensive in order to eliminate the enemy and protect the movement.
- 2) our activity among the people is [through] the Front; propagandize in order to rally the people; organize basic revolutionary cells in order to build political forces among the people.
- 3) try to achieve self-sufficiency.
- 4) create a reserve force

KHẮC PHỤC KHUYẾT ĐIỂM

PHÁT HUY ƯU ĐIỂM

-++++-

RA SỨC ĐẨY MẠNH HƠN NỬA CÔNG-TÁC ĐÔ-THỊ

Nhiệm-vụ và phương châm trước mắt chủ yếu của Đảng-bộ ta là mở rộng công-tác thôn quê, đẩy mạnh công-tác Đô-thị, giành lại những vùng căn-cứ kháng chiến cũ, mở rộng những khu an-toàn, thu hẹp phạm-vi hoạt-dộng và kiểm-soát của địch, làm thay đổi lực-lượng so sánh giữa ta và địch, làm cho địch chẳng những bị động về toàn cuộc mà còn làm cho địch bị động cả về cục bộ nữa, tạo điều kiện đi đến khởi nghĩa cướp chính quyền.

Mở rộng thôn quê, đẩy mạnh Đô-thị, giành lại những vùng căn-cứ kháng chiến cũ chẳng những nó là nhiệm-vụ trước mắt, là phương châm chỉ-đạo ở vùng song song tiến lên, mà nó còn là tư-tưởng chỉ-đạo của Đảng-bộ ta. Tư-tưởng đó phải quán triệt trong các mặt hoạt-dộng, trong mọi công-tác của Đảng-bộ ta hiện nay. Tách rời tư-tưởng chỉ-đạo đó thì công-tác sẽ phạm sai lầm, đi lệch một chân, hoặc đi khắp khênh, không toàn diện.

Theo phương hướng tiến lên khởi nghĩa cướp chính-quyền thì đấu-tranh trong Đô-thị cũng vẫn là đấu-tranh chính-trị chủ yếu có kết hợp với đấu-tranh vũ-trang đúng mức và kịp thời.

Trong Đô-thị đấu-tranh đơn thuần về chính-trị là không đúng, vì đơn thuần về chính-trị thì không xây dựng, củng cố, phát-triển được cơ-sở và không đưa phong-trào đấu-tranh chính trị của quần chúng lên được.

Muốn đạt được yêu cầu mong muốn đó, cần thiết và trước hết phải có lực-lượng, phải có lực-lượng chính-

trị . . .

Excerpts from "Instructions Regarding Activities in Cities":

(Page 1)—The responsibility and main goals that our Party has in view are to develop activities in the countryside, to increase activity in the cities, to reoccupy our former resistance bases, to extend our security zones, to limit the field of action and control of the enemy. . . .

ITEM 4

The Policy of Forcible Seizure of Power

(See Part I, section VI, F, 4, pp. 46-47)

In December 1960 in a raid on a Viet Cong headquarters in Dinh Tuong Province, armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam seized many documents. Included was the notebook of a VC commissioner. Excerpts from the notebook follow:

Subject: Preparation for the creation of a liberation front.

1.—How the international balance of power and the internal balance of power affect the revolution in the South.

—the strategy of our revolution remains a popular and democratic one (unchanged). Its basic purpose: overthrow of imperialism and feudalism and land for the tillers.

—the present policy of the revolution in the South is not the same as in 1956.

—on the basis of the balance of power between ourselves and our enemies inside the country and outside, the Central Committee has outlined a new policy for the revolution in the South

Our purposes: to incite the people to rise against the U.S.-Diem clique in order to achieve the objective of the revolutionary liberation of the South. The enemy is now implementing a dreadful policy to oppress the people (for example, decree No. 10/59, agrovilles, etc.). The people should stand up and fight against them, using all means, legal and illegal, political and military.

The fascist policy of the enemy has prompted the people to join the fight for self-defense with arms.

Whether we should resort to the use of arms or not depends on the actual situation at the moment. This should not occur too early or too late, and it is only up to the Central Committee to determine when the time is appropriate and reach a decision.

The revolution in the South at the present time has two possibilities:

—general uprising to seize power.

—a long-term armed struggle.

But our final objective is a general uprising to seize power.

The Revolution in the South should go through two stages until the General Uprising:

—the preparatory stage, to upset the balance of power.

—the stage of direct revolution.

When the balance of power has completely changed in our favor and when the time is proper for a general uprising, military means will be the essential means and arming the population and our forces will be our primary task.

When should the general uprising take place?

During the preparatory stage, in order to change the balance of power in our favor, we must exert our influence on the people in rural areas and in cities and organize the masses under the strict leadership of the Party.

Party Policy Toward the Front

(See Part I, section VI, F, 5, p. 47)

Below is a copy of the Thu-Bien "instructions" issued by the Lao Dong (Communist) Party organization in the Thu Dau Mot and Bien Hoa region. It is dated March 28, 1961, and was seized in the hideout of a Viet Cong official in Phuoc Thanh Province.

ĐẢNG LAO ĐỘNG VIỆT-NAM
BAN CHẤP-HÀNH ĐẢNG-BỘ
TỈNH THU-BIỆN
-o-o-o-o-
Số: 8 /CT

HỘI-BÌNH THÔNG-THƯT ĐỘC LẬP DÂN-CHỦ

II II II xox II II II
II

Về việc tổ-chức UB .N.T.D.T.G.F.

Mặt-Trận Dân-Tộc Giải-Fóng Miền-Nam ra đời là 1 thắng lợi lịch-sử vĩ-vang cho nhân-dân cả nước ta. Phong-Trào Cách-Lạng M.N. được sự ủng-hộ nhiệt tình của đồng-bào Miền Bắc và nhân-dân tiên bộ trên thế-giới, ngày càng tiến mạnh nhanh chóng như vũ-bạo. Kỳ-Điệm ngày thêm bị cô-lập, suy-sụp mau lẹ.

Để tập hợp quần chúng ngày càng thêm đông-dào, trong Mặt-Trận ta phải luôn-luôn tích-cực tuyên-truyền Tuyên-Ngôn của Mặt-Trận, lấy tuyên-ngôn của Mặt-Trận làm cơ-sở để tuyên-truyền phát động cho mọi vấn đề khác để đẩy mạnh phong-trào đấu-tranh mọi mặt. Đồng thời việc tổ-chức UBHT các cấp, bắt đầu là ở xã là rất cần thiết vì quần chúng muốn biết những người lãnh đạo các cấp Mặt-Trận để xuyên qua tìm hiểu chánh-sách.

Để đó, nhân dân được chỉ thị này, yêu cầu các đồng-chí tiến hành ngay việc tổ-chức Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận ở các Xã căn-cứ, các xã mới đầu mạnh, và ở những xã xôi dẫy yếu nhưng đã có thế kêu gọi ở vài ấp có thể hợp một tỉnh lồi 100 người được và đã tổ-chức BCH Nông-Hội rồi.

Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận xã gồm: 1 Đại-biểu của Chi-bộ, 1 Đại-biểu của Chi-Đoàn TWLD, 1 Đại-biểu của BCH xã-đội-bộ, 1 Đại-biểu của Nông-lội, 1 Đại-biểu của TWGF, 1 Đại-biểu của FNUF, 1 Đại-biểu của Hội mẹ chiến-sĩ... Nơi nào có tin đồn Cao-Dài, Công-Giao, Di-cứ, cả hạn ruộng, địa-chủ yêu nước chống Kỳ-Điệm, tinh-thần vững chắc và có uy-tín, có tinh-cách tiêu-biểu, đi ra cũng cố gắng vận động họ tham gia vào Mặt-Trận. Nơi nào có Chi-bộ Đảng Dân-Chủ thì cũng mời 1 Đại-biểu vào.

Hiện nay tùy tinh-thần tương quan lực lượng ta địch ở mỗi xã mà tổ-chức Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận từ 3 đến 7 ủy-viên: 1 chủ-nhiệm, 1 phó chủ-nhiệm, 1 ủy-viên thư ký và những ủy-viên khác. Nếu Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận có từ 5 ủy-viên trở lên, thì chủ-nhiệm, phó chủ-nhiệm và ủy-viên thư ký hợp thành thường-vụ Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận.

Ở các xã căn-cứ và xôi dẫy mạnh, Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận xã trực tiếp đảm nhận nhiệm vụ quản trị hành chánh, lo về các mặt chánh-trị, quân-sự, kinh tế, văn-hóa, giáo-dục v.v... Đại-biểu của Xã-Đội-Bộ đảm nhận công-tác chỉ-huy dân-quân tự-vệ, đối du-kịch xã và công-tác an-ninh trật tự, phòng gian bảo mật, trừng trị bọn tay sai phản động.

Tùy theo số ủy-viên và khả năng mỗi ủy-viên mà phân công phụ-trách những nhiệm vụ: Tuyên-truyền tổ-chức, kinh tế, tài chánh, binh-vận, giao liên, văn-hóa, giáo-dục. Đại-biểu của xã-đội-bộ thì phụ trách quân-sự, bảo vệ như đã nói trên.

Số ủy-viên ra công-khai với danh nghĩa ủy-viên UBHT trước quần-chúng nhiều hay ít tùy tương quan lực lượng mỗi xã, nhưng ít nhất phải có 2 người ra công-khai, những ủy-viên khác tuy chưa ra công-khai trước quần chúng với danh nghĩa ủy-viên UBHT, nhưng vẫn tuyên-truyền Mặt-Trận 1 cách bí-mật và phát động quần chúng đấu-tranh đường hướng của Mặt-Trận, những cái thấy rằng sắp tới dẫy vùng căn-cứ được thành hình vững mạnh, vùng xôi dẫy mạnh được củng cố thêm, thì toàn thể ủy-viên Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận hoặc đại đa số sẽ ra công-khai hoạt-dộng trước quần chúng.

Để đảm bảo tính chất quần chúng rộng rãi của Mặt-Trận, số Đảng-viên trong ủy-ban Mặt-Trận không nên quá 2 lần 5 số ủy-viên.

Chi-Bộ lãnh đạo Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận bằng führung-fáp Đảng Đoàn, nghĩa là những đồng-chí nằm trong ủy-ban Mặt-Trận phải giáo-dục, thuyết phục các ủy-viên khác nhận rõ trách nhiệm, phải thi-hành những chủ-trương gì, do lợi ích nào, chống tác phong quan liêu, mệnh lệnh, gian ép, bao biện làm mất lòng quần, tự động và tinh-chất độc lập của tổ-chức Q/C.

Yêu cầu các đồng-chí khẩn trương tiến hành tổ-chức UBHT xã-nhánh chóng nhưng phải kỹ càng chọn người vững chắc, có uy-tín, có thành tích đấu-tranh. Đồng thời với việc thành lập Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận Xã như đã nói trên, các đồng-chí cần tích-cực vận động người do đề nghị về 11 thông qua để tổ-chức Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận Huyện kể từ đầu tháng 5/1961, theo chỉ thị gần đây của trên.

Mong các đồng-chí tích-cực thi-hành chỉ-thị này và báo cáo kết quả về chúng tôi rõ./.

Sưu y số 19/57

Kính gửi các đồng-chí phụ-trách các đoàn và chi-bộ 24 để nghiên-cứ thi-hành. Chi-Bộ 25 để biết.

Ngày 29 tháng 3 năm 1961

TRANG.

Ngày 28 tháng 3 năm 1961

T.H. - TỈNH-ỦY

QUANG-ĐỨC

Excerpts from the Thu-Bien "Instructions":

. . . The organization of committees of the Popular Front at all levels, starting with the villages, is very important because the people want to know the leaders of the Popular Front at all levels and, through them, the policy of the Front.


We urge you, comrades, to start immediately the organization of committees of the Popular Front in village bases [controlled by the VC], "rice and beans" villages [mixed control], and in "rice and beans" villages [where the VC is] weak but where we have managed to exert a certain control over a few hamlets and where we can gather about 100 people for demonstrations and where we have already organized peasants associations

The number of members of those [Party] committees working overtly as members of committees of the Popular Front varies according to the degree of control over each village, but in any case the minimum number of committee members operating overtly as such should be two. The other members, although they do not operate openly as committee members, should engage secretly in propaganda activities for the Popular Front, while waiting for the time when we have extended our control over the villages and all or the majority of committee members can operate openly as such.

To secure a broad base of representation within the Front, the number of Party members on committees of the Popular Front should not exceed two-fifths of the total membership

(See Part I, section VI, F, 6, p. 48)

Below is a photograph of instructions issued by the Viet Cong Regional Committee of the South to inter-province committees, seized in Tay Ninh on February 15, 1961.



Excerpts from the "Instructions" issued by the Viet Cong Committee for the South to inter-province committees:

The policy of the Front is that of building up the massive solidarity of all the people without distinctions of race, social class, religion, political party, or sex, without distinctions among intellectuals, bourgeoisie, rich peasants or poor peasants or proletariats. Even those who were against the Resistance or the Party will be admitted to the Front on the sole condition that they be for peace and reunification of the country. All efforts should be directed to attack the enemy number one of the Vietnamese people, the U.S. and Ngo Dinh Diem clique.

For this reason, the Front's forces will comprise workers, peasants, bourgeoisie, students, intellectuals, prominent national figures who are for the progress of the country, and all organizations or individuals in South Viet-Nam who are for peace and reunification of the country.

Of these constituent elements, workers are the heralds of the revolutionary struggle. The coalition bloc of workers and peasants is the foundation stone of the Front for these two classes occupy the absolute majority in the Front. Furthermore, they have the spirit of sacrifice and endurance for the sake of the revolution.

But in the present situation, these two classes do not enjoy high prestige and are not capable of leading the revolution to decisive victory.

That reason prompts the Party to apply the policy of the Front and to set up the People's Front for Liberation of South Viet-Nam to attract bourgeois intellectual circles which comprise young men and girls and students in the cities, middle and rich peasants in the countryside.

In reports read to the 3d Congress of the Party, Comrades Le Duan and Le Duc Tho observed that young men and girls, students, intellectuals, and the bourgeoisie in the cities, as well as rich and middle peasants in the country, are quickly converted to socialism but they are also very prompt to waver and to oppose the revolution, socialism and Marx-Leninism. They are inclined to self-interest, security and pleasure. In the present situation of South Viet-Nam, the Central Committee supports integration of these elements into the Front, not because the Party is betraying the policy of class struggle and of the revolution, not because the Party is going to entrust these classes with heavy responsibilities in the revolutionary liberation of South Viet-Nam, but only to utilize their abilities and their prestige in order to push forward the revolution and to give more prestige to the People's Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam.

This line of conduct is only a temporary policy of the Party. When the revolution is crowned with success, this policy will be revised. Then the Party will act overtly to lead the revolution in South Viet-Nam.

The policy of the Front will help us to control the majority of the people and to isolate the enemy, which will be reduced to a handful of reactionaries in the Government and in the Army. Our final victory will be assured. . . .

Policy of Violence by the Viet Cong

(See Part I, section VI, F, 7, pp. 48-49)

In an attack on August 15, 1961, against a Viet Cong base in Long An Province, forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam seized a copy of instructions to the VC provincial committee from the Inter-Province Committee of the Central Region of the South (Nambo). A photocopy of a page from those instructions appears below.

những địa điểm có lực lượng tồn tại
hoặc đã lập được ít nhất thành tích
đem được ít nhiều vũ khí, tài liệu
cho CM. Thời gian theo dõi theo
trên phải làm thật kín đáo và
được kéo dài quá 3 tháng. Nếu sau
3 tháng mà chưa bắt được những địa điểm
hàng, còn có được nghi ngờ thì
cần phải thanh toán ngay, để lần
ngay nào, có hai cho CM ngay ấy.
Trong thời gian theo dõi tuyệt đối
không được giao công tác và cũng
không được cho ở gần các cơ quan
quan trọng.
Mọi Tổng cũng công tác trên gian
điệt tế. Công tác này cũng làm một
thứ cũng có lợi cho CM và cho M.
càng lớn kéo thêm được nhiều người
xưa nay có thái độ lưỡng lự.
Tích cực, phải ngay theo CM.

Excerpts from the VC instructions from Long An follow:

(The first part of the document points out certain shortcomings in Viet Cong operations.)

Instructions:

I₁ urges all 14 W (provincial cadre) to correct the above shortcomings and from now until National Day, September 2, 1961, to step up the following activities:

1. Special caution against civil guard members who might surrender for infiltration purposes. Conduct thorough investigation of each particular case for no more than three months. After this period, if the case remains suspicious, immediately liquidate the suspect to avoid further trouble for the revolution.

2. Step up extermination activities against traitors. All those refusing to have rice collected, to pay taxes or make money contributions to the Front can be considered as reactionaries and punished like other traitors.

3. Step up activities [aimed at] encircling and paralyzing strategic roads, means of communication used for transporting rice, pigs and charcoal, such as canals and most particularly Inter-Provincial Road No. 4. These activities are aimed at ruining the economy of the enemy, at raising the cost of living in the city of Saigon, and thereby creating discontent.

The accomplishments of the 14 W of Long An and Dinh Tuong during the month of June—sinking 5 junks (loaded with) charcoal, 8 junks with rice, confiscating 4 trucks of pigs—deserve our praise.

4. Build up the revolutionary spirit of the cadre and Party members and most particularly of the liberation forces. Regularly study revolutionary documents so that cadre, Party members and combatants do not panic in the face of the enemy and have strong confidence in the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and of the Front.

The Present Danger

(See Part I, section VII, pp. 49-51)

The first page of a copy of the "Military Plan of the Provincial Party Committee at Baria" is reproduced below.

1-3) **ẤN SAO "ĐỀ-ẤN QUAN-SỰ TỈNH DẢNG BỘ BÀ-RIÀ"**
(bắt được tại Hết-Dịch "Phước-Tuy" ngày 12 - 5 - 1961)

-:-:-:-

NHIỆM-VỤ CỦA LỰC-LƯỢNG VÕ-TRANG : - Để thực-hiện được đường lối hoạt-động của Đảng hiện nay với tình-hình mới : Nâng cao hoạt-động võ-trang lên ngang với đấu-tranh chính-trị và đường lối hoạt-động riêng cụ thể của mỗi vùng : vùng căn-cứ hoạt-động võ trang là chủ yếu, vùng nông thôn ngang với đ/ tranh chính trị. Vùng đô-thị đấu tranh chánh trị là chủ yếu.

Thi hành đường lối của Đảng thích hợp với tình hình ta nhiệm-vụ chung của các lực-lượng võ trang phải đẩy mạnh hoạt-động gỡ thế kềm kẹp, võ trang TT và tác chiến tấn công địch liên tục sâu rộng đều khắp để phục vụ kịp yêu cầu của cách mạng. Tích cực tiêu hao, tiêu diệt binh lực địch, bồi dưỡng. Xây dựng lực lượng ta.

Về mặt-động cụ thể :

1/- Gỡ thế kềm kẹp, phối hợp chắc chẽ với lực-lượng chánh trị quyết tâm thi hành kế hoạch gỡ thế kềm kẹp trong phân đ/ tranh gỡ thế kềm kẹp.

Nhưng chúng ta phải tiến mạnh với hình thức quyết liệt quy mô có tập trung, có điểm, có diện. Các lực lượng của Quân phối hợp với 1 sơ xã có du kích và dân quân tự vệ, tự vệ bí mật, quét sạch trong 1 vùng nhứt địch với hình thức như khởi nghĩa quần chúng trong vùng đó. Lực lượng tập trung của mỗi Quận phải phối hợp tiến hành cho được 1 điểm trong 1 xã hoặc liên xã. Riêng 21/22 và 55 chuẩn bị 1 điểm có lực lượng của T hỗ trợ. Các đội xã tiến lên xôi đậu mạnh và chưa gỡ thế kềm kẹp có xã đội, có đội du-kích phải tiến hành cho được 1 liên ấp.

Các đội phụ trách thị xã, thị trấn, dinh-diên phải có diệt ác tác chiến tại Trung-Tâm để thời động địch nhắm bọn Công An và CDV và Quân, bọn ác ôn đầu sỏ. Ngoài ra, có 1 cuộc võ-trang TT và thường xuyên đi sâu xây dựng cơ sở.

A translation of page 1 of the Baria military plan follows:

The responsibilities and duties of armed groups:

In order to carry out the present policies of the Party to meet the new situation: increase armed activities to the level of political activities and the policies appropriate for each region—in base areas, armed intervention or activities are the mainstay; in rural areas armed activities should be at the same level as political activities; in towns and cities, political activities are the most important.

To carry out the policies of the Party appropriate to the new situation, the common task of armed units of the military forces is to press forward measures to overcome encircling pressures, propaganda under armed protection, and military attacks on the enemy in a continuous, spreading and well-coordinated manner to serve the needs of the revolution. Weaken and annihilate enemy military forces, then regroup for recovery. Build up our forces.

Concrete activities:

I. Overcome encircling pressure; coordinate closely with the political branch to carry out plans for this purpose.

However, we must move forward with determination, planning places for concentration, targets and areas of activities. Forces at the district level should coordinate with a number of villages having guerrilla and people's militia security forces. Wipe out the enemy in one area at a time under the guise of liberating the people in that particular area. Concentrated forces of a district should coordinate to establish a beachhead in a village or inter-village. 21/22 and 55 be prepared for a beachhead with support from the forces of T. Village forces under encircling pressure and having guerrilla groups must progress into inter-village formations.

Squads in charge of villages and agrovilles must carry out assassination missions right at the center to immobilize the enemy. Prime targets should be security forces and civil action district officials, hooligans and thugs. Besides, propaganda under armed protection must be carried out on a regular basis with a view to establishing bases.

Excerpts from the Baria military plan follow:

Organization qualities:

Quick, up-to-date, well planned. All personnel who meet standards and support the directives can

be formed into guerrilla-militia. To be left out: hooligans, spies, police, sons and daughters of landlords and businessmen.

Duties:

- Identical for village guerrilla squads and people's militia.

- Deliver villages from pressure. Assassinate hooligans and oppressors. Disperse reactionary organizations carrying out propaganda to soldiers.

- Protect the people, protect production, maintain security and order in villages. Information and labor duties. Fight the enemy in order to take over weapons and establish bases.

- Oppose military service, labor assignments, concentration of people in agrovilles, and fight against corruption.

Equipment:

For village guerrillas, each squad must have at least two guns, and simple weapons for each member.

Secret militia:

Fight against pressure, suppress corrupt officials, carry out military logistics, sabotage, provide and disseminate information.

Fifth column:

Constant underground activities. Be on the alert to sabotage the enemy's military forces whenever necessary. In this case, instructions from above will be given.

Target level of the districts:

6/14:	2,500
7/14:	6,800
55:	7,500
21/22:	9,800
23:	4,300
5/11:	5,100

Attention: This does not include existing organizations

Training requirements:

The cells supervise the execution of all missions, maintain discipline, administer punishments and rewards. In all Party committees, military training must be given to members as well as to the Party secretary.

Political studies:

Cadre in village and district units:

- Study the combined Party resolution of 1961.
- Study the central resolution No. 15 and the military resolution.
- Study the scope and objectives of the Front for Liberation of the South.

Village local guards:

- Study of the regulations is a duty for local guards.
- Study the bylaws of the Peasants Association and take part in organized political-military discussions in the villages.

New recruits:

- Study the documents related to youth.
- Study the objectives of our struggle.

All units:

- Study the above documents. In addition, study the characteristics of the People's Army.
- In daily activities, the units must instill in the minds of the soldiers, and urge them to carry out, the 36 commandments for the revolutionary fighter.
- Carry out battle analysis after every engagement.
- Propagate education in the units.

Military training:

Guerrillas:

- Study guerrilla tactics. (Each region must analyze its tactical experience. Documents will be sent later.)
- Practice individual combat, triangular formation, and close combat.

Secret local guards:

- Study the employment of rifles, grenades and all other available weapons, practice close combat.

Cadre at district level and in centralized units:

- Study the tactics of cell leaders, guerrilla principles and Mao's theses.
- All units and cadres must practice individual combat, triangular formation (A fights B; C evaluates A's and B's performance against theory).
- Military training must be carried on every day; new techniques will be initiated regularly once or twice a month.
- Discuss and draw conclusions from field exercises and from documents exchanged between regions.
- In addition, the village guerrilla units and those at district level must study the maintenance of available weapons. . . .



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Aggression From the North

*The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign
To Conquer South Viet-Nam*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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**“[Our purpose in Viet-Nam] is to join
in the defense and protection of freedom
of a brave people who are under attack
that is controlled and that is directed
from outside their country.”**


PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
February 17, 1965

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/11/10 : CIA-RDP79R01001A001400010005-4

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Introduction

South Viet-Nam is fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the Communist regime in Hanoi. This flagrant aggression has been going on for years, but recently the pace has quickened and the threat has now become acute.

The war in Viet-Nam is a new kind of war, a fact as yet poorly understood in most parts of the world. Much of the confusion that prevails in the thinking of many people, and even many governments, stems from this basic misunderstanding. For in Viet-Nam a totally new brand of aggression has been loosed against an independent people who want to make their own way in peace and freedom.

Viet-Nam is *not* another Greece, where indigenous guerrilla forces used friendly neighboring territory as a sanctuary.

Viet-Nam is *not* another Malaya, where Communist guerrillas were, for the most part, physically distinguishable from the peaceful majority they sought to control.

Viet-Nam is *not* another Philippines, where Communist guerrillas were physically separated from the source of their moral and physical support.

Above all, the war in Viet-Nam is *not* a spontaneous and local rebellion against the established government.

There are elements in the Communist program of conquest directed against South Viet-Nam common to each of the previous areas of aggression and subversion. But there is one fundamental difference. In Viet-Nam a Communist government has set out deliberately to conquer a sovereign people in a neighboring state. And to achieve its end, it has used every resource of its own government to carry out its carefully planned program of concealed aggression. North Viet-Nam's commitment to seize control of the South is no less total than was the commitment of the regime in North Korea in 1950. But knowing the consequences of the

latter's undisguised attack, the planners in Hanoi have tried desperately to conceal their hand. They have failed and their aggression is as real as that of an invading army.

This report is a summary of the massive evidence of North Vietnamese aggression obtained by the Government of South Viet-Nam. This evidence has been jointly analyzed by South Vietnamese and American experts.

The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Viet-Nam were trained in the North and ordered into the South by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the Viet Cong (VC), the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, political organizers, and propagandists have come from the North and operate under Hanoi's direction. It shows that the training of essential military personnel and their infiltration into the South is directed by the Military High Command in Hanoi. (See section I.)

The evidence shows that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Viet Cong have been sent into South Viet-Nam from Hanoi. In recent months new types of weapons have been introduced in the VC army, for which all ammunition must come from outside sources. Communist China and other Communist states have been the prime suppliers of these weapons and ammunition, and they have been channeled primarily through North Viet-Nam. (See section II.)

The directing force behind the effort to conquer South Viet-Nam is the Communist Party in the North, the Lao Dong (Workers) Party. As in every Communist state, the party is an integral part of the regime itself. North Vietnamese officials have expressed their firm determination to absorb South Viet-Nam into the Communist world. (See section III.)

Through its Central Committee, which controls the government of the North, the Lao Dong Party directs the total political and military effort of the

Viet Cong. The Military High Command in the North trains the military men and sends them into South Viet-Nam. The Central Research Agency, North Viet-Nam's central intelligence organization, directs the elaborate espionage and subversion effort. The extensive political-military organization in the North which directs the Viet Cong war effort is described in section IV.

Under Hanoi's overall direction the Communists have established an extensive machine for carrying on the war within South Viet-Nam. The focal point is the Central Office for South Viet-Nam with its political and military subsections and other specialized agencies. A subordinate part of this Central Office is the Liberation Front for South Viet-Nam. The front was formed at Hanoi's order in 1960. Its principal function is to influence opinion abroad and to create the false impression that the aggression in South Viet-Nam is an indigenous rebellion against the established government. (See section IV.)

For more than 10 years the people and the Government of South Viet-Nam, exercising the inherent right of self-defense, have fought back against these efforts to extend Communist power south across the 17th parallel. The United States has responded to the appeals of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam for help in this de-

fense of the freedom and independence of its land and its people.

In 1961 the Department of State issued a report called *A Threat to the Peace*. It described North Viet-Nam's program to seize South Viet-Nam. The evidence in that report had been presented by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the International Control Commission (I.C.C.). A special report by the I.C.C. in June 1962 upheld the validity of that evidence. The Commission held that there was "sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt" that North Viet-Nam had sent arms and men into South Viet-Nam to carry out subversion with the aim of overthrowing the legal Government there. The I.C.C. found the authorities in Hanoi in specific violation of four provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954.¹

Since then, new and even more impressive evidence of Hanoi's aggression has accumulated. The Government of the United States believes that evidence should be presented to its own citizens and to the world. It is important for free men to know what has been happening in Viet-Nam, and how, and why. That is the purpose of this report.

¹ For the text of pertinent sections of the I.C.C. report, see appendix A.

I. Hanoi Supplies the Key Personnel for the Armed Aggression Against South Viet-Nam

The hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Viet-Nam are men trained in North Viet-Nam. They are ordered into the South and remain under the military discipline of the Military High Command in Hanoi. Special training camps operated by the North Vietnamese army give political and military training to the infiltrators. Increasingly the forces sent into the South are native North Vietnamese who have never seen South Viet-Nam. A special infiltration unit, the 70th Transportation Group, is responsible for moving men from North Viet-Nam into the South via infiltration trails through Laos. Another special unit, the maritime infiltration group, sends weapons and supplies and agents by sea into the South.

The infiltration rate has been increasing. From 1959 to 1960, when Hanoi was establishing its infiltration pipeline, at least 1,800 men, and possibly 2,700 more, moved into South Viet-Nam from the North. The flow increased to a minimum of 3,700 in 1961 and at least 5,400 in 1962. There was a modest decrease in 1963 to 4,200 confirmed infiltrators, though later evidence is likely to raise this figure.

For 1964 the evidence is still incomplete. However, it already shows that a minimum of 4,400 infiltrators entered the South, and it is estimated more than 3,000 others were sent in.

There is usually a time lag between the entry of infiltrating troops and the discovery of clear evidence they have entered. This fact, plus collateral evidence of increased use of the infiltration routes, suggests strongly that 1964 was probably the year of greatest infiltration so far.

Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 VC officers, soldiers, and technicians are known to have entered South Viet-Nam under orders from Hanoi. Additional information indicates that an estimated 17,000 more infiltrators were dispatched to the South by the regime in Hanoi during the past 6


years. It can reasonably be assumed that still other infiltration groups have entered the South for which there is no evidence yet available.

To some level of infiltration from the North may seem modest in comparison with the total size of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam. But one-for-one calculations are totally misleading in the kind of warfare going on in Viet-Nam. First, a high proportion of infiltrators from the North are well-trained officers, cadres, and specialists. Second, it has long been realized that in guerrilla combat the burdens of defense are vastly heavier than those of attack. In Malaya, the Philippines, and elsewhere a ratio of at least 10-to-1 in favor of the forces of order was required to meet successfully the threat of the guerrillas' hit-and-run tactics.

In the calculus of guerrilla warfare the scale of North Vietnamese infiltration into the South takes on a very different meaning. For the infiltration of 5,000 guerrilla fighters in a given year is the equivalent of marching perhaps 50,000 regular troops across the border, in terms of the burden placed on the defenders.

Above all, the number of proved and probable infiltrators from the North should be seen in relation to the size of the VC forces. It is now estimated that the Viet Cong number approximately 35,000 so-called hard-core forces, and another 60,000-80,000 local forces. It is thus apparent that infiltrators from the North—allowing for casualties—make up the majority of the so-called hard-core Viet Cong. Personnel from the North, in short, are now and have always been the backbone of the entire VC operation.

It is true that many of the lower level elements of the VC forces are recruited within South Viet-Nam. However, the thousands of reported cases of VC kidnappings and terrorism make it abun-



Map showing infiltration route from the North by which a group of North Vietnamese troops, including VC Sgt. Huynh Van Tay, entered South Viet-Nam in Sept. 1963.

dantly clear that threats and other pressures by the Viet Cong play a major part in such recruitment.

A. THE INFILTRATION PROCESS

The infiltration routes supply hard-core units with most of their officers and noncommissioned personnel. This source helps fill the gaps left by battle casualties, illness, and defection and insures continued control by Hanoi. Also, as the nature of the conflict has changed, North Viet-Nam has supplied the Viet Cong with technical specialists via the infiltration routes. These have included men trained in armor and ordnance, antiaircraft, and communications as well as medical corpsmen and transport experts.

There is no single infiltration route from the North to South Viet-Nam. But by far the biggest percentage of infiltrators follow the same general course. The principal training center for North Vietnamese army men assigned to join the Viet Cong has been at Xuan Mai near Hanoi. Recently captured Viet Cong have also reported an infiltration training camp at Thanh Hoa. After completion of their training course—which involves political and propaganda work as well as military subjects—infiltrating units are moved to Vinh on the east coast. Many have made stopovers at a staging area in Dong Hoi where additional training is conducted. From there they go by truck to the Laos border.

Then, usually after several days' rest, infiltrators move southward through Laos. Generally they move along the Laos-South Viet-Nam border. Responsibility for infiltration from North Viet-Nam through Laos belongs to the 70th Transportation Group of the North Vietnamese army. After a time the infiltration groups turn eastward, entering South Viet-Nam in Quang Nam, Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Kontum, or another of the border provinces.

The Communists have established regular lanes for infiltration with way-stations established about 1 day's march apart. The way-stations are equipped to quarter and feed the Viet Cong passing through. Infiltrators who suffer from malaria or other illnesses stay at the stations until they recover sufficiently to join another passing group moving south.

The map on page 4 shows the infiltration route from North Viet-Nam to the South followed by VC Sgt. Huynh Van Tay and a group of North Vietnamese army officers and men in September 1963. Tay was captured during an engagement in Chuong Thien Province in April 1964.

Local guides lead the infiltration groups along the secret trails. Generally they direct the infiltrators from halfway between two stations, through their own base station, and on halfway to the next supply base. Thus the guides are kept in ignorance of all but their own way-stations. Only group leaders are permitted to talk with the guides in order to preserve maximum security. The men are discouraged from asking where they are or where they are going.¹

The same system of trails and guides used along the Lao infiltration routes is used within South Viet-Nam itself. Viet Cong infiltrators may report directly to a reassignment center in the highlands as soon as they enter South Viet-Nam. But in the past year or more some groups have moved down trails in South Viet-Nam to provinces along the Cambodian border and near Saigon before receiving their unit assignment. Within South Viet-Nam infiltration and supplies are handled by VC units such as the Nam Son Transportation Group.

At the Laos border crossing point infiltrators are reequipped. Their North Vietnamese army uniforms must be turned in. They must give up all personal papers, letters, notebooks, and photographs that might be incriminating. Document control over the infiltrators has been tightened considerably over the past 2 years. A number of Vietnamese infiltrators have told of being fitted out with Lao "neutralist" uniforms for their passage through Laos.

Infiltration groups are usually issued a set of black civilian pajama-like clothes, two unmarked uniforms, rubber sandals, a sweater, a hammock, mosquito netting, and waterproof sheeting. They carry a 3-5 day supply of food. A packet of medicines and bandages is usually provided.

The size of infiltration groups varies widely. Prisoners have mentioned units as small as 5 men and as large as 500. Generally the groups number 40-50. When they arrive in South Viet-Nam these

¹ For additional maps of the routes taken by VC infiltrators into South Viet-Nam, see appendix B.

groups are usually split up and assigned to various VC units as replacements, although some have remained intact.

B. MILITARY PERSONNEL

The following are individual case histories of North Vietnamese soldiers sent by the Hanoi regime into South Viet-Nam. They are only an illustrative group. They show that the leadership and specialized personnel for the guerrilla war in South Viet-Nam consists in large part of members of the North Viet-Nam armed forces, trained in the North and subject to the command and discipline of Hanoi.

1. Tran Quoc Dan

Dan was a VC major, commander of the 60th Battalion (sometimes known as the 34th Group of the Thon-Kim Battalion). Disillusioned with fighting his own countrymen and with communism and the lies of the Hanoi regime, he surrendered to the authorities in South Viet-Nam on February 11, 1963.

At the age of 15 he joined the revolutionary army (Viet Minh) and fought against the French forces until 1954 when the Geneva accords ended



Maj. Tran Quoc Dan.

the Indochina War. As a regular in the Viet Minh forces, he was moved to North Viet-Nam. He became an officer in the so-called People's Army.

In March 1962 Major Dan received orders to prepare to move to South Viet-Nam. He had been exposed to massive propaganda in the North which told of the destitution of the peasants in the South and said that the Americans had taken over the French role of colonialists. He said later that an important reason for his decision to surrender was that he discovered these propaganda themes were lies. He found the peasants more prosperous than the people in the North. And he recognized quickly that he was not fighting the Americans but his own people.


With the 600 men of his unit, Major Dan left Hanoi on March 23, 1962. They traveled through the Laos corridor. His group joined up with the Viet Cong First Regiment in central Viet-Nam.

The 35-year-old major took part in 45 actions and was wounded once in an unsuccessful VC attack on an outpost. As time passed he became increasingly discouraged by his experience as a VC troop commander. Most of all, he said, he was tired of killing other Vietnamese. After several months of soul-searching he decided to surrender to the authorities of the Republic of Viet-Nam. He has volunteered to do "anything to serve the national cause" of South Viet-Nam.

2. Vo Thoi

Sergeant Vo Thoi (Communist Party alias *Vo Bien*) was an assistant squad leader in the VC Tay Son 22d Battalion. On the night of October 7, 1963, his unit attacked An Tuong village in Binh Dinh Province. After overrunning the village, Vo's company was assigned to set up an ambush against Republic of Viet-Nam troops rushing to defend the village. In the ensuing fight Vo was seriously wounded. He was picked up by local farmers and turned over to the authorities.

Vo's life and experiences were similar to those of thousands of Viet Cong. Born in Quang Ngai Province in 1932, he went through 5 years of school and then worked on his parents' small farm. During the war against the French he joined the Viet Minh forces. When the fighting ended, he was transferred to North Viet-Nam with his unit, the 210th Regiment. He remained in the North Viet-



VC Sgt. Vo Thoi.

nameese army until 1960 when he was sent to work on a state farm in Nghe An Province. Vo said 3,000 men and women worked on the farm, of whom 400 were soldiers. In September 1962 Vo was told he must join the newly activated 22d Battalion. All the members of the battalion came from provinces in South Viet-Nam, from Quang Tri to Phu Yen. But it was not an ordinary battalion; two-thirds of its members were cadre with ranks up to senior captain.


The group was put through an advanced training course that lasted 6 months. The training program included combat tactics for units from squad to company and the techniques of guerrilla and counter guerrilla fighting. There were heavy doses of political indoctrination.

On March 5, 1963, the 22d Battalion received orders to move south. They were transported in trucks from Nghe An Province to Dong Hoi in Quang Binh, just north of the 17th parallel. From there the unit was moved westward to the Lao border. Then the more than 300 men began walking to the south following mountain trails in Laos and the Viet-Nam border area. They marched by day, rested at night. Every fifth day

they stopped at a way-station for a full day's rest. One company dropped off at Thua Thien Province. Vo and the remainder of the group marched on to Pleiku Province. Two fully armed companies from a neighboring province were assigned to the battalion. The assignment given to the battalion was to harass strategic hamlets in the Hoai An district of Binh Dinh, to round up cattle and rice, to kill or kidnap cadre of the Government forces, and to recruit local youth for service with the Viet Cong.

3. Nguyen Thao

Nguyen Thao was a VC weapons technician. A native of Khanh Hoa province in South Viet-Nam, he joined the Viet Minh in 1950. He worked at a secret arsenal manufacturing weapons for use by the guerrilla forces. He went to North



Nguyen Thao, VC weapons technician.

Viet-Nam after the Geneva accords were signed in 1954. In North Viet-Nam he attended a technical school specializing in arms manufacture. He received special training in foreign small arms and artillery.

At the end of 1962 he was ordered to Ha Dong to attend a special course of political training in preparation for infiltrating into South Viet-Nam. On completion of the training course he was assigned to a group of 14 men who would move to the south together. Nguyen Thao said the group was composed of 4 armament specialists, 2 chemical engineers, and 8 middle-level technical cadre.

They left Ha Dong in March 1963, crossed into Laos, and reached their destination in the northern part of South Viet-Nam in May. Nguyen Thao went to work at a secret VC arsenal near the Quang Ngai border. Fifty men, some local workers, manned the arsenal weapons section. The group manufactured mines and grenades for the VC units in the area and repaired weapons.

Nguyen Thao said he soon realized from talking with the local workers at the arsenal that most of what he had heard in the North about conditions in South Viet-Nam was wrong. He said the Communists had deceived him. Two months after his

arrival at the arsenal he decided to defect. He asked permission to rejoin his family and to work in a national defense factory and continue his studies.

4. Nguyen Viet Le

This VC soldier was born in Quang Nam Province in South Viet-Nam. He served with the 305th Division of the Viet Minh and moved to North Viet-Nam in 1954. In April 1961 Nguyen Viet Le and his unit, the 50th Battalion, moved into Laos. He said the unit remained in Laos for 2 months, during which it fought in four battles alongside the Pathet Lao. During these engagements one of the battalion's four companies was badly mauled and had to be returned to North Viet-Nam.

The other three companies were assigned to South Viet-Nam. They arrived in Quang Ngai Province in the summer of 1961. For a month they rested and waited for orders. They took part in a major action against an outpost of the Government of South Viet-Nam in September. Nguyen Viet Le was captured during a battle in Quang Ngai Province in April 1962.

5. Nguyen Truc

Corp. Nguyen Truc was born in 1933, the son of a farmer in Phu Yen Province in South Viet-Nam. From 1949 to 1954 he served as a courier and then as a guerrilla fighter with the Viet Minh. In early 1955 he boarded a Soviet ship and moved with his unit, the 40th Battalion, to North Viet-Nam. He remained in the army, but in 1959, bothered by illness, he went to work on a state farm.

In August 1962 Nguyen Truc was notified that he was back in the army and that he was being sent to South Viet-Nam. He reported to the Xuan Mai training center and underwent 6 months of military and political reeducation. His unit was the newly activated 22d Battalion. The training course was completed in February 1963, but departure for South Viet-Nam was delayed until April.

For infiltration purposes the battalion was divided into two groups. On April 27, Nguyen Truc and his group boarded trucks at Xuan Mai. They went first to Vinh, then on to Dong Hoi, and



Nguyen Viet Le.

finally to the Laos-North Viet-Nam border. There they doffed their North Vietnamese army uniforms and put on black peasants clothing. The march to the south began, sometimes in Lao territory, sometimes in Viet-Nam. They passed through Thua Thien Province, then Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai, and finally to their destination, Pleiku. Each day they had a new guide, generally one of the mountain people of the area.

Nguyen said that he and most of the troops who were sent north after the Indochina War wanted to return to their homes and rejoin their families. In August 1963 Nguyen Truc was sent out on a foraging expedition to find food for his unit. He took the opportunity to defect to Government forces at An Tuc in Binh Dinh Province.

6. Nguyen Cam

Cam is the son of a farmer in Quang Tin Province. Born in 1929, he joined the Viet Minh youth group in his home village in 1946. In one year he became a guerrilla fighter. In 1954, as the Indochina War was drawing to a close, he was serving with the Viet Minh 20th Battalion. In May 1955 he went to North Viet-Nam with his unit.

Ill health caused his transfer to an agricultural camp in 1958. By 1960 he was back in uniform, serving in the 210th Regiment. In May of that year he was assigned to a small group that was to set up a metallurgical workshop. Early in 1961 he was sent to a metallurgical class in Nghe An Province. They were taught a simple form of cast-iron production, simple blast furnace construction, and similar skills. Their instructor was an engineer from the Hanoi Industrial Department.

Their special course completed, Cam and his group of 35 men prepared to go to South Viet-Nam. They went by truck from their training center at Nghe An to the Lao border. After 19 days marching through Laos, they arrived in the vicinity of Tchepone. There they waited for 3 days until food supplies could be airdropped by a North Vietnamese plane. Nineteen days of walking took them to the Laos-South Viet-Nam border.

Delayed en route by illness, Cam finally reached his destination in November 1961. It was a secret VC iron foundry in Kontum Province. Several

iron ore deposits were nearby, and the hill people had long used the iron to make knives and simple tools. Cam's job was building kilns to smelt the ore. The Viet Cong hoped to use the iron for mines and grenades.

On August 4, 1963, Sergeant Cam went to a nearby village to buy salt for his group. On his return he found his comrades had gone to one of their cultivated fields to gather corn, and he joined them. The group was interrupted at their work by a Vietnamese Ranger company. After a brief fight Cam was taken prisoner.

7. Nguyen Hong Thai

Thai, 32 years old, was born and grew up in Quang Ngai Province in South Viet-Nam. After service with the Viet Minh he was moved to North Viet-Nam in 1954. After 3 years of military service he was assigned to a military farm. In December 1961 he was recalled to his former unit, the 305th Division, and went to the special training camp at Xuan Mai in preparation for fighting with the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam.

Training began in January 1962 and lasted for 4 months. The training group, designated the 32d Battalion, was composed of 650 men who came from various branches of the North Vietnamese



Nguyen Hong Thai.

army—engineers, artillery, airborne, transport, marines, and some factory workers and students. Three-fourths of the training was military (guerrilla tactics, ambushes, sabotage, etc.) and one-fourth was political. In the latter, heavy emphasis was laid on the necessity for armed seizure of power in the South.


Group 32 was divided into sections and began infiltrating to the south on July 14, 1962. It moved in three groups. Thai said it took his group more than 55 days to travel from North Viet-Nam through Laos to Quang Ngai Province in the south. He reported that all the communications and liaison stations on the route to South Viet-Nam are now operated by the army of North Viet-Nam. Soon after his arrival in South Viet-Nam, Thai was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. He was made a platoon leader in the 20th Viet Cong Highland Battalion. In February 1963 the unit moved from Quang Nam to Kontum Province.

Combat conditions and the rigors of guerrilla life began to depress Thai. He said he wanted only to rejoin his family and live in peace. In September he asked and received permission to visit his family in Quang Ngai. When he got home, he surrendered to a South Vietnamese Army post.

8. Dao Kien Lap

Lap is a civilian radio technician. He has been a member of the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam since 1955. In February 1963 he was selected for assignment to South Viet-Nam where he was to work with the Liberation Front. He infiltrated into South Viet-Nam with a group of about 70 civilian specialists. They included doctors, pharmacists, union organizers, radio specialists, propagandists, and youth organizers. One of the infiltrators in Dao's group was a man named Binh, publisher of the newspaper *Labor* of the Lao Dong Party. Another was a member of the city soviet of Hanoi.

The specialists in Dao's group received 3 months of basic military training at Son Tay, and then departed for the South in mid-June. Their orders were to report to the Central Office of the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam where they would be assigned according to their individual specialties. Dao and Binh were to help run a radio station of the Liberation Front.



Dao Kien Lap.

They traveled through Laos and along the Viet-Nam border. They had to stop for several weeks in Quang Nam Province to recuperate from their travels. On October 1 they were directed by guides to a VC station in Ban Me Thuot.

Dao said he had by then decided to defect to the Government authorities in the South. He set off with one companion, but they were separated as they crossed a swiftly flowing river. Dao gave himself up at a Government post in Ban Me Thuot on October 13, 1963.

9. Tran Ngoc Linh

Linh was a Viet Cong senior sergeant, leader of a reconnaissance platoon. He is the son of a middle-class farm family in Tay Ninh Province. He served with the Viet Minh against the French and moved to North Viet-Nam in 1954. He spent the next 7 years in the North Vietnamese army. In September 1962 Linh was assigned to the Xuan Mai training center at Ha Dong to prepare for duty in South Viet-Nam. His group was given a 4-month refresher course in infantry tactics with emphasis on guerrilla fighting. Then he received 6 months of special training in the use of machine-guns against aircraft. Antiaircraft training has become an increasingly important part of the preparation of North Vietnamese troops assigned to the Viet Cong.

Linh and about 120 others made up the 406th Infiltration Group commander by Senior Captain Nguyen Van Do. They were divided into four platoons. During the final 2 weeks of preparation each member of the group was issued new equipment—black, pajama-like uniforms, a khaki uniform, a hammock, mosquito netting, rubber sandals, and other supplies, including two packets of medicine.

In the early morning hours of July 4, 1963, his group started its journey from the Xuan Mai training center outside Hanoi. The convoy of six Molotov trucks moved south along Highway 21 to Nghe An Province and then on to Quang Binh. On July 7 they arrived at the final processing station near the Laos-North Viet-Nam border. There they turned in their North Vietnamese Army uniforms as well as all personal papers and anything else that might identify them as coming from the North. But their departure for the South was delayed for several weeks. In August they set off through Laos.

Twice along the way Linh had to stop at liaison stations because of illness. When the infiltrators recovered from their illnesses, they were formed into special groups to continue their penetration into South Viet-Nam. Linh reported being delayed once for 8 days, and the second time for 10 days.

Finally, in the first week of November 1963, Linh was sufficiently recovered to begin the final leg of his journey to a VC center where he was to be assigned to a combat unit. He and three others who had been similarly delayed by attacks of malaria and other sickness made up a group. They moved through the jungles of Quang Duc Province near the Cambodian border. On the morning of November 9 they crossed the Srepok River. There they ran into a unit of the South Vietnamese Army. One of the infiltrators was killed, Linh was taken prisoner, and the other two Viet Cong escaped.

These are typical Viet Cong. There are many other officers like Tran Quoc Dan, technicians like Nguyen Thao, and simple soldiers like Nguyen Truc. They were born in South Viet-Nam, fought against the French, and then went north and served in the army of North Viet-Nam. They were ordered by the Communist rulers in Hanoi

to reenter South Viet-Nam. Violating the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, they used the territory of neighboring Laos to infiltrate into the South. They are the means by which Communist North Viet-Nam is carrying out its program of conquest in South Viet-Nam.¹

C. INFILTRATION OF NATIVE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The Communist authorities in Hanoi are now assigning native North Vietnamese in increasing numbers to join the VC forces in South Viet-Nam. Heretofore, those in charge of the infiltration effort have sought to fill their quotas with soldiers and others born in the South. The 90,000 troops that moved from South Viet-Nam to the North when the Geneva accords ended the Indochina War have provided an invaluable reservoir for this purpose. Now, apparently, that source is running dry. The casualty rate has been high, and obviously many of those who were in fighting trim 10 years ago are no longer up to the rigors of guerrilla war.

In any case, reports of infiltration by native North Vietnamese in significant numbers have been received in Saigon for several months. It is estimated that as many as 75 percent of the more than 4,400 Viet Cong who are known to have entered the South in the first 8 months of 1964 were natives of North Viet-Nam.

Vo Thanh Vinh was born in Nghe An Province in North Viet-Nam in 1936. He was captured by South Vietnamese forces on May 5, 1964. He described himself as a military security officer. He infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in April 1964 with a group of 34 police and security officers from the North.

Another native North Vietnamese captured in the South was VC Private First Class Vo Quyen. His home was in Nam Dinh Province. He was a member of the 2d Battalion of the North Vietnamese army's 9th Regiment. He said the entire battalion had infiltrated into South Viet-Nam between February and May last year. He was captured in an action in Quang Tri Province on July 4. He told interrogators that the bulk of

¹ See appendix C for additional details on military infiltrators.

his unit was composed of young draftees from North Viet-Nam.

Le Pham Hung, also a private first class, was captured on July 7 in Thua Thien Province. He is a native of Nam Dinh in North Viet-Nam. Drafted for military service in May 1963, he was in the 324th Division. His group, consisting solely of 90 North Vietnamese draftees, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in May 1964. He reported that another company of North Vietnamese entered the South at the same time as his unit.

A former member of the 90th VC Battalion reported that his unit had been reinforced by native North Vietnamese troops earlier this year. Le Thua Phuong, an information cadre and a native of Quang Ngai Province in the South, surrendered to Government forces on April 23, 1964. He said that the 90th Battalion had received 80 North Vietnamese replacements in February.

A medical technician named Hoang Thung was captured in Thua Thien Province on July 4, 1964. He said he had infiltrated into the South in late 1963 with a group of 200 Viet Cong, the majority of whom were ethnic northerners. 120 of them draftees.

These reports destroy one more fiction which the authorities in Hanoi have sought so long to promote—that the fighting in the South was a matter for the South Vietnamese. They underline Hanoi's determination to press its campaign of conquest with every available resource.

D. INFILTRATION OF VIET CONG AGENTS

No effort to subvert another nation as elaborate as that being conducted by the Ho Chi Minh regime against South Viet-Nam can succeed without an intelligence-gathering organization. Recognizing this, the authorities in Hanoi have developed an extensive espionage effort. An essential part of that effort is the regular assignment of secret agents from the North to South Viet-Nam.

The heart of the VC intelligence organization is the Central Research Agency in Hanoi (see section IV, C). Communist agents are regularly dispatched from North Viet-Nam, sometimes for brief assignments but often for long periods. Many of these agents move into South Viet-Nam

along the infiltration trails through Laos; others are carried by boats along the coasts and landed at prearranged sites. A special maritime infiltration group has been developed in North Viet-Nam, with its operations centered in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces just north of the 17th parallel.

1. Maritime Infiltration

The following case illustrates the methods of maritime infiltration of secret agents used by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam:

In July 1962 a North Vietnamese intelligence agent named Nguyen Viet Duong began training to infiltrate South Viet-Nam. A native southerner, he had fought against the French and had gone to North Viet-Nam after the war ended. Selected for intelligence work, he was assigned to the Central Research Agency in 1959.

After a period of intensive instruction in radio transmission, coding and decoding, and other skills of the intelligence trade, he was given false identity papers and other supplies and was transported to the South. His principal task was to set up a cell of agents to collect military information. He flew from Hanoi to Dong Hoi, and from there the maritime infiltration group took him by boat to South Viet-Nam. That was in August 1962.

In January 1963 Duong reported to Hanoi that he had run into difficulties. His money and papers had been lost, and he had been forced to take refuge with VC contacts in another province. Another agent was selected to go to South Viet-Nam. One of his assignments was to contact Duong, find out details of what happened to him, and help Duong reestablish himself as a VC agent. The man selected for the task was Senior Captain Tran Van Tan of the Central Research Agency.

Tan had already been picked to go to the South to establish a clandestine VC communications center. Making contact with Duong was one of his secondary assignments. After intensive preparations Tan was ready to move to South Viet-Nam in March. He was transferred to an embarkation base of the maritime infiltration group just north of the 17th parallel.

He was joined by three other VC agents and the captain and three crewmen of the boat that would take them south. All were given false identity papers to conform to their false names. They

also were provided with fishermen's permits, South Vietnamese voting cards, and draft cards or military discharge papers. The boat captain received a boat registration book, crew lists, and several South Vietnamese permits to conduct business.

The agents and boatmen were given cover stories to tell if captured. Each man had to memorize not only the details of his own story but the names and some details about each of the others. The agents had to become familiar with simple boat procedures so they could pass as legitimate fishermen.

The expedition left the embarkation port on April 4. In addition to the four agents the boat carried six carefully sealed boxes containing a generator, several radios, some weapons, and a large supply of South Vietnamese currency. They also carried some chemicals and materials for making false identification papers. Their destination was a landing site on the coast of Phuoc Tuy Province.

Soon after leaving North Viet-Nam the VC boat encountered high winds and rough seas. On April 7 the storm became violent. The boat tossed and threatened to capsize. Strong northeasterly winds forced it ever closer to shore. Finally the boat captain, Nguyen Xit, ordered that the six boxes be thrown overboard. This was done, and the boat then was beached. The eight men decided to split up into pairs and try to make contact with VC forces. They buried their false papers and set out. Six of the eight were captured almost immediately by authorities in Thua Thien Province, and the other two were taken several days later.

2. Student Propaganda Agents

The student population of South Viet-Nam is an important target group for VC propagandists. These agents seek to win adherents for the Communist cause among young workers, students in high schools and universities, and the younger officers and enlisted men in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Typical of the agents sent into South Viet-Nam for this purpose is Nguyen Van Vy, a 19-year-old VC propagandist. He is a native of the Vinh Linh District in North Viet-Nam, just north of the Demilitarized Zone. He was a member of a Communist Party youth group in his native

village. He was recruited for propaganda work in the South in the fall of 1962. He was one of 40 young persons enrolled in a special political training course given by the Communist Party in his district.

The first phase of the training consisted of political indoctrination covering such subjects as the advance of communism, the North Vietnamese plan for winning control of the country, the responsibility of youth in furthering this plan, the war in the South, and the need for propaganda supporting the Liberation Front.

Those who successfully completed the first phase were selected for the second level of training, the so-called technical training phase. In this the trainees were given their mission in the South. Vy was told he should infiltrate into South Viet-Nam and there surrender to the authorities, describing himself as a defector who was "tired of the miserable life in the North." He was to say he wanted to complete his schooling, which was impossible in the North. He was told to ask to live with relatives in the South so he could go to school. Once his story was accepted and he was enrolled in a school, he was to begin his work of propagandizing other students. He was to wait for 3 or 4 months, however, until he was no longer the subject of local suspicion. He was assigned to work under an older agent to whom he had to report regularly.

A third member of the team was a younger man who was to assist Vy. The three were to infiltrate into South Viet-Nam separately and to meet there at a rendezvous point.

At first Vy was to do no more than to observe his fellow students carefully, collecting biographical data on them and studying their personalities, capabilities, and aspirations. He was then to select those he thought might be most influenced by Communist propaganda and try to make friends with them.

Once he had selected targets, he was to begin to influence them favorably toward the North and to implant Communist propaganda. He was responsible then for bringing into his organization those he had influenced effectively. These individuals were to be given their own propaganda assignments to work on other students.

Students who wanted to evade military service in the Government forces were considered prime

targets. Where possible, Vy was to help them get to North Viet-Nam. He was also told to make contact with any students who had been picked up by the authorities for suspected Communist activities. These, too, were to be helped to escape to North Viet-Nam. Any useful information concerning developments in the South or military activities were to be reported through his superior, Nguyen Van Phong.

In case he became suspect, he was either to make his own way back to North Viet-Nam or to go into the jungle and try to contact a VC unit.

Vy entered South Viet-Nam on January 2, 1963, by swimming across the Ben Hai River. He encountered an elderly farmer who led him to the local authorities in Hai Gu. There he told his story but it was not believed. He then admitted his true mission.

3. Other Agents

The Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam send their agents into South Viet-Nam by a wide variety of means. A few like Nguyen Van Vy cross the demilitarized zone, more infiltrate by sea, and still more along the infiltration routes through Laos. But there are other methods for entering South Viet-Nam. VC espionage agent Tran Van Bui attempted one such method.

Bui was a graduate of the espionage training school in Haiphong, North Viet-Nam. He com-

pleted a special 6-month course in July 1962. The training included political indoctrination, but most of the time was spent on such things as use of weapons, preparing booby traps, and methods of sabotage. He was also given instruction in methods for enlisting help from hoodlums, draft dodgers, and VC sympathizers. Once in South Viet-Nam, he was to organize a small unit for sabotage and the collection of information. On specific assignment by his superiors he was to be ready to sabotage ships in Saigon harbor and to blow up gasoline and oil storage points and Vietnamese Army installations. He was told to be prepared to assassinate Vietnamese officials and American personnel.

In September 1962 Bui was given his mission assignment. He was to hide aboard a foreign ship. When discovered, he was to claim to be a refugee who wanted to "escape" to South Viet-Nam. He was given an automatic pistol with silencer, some explosive devices, and a small knife that could inject poison into the body of a victim.

Bui stole aboard a foreign ship in Haiphong harbor. After 3 days at sea—when he was sure the ship would not turn around—Bui surrendered to the ship's captain. When the ship arrived in Bangkok, Bui was turned over to the Thai authorities. They in turn released him to the South Vietnamese as he had requested. But in Saigon his true mission was disclosed and he made a full confession.

II. *Hanoi Supplies Weapons, Ammunition, and Other War Materiel to Its Forces in the South*

When Hanoi launched the VC campaign of terror, violence, and subversion in earnest in 1959, the Communist forces relied mainly on stocks of weapons and ammunition left over from the war against the French. Supplies sent in from North Viet-Nam came largely from the same source. As the military campaign progressed, the Viet Cong depended heavily on weapons captured from the Armed Forces in South Viet-Nam. This remains an important source of weapons and ammunition

for the Viet Cong. But as the pace of the war has quickened, requirements for up-to-date arms and special types of weapons have risen to a point where the Viet Cong cannot rely on captured stocks. Hanoi has undertaken a program to re-equip its forces in the South with Communist-produced weapons.

Large and increasing quantities of military supplies are entering South Viet-Nam from outside the country. The principal supply point is

North Viet-Nam, which provides a convenient channel for materiel that originates in Communist China and other Communist countries.


An increasing number of weapons from external Communist sources have been seized in the South. These include such weapons as 57mm. and 75mm. recoilless rifles, dual-purpose machineguns, rocket launchers, large mortars, and antitank mines.

A new group of Chinese Communist-manufactured weapons has recently appeared in VC hands. These include the 7.62 semiautomatic carbine, 7.62 light machinegun, and the 7.62 assault rifle. These weapons and ammunition for them, manufactured in Communist China in 1962, were first captured in December 1964 in Chuong Thien Province. Similar weapons have since been seized in each of the four Corps areas of South Viet-Nam. Also captured have been Chinese Communist antitank grenade launchers and ammunition made in China in 1963.

One captured Viet Cong told his captors that his entire company had been supplied recently with modern Chinese weapons. The reequipping of VC units with a type of weapons that require ammunition and parts from outside South Viet-Nam indicates the growing confidence of the authorities in Hanoi in the effectiveness of their supply lines into the South.

Incontrovertible evidence of Hanoi's elaborate program to supply its forces in the South with weapons, ammunition, and other supplies has accumulated over the years. Dramatic new proof was exposed just as this report was being completed.

On February 16, 1965, an American helicopter pilot flying along the South Vietnamese coast sighted a suspicious vessel. It was a cargo ship of an estimated 100-ton capacity, carefully camouflaged and moored just offshore along the coast of Phu Yen Province. Fighter planes that ap-



Chinese Communist 75 mm. recoilless rifle captured in An Xuyen Province in Sept. 1963.



Part of the hull (left) of a North Vietnamese cargo ship which delivered a huge supply of arms and ammunition to the Viet Cong. It was sunk along the coast of Phu Yen Province by South Vietnamese aircraft. More than 100 tons of military supplies were seized.

proached the vessel met machinegun fire from guns on the deck of the ship and from the shore as well. A Vietnamese Air Force strike was launched against the vessel, and Vietnamese Government troops moved into the area. They seized the ship after a bitter fight with the Viet Cong.

The ship, which had been sunk in shallow water, had discharged a huge cargo of arms, ammunition, and other supplies. Documents found on the ship and on the bodies of several Viet Cong

aboard identified the vessel as having come from North Viet-Nam. A newspaper in the cabin was from Haiphong and was dated January 23, 1965. The supplies delivered by the ship—thousands of weapons and more than a million rounds of ammunition—were almost all of Communist origin, largely from Communist China and Czechoslovakia, as well as North Viet-Nam. At least 100 tons of military supplies were discovered near the ship.



Part of the huge stock of Chinese and other Communist weapons and ammunition seized from the Viet Cong in Phu Yen Province in Feb. 1965. A North Vietnamese military cargo vessel which delivered the arms was sunk. More than 100 tons of weapons and ammunition were captured. (For other pictures of this incident, see appendix E.)

A preliminary survey of the cache near the sunken vessel from Hanoi listed the following supplies and weapons:

- approximately 1 million rounds of small-arms ammunition;
- more than 1,000 stick grenades;
- 500 pounds of TNT in prepared charges;
- 2,000 rounds of 82 mm. mortar ammunition;
- 500 antitank grenades;
- 500 rounds of 57 mm. recoilless rifle ammunition;
- more than 1,000 rounds of 75 mm. recoilless rifle ammunition;
- one 57 mm. recoilless rifle;
- 2 heavy machineguns;
- 2,000, 7.95 Mauser rifles;
- more than 100, 7.62 carbines;
- 1,000 submachineguns;
- 15 light machineguns;
- 500 rifles;
- 500 pounds of medical supplies (with labels from North Viet-Nam, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Soviet Union, and other sources).

(Translation)

THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM

PERSONAL HEALTH RECORD

FULL NAME NGUYEN HOANG LONG
 POSITION TEACHER
 RANK SERGEANT
 UNIT CULTURE BATTALION

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

1960

SỔ SỨC KHỎE

Họ và tên: Nguyễn Hoàng Long
 Chức vụ: Giáo viên
 Cấp bậc: TRUNG SĨ
 Đơn vị: TRƯỜNG VĂN HÓA

CỤC QUẢN LÝ
1960

The document reproduced above is a personal health record issued by the army of North Viet-Nam to its personnel. It bears the name Nguyen Hoang Long. It was found on the body of a Viet Cong killed when a North Vietnamese military cargo ship was sunk along the coast of South Viet-Nam's Phu Yen Province in Feb. 1965. Another document in the same name was a permit from the North Vietnamese army for Sgt. Long to have leave in Haiphong in Sept. 1964.

The ship was fairly new and had been made in Communist China. Documents aboard the ship included three North Vietnamese nautical charts (one of the Haiphong area and one of Hong Gay, both in North Viet-Nam, and one of the Tra Vinh area of South Viet-Nam). The military health records of North Vietnamese soldiers were found. One man had a political history sheet showing he was a member of the 338th Division of the North Vietnamese army. (See Appendix E.)

Also aboard the North Vietnamese ship were: an instruction book for a Chinese Communist navigational device; postcards and letters to addresses in North Viet-Nam; snapshots, including one of a group of men in North Vietnamese army uniforms under a flag of the Hanoi government.

Members of the I.C.C. and representatives of the free press visited the sunken North Vietnamese ship and viewed its cargo. The incident itself underlined in the most dramatic form that Hanoi is behind the continuing campaign of aggression aimed at conquering South Viet-Nam. It made

unmistakably clear that what is happening in South Viet-Nam is not an internal affair but part of a large-scale carefully directed and supported program of armed attack on a sovereign state and a free people.

There have been previous seizures of large stocks of ammunition and weapons and other military supplies that could only have come from Communist sources outside South Viet-Nam. In December 1963 a Republic of Viet-Nam force attacked a VC stronghold in Dinh Tuong Province southwest of Saigon. A large cache of VC equipment was seized. Included in the captured stocks were the following weapons and ammunition, all of Chinese Communist manufacture:

- One 90 mm. rocket launcher;
- 2 carbines (type 53);
- 120 rounds of 75 mm. recoilless rifle ammunition;
- 120 detonating fuzes for recoilless rifle ammunition;
- 14,000 rounds of 7.62 (type P) ammunition;
- 160,000 rounds of 7.62 carbine ammunition;
- 150 fuzes for mortar shells;
- 100,000 rounds of 7.92 Mauser-type ammunition;
- 110 lbs. (approximate) of TNT;
- Two 60 mm. mortars.

These weapons and ammunition are the same as those used in the North Vietnamese army. Some of the 7.62 mm. ammunition was manufactured as recently as 1962.¹

Materiel is sent into South Viet-Nam from the North by a variety of methods—overland, by river and canal, and by sea. In one instance Vietnamese troops discovered a cache in which the 75 mm. ammunition alone weighed approximately 1½ tons. It has been estimated that it would require more than 150 porters to carry this quantity of ammunition over rough terrain. However, a few sampans, each manned by a few men, could transport it with little difficulty. It is worth noting, in this connection, that the delta where the cache of materiel was seized has 460 miles of seacoast as well as



120 rounds of Chinese Communist 75 mm. ammunition for recoilless rifle—part of the huge cache of VC weapons and supplies captured at Dinh Tuong in Dec. 1963.

¹ On Jan. 29, 1964, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam supplied the International Control Commission with a list of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment of Communist origin captured in South Viet-Nam since June 1962. The list is summarized in appendix D.

2,500 miles of canals navigable by large water craft and another 2,200 miles of canals over which sampans can move easily. Much of the transport of large stocks of ammunition is undoubtedly waterborne for at least much of its travel into South Viet-Nam.²

Large quantities of chemical components for explosives have been sent into South Viet-Nam for the Viet Cong. During 1963 there were at least 15 incidents in which boats, junks, or sampans were seized with explosives aboard. More than 20 tons of potassium chlorate or nitrate were captured. All these cases were in the delta area, and the majority were on or near the Mekong River. Red

²Photographs of additional Viet Cong weapons and ammunition of Communist origin are contained in appendix E.

phosphorus made in Communist China has been among the chemicals captured from the Viet Cong.

The Communists have shown extreme sensitivity to exposure of the fact that war materiel is going to the Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam, Communist China, and other Communist countries. A secret document captured from a VC agent last year reflected this sensitivity. The document was sent from VC military headquarters in Bien Hoa Province to subordinate units. It ordered them to "pay special attention to the removal of all the markings and letters on weapons of all types currently employed by units and agencies and manufactured by friendly East European democratic countries or by China." It said incriminating marking should be chiseled off "so that the enemy cannot use it as a propaganda theme every time he captures these weapons."

III. *North Viet-Nam: Base for Conquest of the South*

The Third Lao Dong Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960 set forth two tasks for its members: "to carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam" and "to liberate South Viet-Nam."

The resolutions of the congress described the effort to destroy the legal Government in South Viet-Nam as follows: "The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary power of the masses."

At the September meeting the Communist leaders in the North called for formation of "a broad national united front." Three months later Hanoi announced creation of the "Front for Liberation of the South." This is the organization that Communist propaganda now credits with guiding the forces of subversion in the South; it is pic-

tured as an organization established and run by the people in the South themselves. At the 1960 Lao Dong Party Congress the tone was different. Then, even before the front existed, the Communist leaders were issuing orders for the group that was being organized behind the scenes in Hanoi. "This front must rally . . ."; "The aims of its struggle are . . ."; "The front must carry out . . ."—this is the way Hanoi and the Communist Party addressed the "Liberation Front" even before its founding.

The Liberation Front is Hanoi's creation; it is neither independent nor southern, and what it seeks is not liberation but subjugation of the South.

In his address to the Third Lao Dong Party Congress, party and government leader Ho Chi Minh spoke of the necessity "to step up the socialist revolution in the North and, at the same time, to step up the national democratic people's revolution in the South."

The year before, writing for *Red Flag*, the Communist Party newspaper of Belgium, Ho had said much the same thing:

We are building socialism in Viet-Nam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to *direct and bring to a close* the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist *revolution*.

In the same vein, the commander-in-chief of the North Vietnamese armed forces, Vo Nguyen Giap, spoke at the 1960 party congress of the need to "*step up the national democratic people's revolution in the South*." Earlier in the year, writing for the Communist Party journal *Hoc Tap* in Hanoi, General Giap described the North as "*the revolutionary base for the whole country*."

Le Duan, a member of the Politburo and first secretary of the Lao Dong Party, was even more explicit when he talked at the party congress about the struggle in the South and the party's role. After noting the difficulties involved in overthrowing the existing order in South Viet-Nam, Le Duan said:

Hence the southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, *legal and illegal*—and based on the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, *we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the South*. . . .

Another high official of the Hanoi regime, Truong Chinh, writing in the party organ *Hoc Tap* in April 1961, expressed confidence in the success of the struggle to remove the legal Government in South Viet-Nam because: "North Viet-Nam is being rapidly consolidated and strengthened, *is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as a strong base for the struggle for national reunification*."

He outlined the steps by which the Communists expect to achieve control over all Viet-Nam as follows: The "Liberation Front" would destroy the present Government in the South; a "Coali-

tion Government" would be established; this government would agree with the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi regarding national reunification "under one form or another." It takes little imagination to understand the form that is intended.

"Thus," wrote Truong Chinh, "though *South Viet-Nam will be liberated by nonpeaceful means*, the party policy of achieving peaceful national reunification is still correct."

The official government radio in Hanoi is used both overtly and covertly to support the Viet Cong effort in South Viet-Nam. Captured agents have testified that the broadcasts are used sometimes to send instructions in veiled code to Viet Cong representatives in the South.

Hoc Tap stated frankly in March 1963: "They [the authorities in South Viet-Nam] are well aware that *North Viet-Nam is the firm base for the southern revolution* and the point on which it leans, and that *our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution*."

In April 1964 the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party issued a directive to all party echelons. It stated: "When the forces of the enemy and the plots of the enemy are considered, it is realized that *the cadres, party members, and people in North Viet-Nam must . . . increase their sense of responsibility in regard to the South Viet-Nam revolution by giving positive and practical support to South Viet-Nam in every field*."

Nguyen Chi Thanh, writing in a Hanoi newspaper in May 1963, underlined the importance of the role of the North Vietnamese army in Hanoi's plans to unify Viet-Nam under Communist rule:

"Our party set forth two strategic tasks to be carried out at the same time: to transform and build socialism in the North and to struggle to unify the country. *Our army is an instrument of the class struggle in carrying out these two strategic tasks*."

IV. Organization, Direction, Command, and Control of the Attack on South Viet-Nam Are Centered in Hanoi

The VC military and political apparatus in South Viet-Nam is an extension of an elaborate military and political structure in North Viet-Nam which directs and supplies it with the tools for conquest. The Ho Chi Minh regime has shown that it is ready to allocate every resource that can be spared—whether it be personnel, funds, or equipment—to the cause of overthrowing the legitimate Government in South Viet-Nam and of bringing all Viet-Nam under Communist rule.

A. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Political direction and control of the Viet Cong is supplied by the Lao Dong Party, i.e. the Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh. Party agents are responsible for indoctrination, recruitment, political training, propaganda, anti-Government demonstrations, and other activities of a political nature. The considerable intelligence-gathering facilities of the party are also at the disposal of the Viet Cong.

Overall direction of the VC movement is the responsibility of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party. Within the Central Committee a special Reunification Department has been established. This has replaced the "Committee for Supervision of the South" mentioned in intelligence reports 2 years ago. It lays down broad strategy for the movement to conquer South Viet-Nam.

Until March 1962 there were two principal administrative divisions in the VC structure in the South. One was the Interzone of South-Central Viet-Nam (sometimes called Interzone 5); the other was the Nambo Region. In a 1962 reorganization these were merged into one, called the Central Office for South Viet-Nam. The Central Committee, through its Reunification Department, issues directives to the Central Office, which translates them into specific orders for the appropriate subordinate command.

Under the Central Office are six regional units (V through IX) plus the special zone of Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh. A regional committee responsible to the Central Office directs VC activities in each region. Each regional committee has specialized units responsible for liaison, propaganda, training, personnel, subversive activities, espionage, military bases, and the like.

Below each regional committee are similarly structured units at the province and district levels. At the base of the Communist pyramid are the individual party cells, which may be organized on a geographic base or within social or occupational groups. The elaborateness of the party unit and the extent to which it operates openly or underground is determined mainly by the extent of VC control over the area concerned.

1. The "Liberation Front"

The National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam is the screen behind which the Communists carry out their program of conquest. It is the creature of the Communist Government in Hanoi. As noted above the Communist Party in the North demanded establishment of such a "front" three months before its formation was actually announced in December 1960. It was designed to create the illusion that the Viet Cong campaign of subversion was truly indigenous to South Viet-Nam rather than an externally directed Communist plan.

The front has won support primarily from the Communist world. Its radio faithfully repeats the propaganda themes of Hanoi and Peiping. When its representatives travel abroad, they do so with North Vietnamese passports and sponsorship.¹ The front's program copies that of the Lao Dong Party in North Viet-Nam.

¹ Pictures of North Vietnamese passports and travel documents used by front officials are in appendix F.

In late 1961, in still another effort to conceal the extent of Communist domination of the front, the Communists announced formation of a new Marxist political unit, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). This mechanism provided a way to explain the Communist presence in the front while at the same time making it appear that the Communist voice was only one of several affiliated organizations in the front. The PRP itself claimed direct descent from the original Indo-Chinese Communist Party and from the North Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi.²

B. MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Military affairs of the Viet Cong are the responsibility of High Command of the People's Army of North Viet-Nam and the Ministry of Defense, under close supervision from the Lao Dong Party. These responsibilities include operational plans, assignments of individuals and regular units, training programs, infiltration of military personnel and supplies, military communications, tactical intelligence, supplies, and the like. The six military regions are the same as those of the VC political organization.

The military structure of the Viet Cong is an integral part of the political machinery that controls every facet of VC activity in South Viet-Nam under Hanoi's overall direction. Each political headquarters from the Central Office down to the village has a military component which controls day-to-day military operations. Similarly, each military headquarters has a political element, an individual or a small staff. This meshing of political and military activity is designed to insure the closest cooperation in support of the total Communist mission. It also gives assurance of political control over the military.

Associated with the Central Office, believed to be located in Tay Ninh Province, is a military headquarters. Through this headquarters, as well as through other channels, Hanoi maintains direct contact with its principal military units in the South.

² For evidence that the People's Revolutionary Party in the South and the Communist Lao Dong Party in the North are one Party, see appendix G.

In addition to its supervision of the general military effort of the VC, the military section of the Central Office is believed to have direct command of two regimental headquarters and a number of security companies.

The hard core of the VC military organization is the full-time regular unit usually based on a province or region. These are well-trained and highly disciplined guerrilla fighters. They follow a rigid training schedule that is roughly two-thirds military and one-third political in content. This compares with the 50-50 proportion for district units and the 70 percent political and 30 percent military content of the village guerrilla's training.

The size of the Viet Cong regular forces has grown steadily in recent years. For example, the Viet Cong have five regimental headquarters compared with two in 1961. And the main VC force is composed of 50 battalions, 50 percent more than before. There are an estimated 139 VC companies. Hard-core VC strength now is estimated at about 35,000, whereas it was less than 20,000 in 1961.

The main force battalions are well armed with a variety of effective weapons including 75-mm. recoilless rifles and 81-82-mm. mortars. The companies and smaller units are equally well equipped and have 57-mm. recoilless rifles and 60-mm. mortars in their inventory. It is estimated that the Viet Cong have at least 130 81-mm. mortars and 300 60-mm. mortars. There is no precise estimate for the number of recoilless rifles in their hands, but it is believed that most main force units are equipped with them. In at least one recent action the Viet Cong employed a 75-mm. pack howitzer. This mobile weapon, which has a range of 8,500 yards, will increase the Viet Cong capabilities to launch long-range attacks against many stationary targets in the country.

Supporting the main force units of the Viet Cong are an estimated 60,000-80,000 part-time guerrillas. They are generally organized at the district level where there are likely to be several companies of 50 or more men each. These troops receive only half pay, which means they must work at least part of the time to eke out a living.

Below the irregular guerrilla forces of the district are the part-time, village-based guerrillas.



The smoking ruins of a Cao Dai temple in Tan Hanh village, Vinh Long Province, burned down by VC terrorists on Aug. 10, 1964. The 64-year-old caretaker died in the flames.

They are available for assignment by higher headquarters and are used for harassment and sabotage. They are expected to warn nearby VC units of the approach of any force of the legal government. They provide a pool for recruitment into the VC district forces.

The record shows that many of the village guerrillas are dragooned into service with the Viet Cong. Some are kidnaped; others are threatened; still others join to prevent their families from being harmed. Once in the Viet Cong net, many are reluctant to leave for fear of punishment by the authorities or reprisal by the Communists.

Lam Van Chuoi is a typical example. He was a member of the Village Civil Defense force in his home village in Kien Giang province. In March 1960, he was kidnaped by the Viet Cong and kept a prisoner in the highlands for one month. There he was subjected to intense propaganda and indoctrination. He was returned to his village but kept under close observation and steady pressure. Finally, he was convinced he must join the VC.

Later, he was transferred to a Communist military unit in another province. After learning of the Government's "Open Arms" program, he decided to defect from the VC. In May 1964, he walked into a Government outpost and asked for protection.

Money to pay the regular VC units comes from a variety of sources. Funds are sent from Hanoi. "Taxes" are extorted from the local population. Landowners and plantation operators often must pay a tribute to the VC as the price for not having their lands devastated. Similarly, transportation companies have been forced to pay the VC or face the threat of having their buses or boats sabotaged. Officials and wealthy people have been kidnaped for ransom. The VC have often stopped buses and taken the money and valuables of all on board.

For the most part, the VC have concentrated their attention on individuals, isolated or poorly defended outposts, and small centers of population. They have mercilessly killed or kidnaped thousands of village chiefs and other local officials.

But over the past year the VC have moved into larger unit operations. Their ability to operate on a battalion-level or larger has substantially increased.

C. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

A key element in the Viet Cong effort is an elaborate organization in Hanoi called the Central Research Agency (C.R.A.) (Cuc Nghien-Cuu Trung-Uong). Though it handles Hanoi's intelligence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus of its operation is on South Viet-Nam. This agency is able to draw on the intelligence capabilities of both the Lao Dong Party and the North Vietnamese armed forces for information, personnel, and facilities.

The C.R.A. reportedly operates under the close personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh himself. Some of the top officials in the Hanoi government reportedly sit on its directing committee, including Premier Pham Van Dong, Deputy Premier Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap.

Considerable information on the organization of the C.R.A. has become available from captured Viet Cong agents and from the work of intelligence agents of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Much of this information cannot be made public for security reasons, but it is possible to describe the C.R.A. organization and its operations in broad outline.

The headquarters of the C.R.A. in Hanoi is divided into six main sections, not including a special code unit. The six sections are responsible for administration, cadres, communications, espionage, research, and training. Each section has units to handle the specialized activities of its particular area of responsibility. The research section, for example, has subsections that handle political, economic, and military affairs respectively.

C.R.A. headquarters directs a number of special centers for overseas operations. One such center maintains intelligence channels to overseas areas.

It operates through special units at Haiphong and at Hongay.

A second special center is responsible for VC intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. A third center handles activities along the "demarcation line," the border with South Viet-Nam. This unit, based in Vinh Linh in southeast North Viet-Nam, is responsible for sending agents and supplies to the South by sea. It also cooperates with the North Vietnamese army in planning and carrying out infiltration. The C.R.A. maintains intelligence bases in Laos and other countries.

Inside South Viet-Nam the Viet Cong have a large intelligence network. Some of its units are responsible for receiving and sending on agents arriving from the North. They feed and give instructions to groups infiltrating into South Viet-Nam. They take delivery of equipment and supplies received from the North and relay them to Viet Cong units in the South.

Many Viet Cong agents have been captured in Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by the C.R.A. to penetrate all Republic of Viet-Nam Government agencies, foreign embassies, and other specialized organizations. Party and military intelligence units and agents work closely with the C.R.A.

Each of the main centers operating under C.R.A. headquarters has its own sections and units designed to carry out its main functions. The center at Vinh Linh, responsible for the main infiltration effort of the Viet Cong, has separate sections for radio communications, coding, documentation and training, and liaison. It also has specialized units for infiltration through the mountains, infiltration by sea, and "illegal action" in the mountain area.

The C.R.A. maintains a large and expanding radio communications network. Agents also are used to carry messages, usually in secret writing or memorized.

Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelligence operation in support of the Viet Cong is one of the most extensive of its kind in the world.¹

¹ Charts of the VC organizational structure are in appendix H.

V. A Brief History of Hanoi's Campaign of Aggression Against South Viet-Nam

While negotiating an end to the Indochina War at Geneva in 1954, the Communists were making plans to take over all former French territory in Southeast Asia. When Viet-Nam was partitioned, thousands of carefully selected party members were ordered to remain in place in the South and keep their secret apparatus intact to help promote Hanoi's cause. Arms and ammunition were stored away for future use. Guerrilla fighters rejoined their families to await the party's call. Others withdrew to remote jungle and mountain hideouts. The majority—an estimated 90,000—were moved to North Viet-Nam.

Hanoi's original calculation was that all of Viet-Nam would fall under its control without resort to force. For this purpose, Communist cadres were ordered to penetrate official and non-official agencies, to propagandize and sow confusion, and generally to use all means short of open violence to aggravate war-torn conditions and to weaken South Viet-Nam's Government and social fabric.

South Viet-Nam's refusal to fall in with Hanoi's scheme for peaceful takeover came as a heavy blow to the Communists. Meantime, the Government had stepped up efforts to blunt Viet Cong subversion and to expose Communist agents. Morale in the Communist organization in the South dropped sharply. Defections were numerous.

Among South Vietnamese, hope rose that their nation could have a peaceful and independent future, free of Communist domination. The country went to work. The years after 1955 were a period of steady progress and growing prosperity.

Food production levels of the prewar years were reached and surpassed. While per capita food output was dropping 10 percent in the North from 1956 to 1960, it rose 20 percent in the South. By 1963, it had risen 30 percent—despite the disruption in the countryside caused by intensified Viet Cong military attacks and terrorism. The authorities in the North admitted openly to continuing annual failures to achieve food production goals.


Production of textiles increased in the South more than 20 percent in one year (1958). In the same year, South Viet-Nam's sugar crop increased more than 100 percent. Despite North Viet-Nam's vastly larger industrial complex, South Viet-Nam's per capita gross national product in 1960 was estimated at \$110 a person while it was only \$70 in the North.

More than 900,000 refugees who had fled from Communist rule in the North were successfully settled in South Viet-Nam. An agrarian reform program was instituted. The elementary school population nearly quadrupled between 1956 and 1960. And so it went—a record of steady improvement in the lives of the people. It was intolerable for the rulers in Hanoi; under peaceful conditions, the South was outstripping the North. They were losing the battle of peaceful competition and decided to use violence and terror to gain their ends.

After 1956 Hanoi rebuilt, reorganized, and expanded its covert political and military machinery in the South. Defectors were replaced by trained personnel from party ranks in the North. Military units and political cells were enlarged and were given new leaders, equipment, and intensified training. Recruitment was pushed. In short, Hanoi and its forces in the South prepared to take by force and violence what they had failed to achieve by other means.

By 1958 the use of terror by the Viet Cong increased appreciably. It was used both to win prestige and to back up demands for support from the people, support that political and propaganda appeals had failed to produce. It was also designed to embarrass the Government in Saigon and raise doubts about its ability to maintain internal order and to assure the personal security of its people. From 1959 through 1961, the pace of Viet Cong terrorism and armed attacks accelerated substantially.

The situation at the end of 1961 was so grave that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam asked the United States for increased military assistance. That request was met. Meantime, the program of strategic hamlets, designed to improve



The wreckage of a civilian bus destroyed by a Viet Cong mine on Mar. 22, 1964, in Long An Province; 22 civilian passengers, including 6 children, were killed in the incident.

the peasant's livelihood and give him some protection against Viet Cong harassment and pressure, was pushed energetically.

But the Viet Cong did not stand still. To meet the changing situation, they tightened their organization and adopted new tactics, with increasing emphasis on terrorism, sabotage, and armed attacks by small groups. They also introduced from the North technicians in fields such as armor and antiaircraft. Heavier weapons were sent in to the regular guerrilla forces.

The military and insurgency situation was complicated by a quite separate internal political struggle in South Viet-Nam, which led in November 1963 to the removal of the Diem government and its replacement with a new one. Effective power was placed in the hands of a Military Revolutionary Council. There have been a number of changes in the leadership and composition of the Government in Saigon in the ensuing period.


These internal developments and distractions gave the Viet Cong an invaluable opportunity, and they took advantage of it. Viet Cong agents did what they could to encourage disaffection and to exploit demonstrations in Saigon and elsewhere. In the countryside the Communists consolidated their hold over some areas and enlarged their mili-

tary and political apparatus by increased infiltration. Increasingly they struck at remote outposts and the most vulnerable of the new strategic hamlets and expanded their campaign of aggressive attacks, sabotage, and terror.

Any official, worker, or establishment that represents a service to the people by the Government in Saigon is fair game for the Viet Cong. Schools have been among their favorite targets. Through harassment, the murder of teachers, and sabotage of buildings, the Viet Cong succeeded in closing hundreds of schools and interrupting the education of tens of thousands of youngsters.

Hospitals and medical clinics have often been attacked as part of the anti-Government campaign and also because such attacks provide the Viet Cong with needed medical supplies. The Communists have encouraged people in rural areas to oppose the Government's antimalaria teams, and some of the workers have been killed. Village and town offices, police stations, and agricultural research stations are high on the list of preferred targets for the Viet Cong.

In 1964, 436 South Vietnamese hamlet chiefs and other Government officials were killed outright by the Viet Cong and 1,131 were kidnaped. More than 1,350 civilians were killed in bombings



The maternity hospital of My Phuoc Tay in Dinh Tuong Province, destroyed by Viet Cong terrorists on Apr. 8, 1964

and other acts of sabotage. And at least 8,400 civilians were kidnaped by the Viet Cong.¹

Today the war in Viet-Nam has reached new levels of intensity. The elaborate effort by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam to conquer the South has grown, not diminished. Military men, technicians, political organizers, propagandists, and secret agents have been infiltrating into the Republic of Viet-Nam from the North in growing numbers. The flow of Communist-supplied weapons, particularly those of large caliber, has increased. Communications links with Hanoi are extensive. Despite the heavy casualties of 3 years of fighting, the hard-core VC force is considerably larger now than it was at the end of 1961.

The Government in Saigon has undertaken vigorous action to meet the new threat. The United States and other free countries have increased their assistance to the Vietnamese Government and people. Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Viet-Nam in 1964, and he promised the Vietnamese: "We shall remain at your side until the aggression from the North has been defeated,

¹ For additional details of VC terrorism, see appendix I.

until it has been completely rooted out and this land enjoys the peace which it deserves."

President Johnson has repeatedly stressed that the United States' goal is to see peace secured in Southeast Asia. But he has noted that "that will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace."

Though it has been apparent for years that the regime in Hanoi was conducting a campaign of conquest against South Viet-Nam, the Government in Saigon and the Government of the United States both hoped that the danger could be met within South Viet-Nam itself. The hope that any widening of the conflict might be avoided was stated frequently.

The leaders in Hanoi chose to respond with greater violence. They apparently interpreted restraint as indicating lack of will. Their efforts were pressed with greater vigor and armed attacks and incidents of terror multiplied.

Clearly the restraint of the past was not providing adequately for the defense of South Viet-Nam against Hanoi's open aggression. It was mutually agreed between the Governments of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States that further

means for providing for South Viet-Nam's defense were required. Therefore, air strikes have been made against some of the military assembly points and supply bases from which North Viet-Nam is conducting its aggression against the South. These strikes constitute a limited response fitted to the aggression that produced them.

Until the regime in Hanoi decides to halt its intervention in the South, or until effective steps are taken to maintain peace and security in the area, the Governments of South Viet-Nam and the United States will continue necessary measures of defense against the Communist armed aggression coming from North Viet-Nam.

VI. *Conclusion*

The evidence presented in this report could be multiplied many times with similar examples of the drive of the Hanoi regime to extend its rule over South Viet-Nam.

The record is conclusive. It establishes beyond question that North Viet-Nam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the South. It shows that North Viet-Nam has intensified its efforts in the years since it was condemned by the International Control Commission. It proves that Hanoi continues to press its systematic program of armed aggression into South Viet-Nam. This aggression violates the United Nations Charter. It is directly contrary to the Geneva accords of 1954 and of 1962 to which North Viet-Nam is a party. It shatters the peace of Southeast Asia. It is a fundamental threat to

the freedom and security of South Viet-Nam.

The people of South Viet-Nam have chosen to resist this threat. At their request, the United States has taken its place beside them in their defensive struggle.

The United States seeks no territory, no military bases, no favored position. But we have learned the meaning of aggression elsewhere in the post-war world, and we have met it.

If peace can be restored in South Viet-Nam, the United States will be ready at once to reduce its military involvement. But it will not abandon friends who want to remain free. It will do what must be done to help them. The choice now between peace and continued and increasingly destructive conflict is one for the authorities in Hanoi to make.

APPENDIX A

Findings of the International Control Commission

(See Introduction, page 1)

On June 2, 1962, the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam (I.C.C.) sent a special report to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Soviet Union in their role as Cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. The I.C.C. is composed of delegates from India (chairman), Canada, and Poland.

In its report the I.C.C. noted the following findings of the Commission's Legal Committee:

Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

In examining the complaints and the supporting material in particular documentary material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the fur-

ther conclusion that there is evidence to show that the PAVN [People's Army of Viet-Nam] has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South. The use of the Zone in the North for such activities is in violation of Articles 10, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

The I.C.C. report then stated:

The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Legal Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt that the PAVN has violated Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 in specific instances. The Polish delegation dissents from these conclusions. On the basis of the fuller report, that is being prepared by the Legal Committee covering all the allegations and incidents, the Commission will take action as appropriate in each individual case.


The full text of the I.C.C. report is contained in a publication, "Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China" issued by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State on July 2, 1962.

APPENDIX B


Infiltration of Military Personnel From North Viet-Nam Into South Viet-Nam

(See section I, B.)

1. Map showing the route over which Huynh Duc Tha, deputy commander of a Viet Cong company, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam from the North in Mar.-Apr. 1962. Tha surrendered to Government forces in July 1963.



2. Map showing the infiltration route of VC Master Sergeant Tran Huu Hung, who was taken prisoner in June 1963.



APPENDIX C


Detail on Military Infiltration With Case Studies

(See section I, B and C.)

The following table shows the scale of infiltration of military personnel from North Viet-Nam into the South since 1959. The confirmed list is based on information on infiltration groups from at least two independent sources.

Year	Confirmed	Estimated additional	Total
1959-60	1, 800	2, 700	4, 500
1961	3, 750	1, 650	5, 400
1962	5, 400	7, 000	12, 400
1963	4, 200	3, 200	7, 400
1964	4, 400	3, 000	7, 400
Total	19, 550	17, 550	37, 100

Photographs and brief case histories of typical Viet Cong who were sent into South Viet-Nam by the authorities in Hanoi follow.

Name: Le Van Thanh**Alias:** Huu Tam**Date and place of birth:** July 12, 1936, Hoa Hao hamlet, Cat Tai village, Phu Cat district (Binh Dinh)**Rank and position in North Viet-Nam:** Lt., formerly platoon leader of signal platoon of 8d Bn., 90th Regt., 324th Div.**VC position in South Viet-Nam:** Platoon leader of signal platoon of 95th Bn., 2d Regt., 5th Inter-Region**Date entered South Viet-Nam:** Departed Nov. 27, 1961, arrived Do Xa station early Feb. 1962**Date, place, and circumstance of defection:** Rallied to Government at Nhon Loc post, Nghia Hanh district (Quang Ngai) May 24, 1962

Name: La Thanh

Alias: Nguyen Ba Tong - La Glau

Date and place of birth: 1928, Can Tho city (Phong Dinh)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Sr. sgt., formerly squad leader in charge of construction of barracks for 338th Div.

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Squad leader, 8th Squad, 3d Platoon, 3d Co., 218B Bn. (War Zone D)

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed Apr. 4, 1962, arrived War Zone D early Aug. 1962

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Cau Song Be (bridge) post Sept. 8, 1962, with 1 MAS 36



Name: Le Van Quyen

Alias: Ho Hai, Hong Thanh


Date and place of birth: 1929, Tan Binh Than village, Cho Gao district (My Tho)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Lt., formerly assigned to 338th Brigade as instructor on heavy weapons such as 57 mm. recoilless rifle and machinegun

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 2d Co., Infiltration Group 15

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed Apr. 3, 1962, arrived Suoi Da (War Zone D) Sept. 10, 1962

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Hieu Liem district (Phuoc Thanh) Oct. 7, 1962



Name: Nguyen Van Do

Party name: Thanh Minh

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Thuan


Date and place of birth: 1923, Thuan Giao village, Lai Thieu district (Binh Duong)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Sr. capt. (Bn. comdr.) 1st Bn., 338th Brigade

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Subject was to be appointed comdr. of Phuoc Tuy Province Main Force Battalion

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Comdr. of Infiltration Group H. 26; departed Xuan Mai, Ha Dong (North Viet-Nam) July 4, 1963; arrived Ban Me Thuot Oct. 23, 1963

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Ban Don post, Ban Me Thuot, Oct. 23, 1963, while guiding Group H.26 to Hai Yen Zone



Name: Nguyen Thanh Phi

Party name: Hung Phuong

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Tu


Date and place of birth: Nov. 16, 1926, Thanh Van village, Thanh Chuong district (Nghe An)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Doctor, chief of internal disease section, Tiep Viet Hospital

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Doctor, health team leader, 5th Region base construction group (Do Xa)

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Mar. 1962

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Vietnamese Armed Forces May 4, 1963, with 1 12mm. Colt pistol and 5 rounds



Name: Le Van Net

Party name: Le Hung Tien

Infiltration alias: Le Na


Date and place of birth: 1924, Tan Hiep village, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Discharged Lt., served in Co Dinh chromite mine (Thanh Hoa) with grade of sr. sgt.

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Sr. sgt., 6th Squad, 2d Platoon, Infiltration Group H.26

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Late June 1963 with Infiltration Group H.26

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured Nov. 16, 1963, by inhabitants in strategic hamlet in Ban Me Thuot (Darlac) with 1 Communist Chinese rifle and 70 rounds



Name: Van Cong Khanh

Party name: Pham Tien

Date and place of birth: 1924, An Hoi village, Chau Thanh district (Kien Hoa)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Discharged and reassigned to Co Dinh chromite mine (Thanh Hoa) as sr. sgt.

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Aspirant, leader of 7th Squad, 3d Platoon, 608th Engineer Co. subordinate to Hdqtrs. Region 7

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied Group 49, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam Mar. 18, 1962

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured Nov. 23, 1962, in Bung Dia hamlet



Name: Nguyen Thanh Hoa

Party name: Quoc

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Quoc Trung


Date and place of birth: 1917, Phong Coc village, Ha Nam canton (Quang Yen)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Capt., discharged and reassigned to Chi Ne agricultural camp May 1957

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Comdr., 4th Main Force Battalion

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 52; departed Xuan Mai Apr. 13, 1961, arrived about Aug. 1961

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Vietnamese Armed Forces with 1 PA 38 (pistol) in Quon Long (Dinh Tuong) Aug. 1962



Name: Tran van Khoa

Alias: Tran Hong Hai

Date and place of birth: 1935, Glong Gach hamlet, An Hiep village, Ba Tri district, Ben Tre Province (Kien Hoa)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Sgt., formerly driver of Transportation Group 3 of (Hanoi) Logistical Bureau

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Member of 46th Infiltration Co.; cover designation V.2 (infiltrated unit)

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied the 46th Infiltration Co.; departed for South Viet-Nam Apr. 17, 1962

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Vietnamese Rangers in ambush (after being wounded) along with 1 MAS 36 July 7, 1962, in Phuoc Long Province



APPENDIX D

List of Communist Weapons Captured in South Viet-Nam

(See section II.)

On January 29, 1964, the Government of Viet-Nam submitted to the International Control Commission a list of weapons and other military equipment which had been captured from the Viet Cong. The weapons and equipment came from Communist sources outside South Viet-Nam and obviously had been introduced clandestinely into the country in support of the Viet Cong campaign of conquest directed by Hanoi.

I. CHINESE COMMUNIST ORIGIN

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
75-mm. recoilless rifle	1	9/10/63 . .	An Xuyen Province
	1	12/2-6/63 . .	An Xuyen Province
	1	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	3		
57-mm. recoilless gun	1	11/25/62 . .	Phuoc Chau in Quang Tin (1 gun and 7 gun carriages)
		12/5/62 . .	Phu Bon (1 gun carriage)
	2	8/31/63 . .	Province of Quang Ngai
Total	3 guns (8 gun carriages)		
Shells for 75-mm. gun (shells bear markings in Chinese characters. On some shells, markings were scratched out and replaced by "American" markings.)	8	11/24/63 . .	Province of An Xuyen
	120	12/22/63 . .	Operation Duc Thang at Dinh Tuong
Total	128		
Shells for 57-mm. gun	49	11/25/62 . .	Phuoc Chau, Province of Quang Tin
	8	2/20/63 . .	Viet Cong attack on the post of Ben Hco (Tay Ninh)
	33	5/24/63 . .	On a Viet Cong vessel on the Bassac River
	6	8/31/63 . .	Quang Ngai
	1	10/8/63 . .	Province of Binh Dinh
	58	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	155		

I. CHINESE COMMUNIST ORIGIN—Continued

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
80-mm. mortar	1	3/25/63 . .	Province of Tay Ninh
60-mm. mortar	1	1/7/63 . . .	Phuoc Thanh
	2	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	3		
Shells for 60-mm. mortar	18	9/10/63 . .	Province of An Xuyen
	165	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	183		
90-mm. bazooka	1	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong.
Caliber 27-mm. rocket launcher . .	2	6/10/62 . .	Provinces of Quang Ngai and Quang Duc.
Total	3		
Caliber 7.92-mm. model 08 Maxim machinegun	2	9/10/63 . .	Province of An Xuyen
	4	12/21/63 . .	Chuong Thien
Total	6		
MP-82 rocket	142	4/24/63 . .	Quang Ngai
TNT explosives	365 charges	6/13/62 . .	Quang Duc
	43	11/25/62 . .	Phuoc Chau (Quang Tin)
	29	5/7/63 . . .	Can Tho
	140	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	577 charges		
Red phosphorous	5 kg.	4/19/63 . .	Province of Kien Phong
Potassium chlorate	17 tons	Sept. '62 . .	On a Viet Cong vessel at Phu Quoc
	2 tons	4/19/63 . .	Province of Kien Phong
	150 kg.	7/10-15/63 .	Phu Quoc
Total	19 tons 155 kg.		
Cartridges for 7.92-mm. machinegun.	100, 000	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Detonating fuses for 60-mm. mortar shell.	150	. . do . .	Do.

II. SOVIET ORIGIN

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
MP-82 rifle		5/10/62 . .	Binh Dinh
Launching cartridges do . .	Do.
Mossin Nagant carbine (with auto- matic bayonet).	1	6/13/63 . .	Kien Phong
	2	7/13/63 . .	Long An
	5	7/20/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
	7	9/8/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	15		
Rifles	6	10/6/63 . .	Long An
	1	10/19/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
	11	11/6/63 . .	Vinh Binh
	1	11/17/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
	1	11/25/63 . .	Hau Nghia
	1	12/6/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
	8	12/7/63 . .	Phong Dinh
	1	12/12/63 . .	Kien Tuong
	1	12/13/63 . .	An Xuyen
	1	12/16/63 . .	Kien Giang
	1	. . . do . .	Ba Xuyen
	3	. . . do . .	An Xuyen
	1	12/17/63 . .	Phong Dinh
	1	12/20/63 . .	Kien Hoa
	6	12/21/63 . .	Chuong Thien
	2	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	46		
Automatic pistol	1	10/19/63 . .	Phan Thiet
Grenades	5		Long An
Rifle cartridges	160,000	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Submachinegun (machine pistol). . .	2	9/23/63 . .	Long Xuyen

III. CZECH ORIGIN

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
7.65-mm. automatic pistol	1	1/2/63 . . .	On person of Viet Cong leader arrested at Phu Yen
K-50 submachinegun	2	11/25/62 . .	Quang Tin
	1	11/29/62 . .	Phuoc Long
	7	4/24/63 . .	Quang Ngai
	5	5/9/63 . . .	Quang Tin
	2	7/11/63 . .	Operation Hau Giang
	3	8/31/63 . .	Quang Ngai
	1	9/8/63 . . .	Dinh Tuong
	1	9/16/63 . .	Long An
	1	10/17/63 . .	Quang Nam
	2	11/13/63 . .	Phu Yen
	1	-----do-----	At Hué
	9	10/8/63 . .	Binh Dinh
	1		Operation Phuoc Binh Thang
	1	12/20/63 . .	Kien Hoa
	1	12/26/63 . .	Chuong Thien
	1	12/17/63 . .	Long Xuyen
Total	40		
Rifles	9	9/10/63 . .	An Xuyen
	1	10/19/63 . .	Chuong Thien
	1	11/6/63 . .	Ba Xuyen
	2	11/9/63 . .	Chuong Thien
	3	11/13/63 . .	Kien Giang
	1	11/17/63 . .	Ba Xuyen
	2	11/26/63 . .	Hau Nghia
	1	12/2/63 . .	Phong Dinh
	6	12/21/63 . .	Chuong Thien
Total	26		

III. CZECH ORIGIN—*Continued*

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
Machinegun cartridges	14,000	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Grenade launcher	1	7/14/63 . .	Long An
3.5 antitank bazooka	1	12/22/63 . .	Din Tuong

IV. (a) WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MODIFIED BY THE
REGULAR ARMY OF NORTH VIET-NAM

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
Modified MAT-49	16	11/25/62 . .	Quang Tin
	2	12/ 5/63 . .	Phu Bon
	6	11/13/63 . .	
Total	24		
12.7-mm. machinegun	2	11/24/63 . .	Operation at Duc Hoa

IV. (b) MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE MANUFACTURE


Uniform		12/21/62 . .	Phuoc Thanh
Helmets	16	10/8-10/63 .	Kien Hoa
Socks	(No number given).	12/21/62 . .	Phuoc Thanh
Sweaters (made in Ha Dong)	do		Do.
Belts (made in Hanoi)	do		Do.
Mess Kits (made in Haiphong)	do		Do.

APPENDIX E

Photos of Captured Viet Cong Weapons and Ammunition From External Communist Sources

(See section II.)

The following are photographs of some of the many weapons and the large stocks of ammunition supplied to the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam from external Communist sources.



A North Vietnamese nautical chart of Haiphong harbor and channel. It was found aboard the North Vietnamese cargo vessel that delivered weapons, ammunition, and other supplies to the Viet Cong. It was sunk by the South Vietnamese Air Force along the coast of Phu Yen Province on Feb. 16, 1965. (For details, see section II, pp. 15-17.)

QUÂN ĐỘI NHÂN DÂN VIỆT NAM
VIỆT NAM DÂN CHỦ CÔNG HÒA
TẠO LẬP: 10-10-1960


SS. 42

GIẤY NGHỈ PHÉP

Họ và tên: Nguyễn Hoàng Long
Quê: Thị trấn
Số: 42
Ngày cấp: 25/9/65
Nơi cấp: Haiphong
Lý do: Đi
Được hoặc không được cấp: Được

Chú thích:
Nơi nghỉ phép, ngày
nghỉ đi, địa phương
nghỉ ở, nơi ở.

Leave slip of a North Vietnamese soldier, Nguyen Hoang Long, found on his body at the site of the sinking of the munitions supply ship in Phu Yen Province. The heading shows he was a member of Unit 1270 of the People's Army of North Viet-Nam. He was on leave in Haiphong (North Viet-Nam) from Sept. 19 to Sept. 25, 1965. Below, a page from the Communist Party record of Sergeant Long, also found on his body, showing he was a soldier of the North Vietnamese army's 338th Division. One notation mentions his being "on missions in distant areas," the phrase used in Hanoi to mean South Viet-Nam.



XI NGHIỆP DƯỢC PHẨM SỐ 2 HÀ-NỘI VIỆT-NAM

Tên thuốc: Indo-Ha-Zol 0.50

Quy cách: 1 hộp x 10 x 10 viên

Số lượng: 200 viên

Số kiểm soát Lô: 6404008

Hội đồng đóng gói: Nhóm việc

Người đóng gói: _____

Ngày 14 tháng 1 năm 1964
Ký tên

Log #2-163-65

A packing slip found in one of the many boxes of military supplies discovered at the site of the sunken North Vietnamese ship in Phu Yen. It shows clearly that the supplies originated in Hanoi. More than 100 tons of weapons and ammunition were found, as well as medicines and other supplies.

BỘ TƯ LỆNH HẢI QUÂN
ĐOÀN 125
Số: 105 / 0

VIỆT NAM HẢI QUÂN
Độc Lập Tự Do Hạnh Phúc
Ngày 12 tháng 11 năm 1964


HUONG DAN

Mục đích yêu cầu và phương pháp
tiến hành xét khen thưởng

Trong năm qua, tuy gặp cảnh sóng gió của chiến tranh và khó khăn phức tạp, nhờ sự cố gắng của các cấp lãnh đạo và cơ quan chuyên môn, nên việc xét khen thưởng kết quả 6 tháng đầu năm 64 đạt được kết quả tốt. Tuy nhiên còn một số khuyết điểm cần rút kinh nghiệm để cứu và kịp thời xử lý như:

- Việc bình chọn, phát hiện và xét khen thưởng còn chậm trễ, chưa giải quyết kịp thời nên hạn chế tác dụng cổ vũ, khuyến khích hăng hái của cán bộ, chiến sĩ.
- Việc luân chuyển giáo dục tư tưởng thì chưa được chú trọng, chưa nêu rõ ràng giúp đỡ trong quân chúng nên xảy ra hiện tượng suy bì, sợ sệt, thiếu phần khen, thậm chí khi phát hiện khen thưởng mà không khen.

Part of a document captured aboard the sunken North Vietnamese munitions supply ship in Phu Yen in February 1965. The heading shows it originated in North Viet-Nam's navy headquarters, Group 125. It carries the notation "K.35" believed to be the designation of the sunken ship or its unit.




Part of the huge supply of Communist weapons and ammunition seized in Phu Yen Province from the Viet Cong Feb. 1965. These are 82 mm. mortar shells made in Communist China.

Chinese Communist PG-2 antitank ammunition. This was part of the more than 100 tons of weapons and ammunition delivered to the Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam and captured from the Viet Cong in Phu Yen Province in Feb. 1965.






A closeup view of the wreckage of the North Vietnamese supply ship sunk off the coast of South Viet-Nam's Phu Yen Province. It had delivered a large supply of arms, ammunition, and other materiel to the Viet Cong.




A Chinese Communist 7.92 mm. heavy machinegun captured from the Viet Cong in An Xuyen in Sept. 1963.




A 200-gram block of Chinese Communist TNT captured at Quang Ngai in Apr. 1962.




North Vietnamese 81 mm. mortar captured in Kontum in Oct. 1960.




Communist Chinese stick grenades, submachineguns, and other weapons captured from the Viet Cong in Quang Tin Province in Nov. 1962.




Chinese Communist 60 mm. mortar shell, one of several picked up after a battle in Phu Yen in July 1963.



Chinese Communist 7.62 mm. carbine seized in Dinh Tuong in Sept. 1963.



Chinese markings on 75 mm. recoilless rifle shells captured at Dinh Tuong in Dec. 1963.



Gun sight of Chinese Communist manufacture. It was mounted on a VC machinegun captured in Long An in Nov. 1963.


APPENDIX F

North Vietnamese Passports and Travel Documents Used by Liberation Front Officials


(See section IV, A, 1.)



Huynh Van Nghia and Nguyen Van Tien are officials of the "National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam." Though they profess to be citizens of South Viet-Nam, their ties are with and their support comes from North Viet-Nam and the Communist regime in Hanoi. In 1963, when the two men traveled abroad on front business, they traveled as North Vietnamese with passports and other documents issued by the Hanoi regime.

Photographs of these documents follow:



Huynh Van Nghia's passport.





APPENDIX G

The People's Revolutionary Party (South) and the Lao Dong Party (North) Are One Communist Party

(See section IV, A.)

In May 1962 a military force of the Government of Viet-Nam captured a number of Viet Cong documents in Ba Xuyen Province. One of these documents contained instructions from the provincial committee of the Lao Dong Party (Communist Party) in Ba Xuyen to the party's district committees concerning formation of the new People's Revolutionary Party (PRP).

Pertinent sections of the instruction, dated December 7, 1961, follow:

To D2 and K,

In regard to the foundation of the People's Revolutionary Party of South Viet-Nam, the creation of this party is only a matter of strategy; it needs to be explained within the party; and, to deceive the enemy, it is necessary that the new party be given the outward appearance corresponding to a division of the party (Lao Dong) into two and the foundation of a new party, so that the enemy cannot use it in his propaganda.

Within the party, it is necessary to explain that the founding of the People's Revolutionary Party has the purpose of isolating the Americans and the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, and to counter their accusations of an invasion of the South by the North. It is means of supporting our sabotage of the Geneva agreement, of advancing the plan of invasion of the South, and at the same time permitting the Front for Liberation of the South to recruit new adherents, and to gain the sympathy of non-aligned countries in Southeast Asia.

The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence; actually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam (Viet-Minh Communist Party), unified from North to South, under the direction of the central executive committee of the party, the chief of which is President Ho. . . .

During these explanations, take care to keep this strictly secret, especially in South Viet-Nam, so that the enemy does not perceive our purpose. . . .

Do not put these explanations in party bulletins. . . .

Another party circular of the same date said:

The reasons for the change in the party's name must be kept strictly secret. According to instructions of the

Central Committee, one must not tell the people or party sympathizers that the People's Revolutionary Party and the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam are one. One must not say that it is only a tactic, because it would not be good for the enemy to know. . . .

A third party circular, dated December 8, 1961, said:

Study the instructions so that you will be able to execute them. In passing them to D2V, D2, and K, be very careful that the documents do not fall into enemy hands. After D2N/C has passed to the sections, destroy the written documents immediately. . . .

The originals and translations of the above documents were submitted to the International Control Commission by the Government of Viet-Nam on May 30, 1962.¹

In 1964 new rules and regulations were promulgated for the People's Revolutionary Party. A copy of the new rules was captured from the Viet Cong in Chuong Thien Province in November 1964. A photograph of the captured document appears on the next page. Key portions of the instructions said that new rules and regulations had been approved for the PRP, "but the real nature of those rules and regulations is that they still are the rules and regulations of the Viet-Nam Lao Dong Party (in North Viet-Nam)."

The instructions added: ". . . we should realize that our country is one country, that the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party and the Viet-Nam Lao Dong Party are one party. . . . There is nothing different between the two parties."

¹ For picture of captured documents and text, see the white paper "Communist Viet Minh Aggressive Policy," published by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Saigon, July 1962.

C H I - T H I

(V E V I E N G T H I H A N H B A N D I N H L E C H I N H T H U O C U A D A N G)

-1-1-1-1-1-

Đã thông qua bản điều lệ Đảng chính thức cho Đảng bộ Việt-Nam nhân dân là "điều lệ Đảng nhân dân cách mạng Việt-Nam" nhưng thực chất vẫn là điều lệ của Đảng lao động Việt-Nam. Đã được R nhứt tizen thành để tiện việc nghiên cứu học tập và thi hành, TVH gần giới thiệu những điểm chính với bản điều lệ dự thảo, ấn định ngay thi hành và 1 số yêu cầu học tập bản điều lệ Đảng chính thức này thế như sau:

1)- Những điểm khác của bản điều lệ chính thức:

Bản dự thảo điều lệ Đảng trước đây gồm có phần cương lĩnh tổng 10 chương 41 điều, còn bản điều lệ Đảng chính thức hiện nay thì có phần tên chỉ mục dịch, 10 Chương chỉ có 39 điều vì có bỏ 2 điều, điều 24 chương 3 và điều 39 chương 8, nhưng nội dung của điều đó vẫn giữ và được lồng vào trong các điều khác.

Nói chung nội dung cơ bản của 2 bản điều lệ về cơ bản không khác nhau nhưng nội dung của bản điều lệ Đảng chính thức mục đích bản và rõ hơn... có 1 số qui định chặt chẽ và hợp lý hơn và có thêm một vài điều dự thảo không có là việc thành lập ban kỷ luật các cấp từ U trở lên, ở đây chỉ nêu lên 1 số điểm chính khác bản dự thảo điều lệ Đảng.

Trong phần cương lĩnh của bản dự thảo thì điều lệ chỉ nói về cương lĩnh đơn giản của Đảng lao động Việt-Nam còn bản điều lệ Đảng chính thức thì nói toàn diện chỉ mục dịch của Đảng ĐNDNVN nhưng phần thứ 1 nói về nước ta là 1, Đảng ĐNDNVN với Đảng lao động VN Nam 1: Đảng ĐNDNVN cũng như Đảng lao động Việt Nam vẫn là chính Đảng của giới cấp công nhân đồng thời đại biểu quyền lợi của nhân dân lao động và quyền lợi của dân tộc... không có gì khác nhau, nhưng ở đây muốn làm rõ hơn vấn đề sách lược, để cho khi học tập nói rõ cho Đảng viên để họ không nhầm lẫn về ĐNDNVN.

Trong phần qui định cụ thể có mấy điểm khác nhau chính như sau:

- Ở Chương I trung, điều 1 của dự thảo nói về điều kiện của người Đảng viên 1 số tất cả những người VN từ 18 tuổi trở lên... có thể công nhận là Đảng viên, còn bản chính thức chỉ nói tất cả người VN... có thể công nhận là Đảng viên. Trong điều 2 nói về nhiệm vụ của người Đảng viên thì bản dự thảo đặt ra 6 nhiệm vụ còn bản chính thức đặt ra 7 nhiệm vụ về cơ bản không có gì khác nhau nhưng có 1 khác là đặt nhiệm vụ tuyệt đối trung thành với Đảng lao động thanh niên hàng đầu. Trong điều năm nói về điều kiện người giới thiệu, thời gian dự bị bản dự thảo những người xin vào Đảng thành 5 loại với điều kiện người giới thiệu và thời gian dự bị ngắn hơn bản chính thức. Bản chính thức gồm những hạng người xin vào Đảng thành 3 loại cho giữa đơn hơn nhưng về điều kiện người giới thiệu thời gian dự


APPENDIX H

Charts of the Viet Cong Organization, North and South

(See section IV.)


Lines of control, political and military, from the Hanoi regime to the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam.

Lines of Control in North Viet-Nam's Direction of Communist Subversion in South Viet-Nam




APPENDIX II- Continued

Organization of the Viet Cong Apparatus - the Central Office for South Viet-Nam



APPENDIX H—Continued

Organization of the Central Research Agency in Hanoi



APPENDIX I

Detail on Viet Cong Terrorism

(See section V.)

The following table lists the Government officials and other civilians killed, wounded, or missing as a result of Viet Cong terrorist activities during 1964. Combat casualties are not included.

VILLAGE, DISTRICT, AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Killed	47	34	49	30	25	31	45	36	46	48	21	24
Wounded	14	16	24	9	8	9	14	15	13	10	22	7
Kidnaped	93	113	91	67	74	132	93	103	144	69	52	100
Total	154	163	164	106	107	172	152	154	203	127	95	131


OTHER CIVILIANS

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Killed	131	110	138	115	105	110	181	103	132	100	66	88
Wounded	116	174	239	218	163	173	194	122	203	90	94	154
Kidnaped	694	590	1,531	647	727	483	964	834	778	477	200	498
Total	941	874	1,908	980	995	766	1,339	1,059	1,113	667	360	740


The following table shows the number of incidents of Viet Cong terrorism, sabotage, forced propaganda sessions, and armed attacks during 1964.

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Attacks	223	217	203	220	175	140	184	113	118	83	60	96
Terrorism	1,234	1,389	1,632	1,738	1,418	1,390	2,123	1,775	1,938	1,790	1,391	1,719
Sabotage	129	201	158	169	217	176	286	315	482	480	247	318
Propaganda	174	271	167	157	140	162	224	173	178	197	109	128

Some of the consequences of Viet Cong terrorism are shown in the accompanying photographs.




Wreckage of a freight train derailed by a Viet Cong mine at Thu Duc, northeast of Saigon, on Jan. 17, 1965. The engine was destroyed and two Vietnamese trainmen were seriously wounded.



The Viet Cong destroyed this railway bridge at Vinh Binh in 1962. The transportation system of Viet-Nam is a favorite VC target.



Vinh Binh village hospital destroyed by Communist terrorist in 1962. The Viet Cong usually seize all medicines for their own use in such attacks.



This bus carried civilian passengers between Kien Binh and Moc Hoa in Kien Tuong Province. On May 3, 1964, it was destroyed by a Viet Cong mine; 14 passengers were killed and 15 were injured. Many of the victims were women and children.